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STRATEGIC WISDOM IN SMALL FIRMS:
Exploring The Chief Executive's Perspective
ABSTRACT
This is a cognitively-oriented, interpretive study of 
strategic managerial knowing and sense-making. It seeks 
to explore qualitatively the experiential, strategic 
knowing or wisdom of the chief executives of two small 
firms, as they guide the development of these firms over 
time and in contexts that they perceive to be both threat 
and opportunity laden.
The study considers how their knowing may plausibly and 
usefully be represented for the purposes of analysis and 
reflection. A variety of analytic approaches are 
employed, drawing on notions of scripts and dualistic 
constructs on one hand, and role-identities derived from 
organization process studies and metaphor constructions 
on the other.
A description of each firm's development path then 
follows, drawing on detailed, tape-recorded conversations 
with its chief executive and his senior colleagues. The 
outlooks and strategic knowing of the chief executives 
are subsequently treated in detail, individually and 
comparatively, providing a multi-faceted interpretation 
of their sense-making.
The study suggests that the two individuals have quite 
different patterns of knowing. Further insights are 
offered in terms of the theoretical approaches used to 
explicate their knowing. Thus the analytic approaches 
developed in the study are considered to be relevant and 
in principle amenable to further useful development.
The study concludes with some reflections on how the 
strategic knowing of these individuals has evolved, the 
relation of personal 'wisdom' and firm strategy, the 
significance of transformational thinking in strategic 
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This study explores the nature of the evolving, 
experiential strategic knowing or wisdom of executives 
and the relation of this knowing to organizational 
viability and development. More specifically, it examines 
how two chief executives in small owned-and-operated 
firms make sense of their firms' strategic development 
and their own contributions thereto. It explores the 
assumptions they make in the particular operating 
contexts of their firms, and how these evolve over time. 
In considering how their knowing develops as they pursue 
organizational effectiveness, the study asks how their 
learning may usefully be represented for the purposes of 
analysis and reflection. Nominally, The work locates in a 
field labelled by Pettigrew (1992) as studies of 
strategic leadership, decision-making and change, a 
subset of research into managerial elites.
For many readers this knowing or expertise is the 
essence of strategic management, where the latter is 
taken to mean executive responsibility for securing the 
long-run viability and direction of the firm under 
conditions of uncertainty. Viability implies not merely 
surviving, but enhancing survivability, extending 
competence in human and organizational terms. This 
process may be synonymous with growth, provided one does
2not interpret growth narrowly as increased scale. Rather,
as Normann (1977, 7) so aptly said:
'...the growth of knowledge or the process of 
knowledge development ...is the central process of 
growth as I interpret it'.
So the aspects of strategic management that are of most
interest here are those enabling experiential knowing or
wisdom to develop.
Chapter 1 refers briefly to salient aspects of 
strategic management, the nature of managerial knowing, 
the small firm perspective, and research implications for 
this study. Chapter 2 explores the literature in more 
depth, identifying a range of cognitive and process 
perspectives on how strategic knowing can be represented 
or mapped. Chapter 3 discusses methodological issues 
relevant to the enquiry, research options, and the chosen 
design. It also explores the concept of cognitive script 
in some depth. Chapters 4 and 5 present the empirical 
findings. Chapter 6 concludes the study by reflecting on 
these findings and their implications for effective 
managerial performance.
1.2 The Nature Of Strategic Management 
Many writers have discussed the multi-faceted character 
of managing complex organizations. Much of their 
considerable and often prescriptive output has been 
treated under the broad heading of leadership studies 
(Czarniawska-Joerges & Wolff, 1991; Pfeffer, 1982; 
Stogdill, 1974). Yet the remarkable growth in the last 
two decades of the literature addressing firm-level
3strategy has by no means resolved the somewhat fuzzy and 
controversial picture of the strategic role of executives 
(McGee & Thomas, 1986: introduction).
A popular definition of strategic management would 
be those executive activities concerned with building 
appropriate bridges between the organizational present 
and a viable future state, enabling and securing the 
firm's longer run survival and prosperity. In Harvey- 
Jones' (1988) terms, one might call this 'setting the 
direction'. Such activities are necessarily performed 
under uncertainty and they require the application of 
intuitive, uncodified knowledge and judgement (Barnard, 
1938? McCaskey, 1982). This suggests that executives need 
periodically to stand back from operational concerns to 
reflect on doing the right things, as opposed merely to 
doing (current) things right (Drucker, 1974: 44). Indeed, 
this distinction underpins the 'strategic management 
paradigm' articulated by Schendel & Hofer (1979).
Pfeffer (1982, 13) distinguished three perspectives 
on executive action, namely (i) prospective, intendedly 
rational (ii) externally controlled or constrained and 
(iii) almost-random, emergent and socially constructed.
He further distinguished two levels of analysis (a) 
individual/local and (b) organizational/global. 
Perspective (i-b) dominates conventional treatments of 
strategic management, the argument being that although 
executives must understand and negotiate with external 
environments, their strategies manifest an intentional, 
quasi-autonomous character with respect to the firm (eg.
4Child, 1972). Thus for many commentators strategic 
management is a proactive process whose tangible outputs 
are variously conceived as organizational decisions, 
plans and programmes for contextual action (ie. strategy 
content or matters for decision: Hickson et. al., 1986; 
Jauch, 1983).
Pennings (1985, intro.) attributed the origins of 
this view of strategy to military science, being 
synonymous with the 'art of war': resource deployments 
aimed at securing overwhelming advantage in the 
strategist's favour. Classical strategy is the enactment 
of plan (grand design) and ploy (tactics) in pursuit of 
position, for security and advantage (Mintzberg, 1988). 
In this perspective strategic action tends to formality, 
relating proposed (intended) initiatives to explicit 
organizational goals and is portrayed as essentially 
analytical (eg. Ansoff, 1965? 1984). Hence, considerable 
efforts have been devoted to applying analytic 
disciplines such as industrial economics, decision 
theory, operations research and financial planning and 
control to support strategic management.
Yet other sources (including Mintzberg, 1978; 
Pettigrew, 1985a? Quinn, 1979? 1980? and Weick, 1987) 
have questioned the separation of the behaviour patterns 
whereby strategic choices emerge from those whereby they 
are realised, especially in an innovating context. An 
alternative characterisation of strategic behaviour, 
then, is an emerging pattern in a stream of unfolding 
events, underpinned by a largely shared, socially-
5constructed vision of what the organization is about, 
promulgated in the ideas, cultural artefacts and actions 
constituting the currency and cumulative experience of 
organizational life (Johnson, 1987, Chs. 7 & 8). By 
implication, strategic expertise encompasses formulation 
through implementation seamlessly and iteratively. Whilst 
proponents of the second view would mostly accept that 
'analytic' strategic knowledge is a legitimate component 
of expertise, it would be considered insufficient for 
anyone aspiring to the status of an effective strategic 
practitioner.
Today the strategy literature acknowledges a variety 
of alternative disciplinary perspectives and is 
increasingly research-driven and cautious in respect of 
its conclusions. Yet the literature offers a paucity of 
we11-documented and systematic insights into how 
practitioners actually think and interpret situations in 
context over time.
Moreover, the experientially-derived aspects of 
strategic knowing have proved relatively unamenable to 
codification. Some sources advance interpretive schemas 
containing alternative models or research 'lenses' to be 
applied according to perceived utility (Allison, 1971? 
Lyles & Thomas, 1988? Morgan, 1986? Whittington, 1993), 
though their ranges of convenience are freguently 
unspecified. Underlying assumptions are also largely 
taken for granted (Brunsson, 1982). For example, in the 
rational analytic planning model of policy making 
(Allison, 1971? Chaffee, 1985) the validity of the twin
6assumptions of intentionality and decision-rationality go 
unchallenged. Even the authors of classic statements 
about 'irrational' organizational choice processes 
(Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972? Cyert & March, 1963? 
Lindblom, 1959? Mintzberg et. al., 1976) have generally 
not challenged the decision metaphor per se.
However, despite a tendency to introduce and apply 
terminology somewhat indiscriminately and inconsistently, 
there appears reasonable agreement that strategic 
organizational issues are important, being characterised 
by and concerned with:
* Long-run organizational viability and development
* Basic purpose or mission of the organization and how 
it is to be achieved
* Sensitivity to environmental potentialities and 
stakeholder expectations
* Continued matching of scarce organizational 
resources to specified activities and initiatives 
(thus defining the scope of the firm)
* Applying interpretation and judgement, not just 
routine, pre-programmed rules of thumb
* Coping with perceived ambiguity, uncertainty and 
risk, arising from complexity, incomplete 
information about unpredictable environments and 
events, and from human cognitive limitations.
Whilst these issues affect executive action throughout an
organization, their problematic and fundamental nature
makes them a natural concern of senior managers,
particularly of chief executives. By the same token,
there is ample scope for executives to demonstrate wide
variations in style and degree of expertise in coping
with strategic issues.
71.3 Strategic Knowing: Experiential Executive Wisdom 
In Britain there has been much recent debate over the 
nature of managerial work, especially the thorny question 
whether it requires the kind of formal qualification 
considered necessary in professions such as medicine and 
engineering. A professional characterisation of 
management implies that particular knowledge and skills 
are best assimilated before as well as during practice, 
creating a cadre of 'chartered' managers. This 
perspective has some currency for example in French 
society.
Yet there remains practical disagreement over what 
managerial expertise comprises and the degree to which 
good practice can be codified and conveyed (Handy et. 
aim, 1988). Even so, probably few people would doubt the 
value of training and management development in the more- 
or-less technical skills of business administration, and 
to enhance interpersonal and organising skills as an 
essential part of executive process (Mangham, 1986).
Administrative skills, arguably, relate to the 
efficient running of the firm under moderate uncertainty 
and as such, require relatively codifiable knowledge. In 
contrast, strategic skills are presumed to be needed 
under conditions of greater uncertainty and over longer 
time scales. These situations require judgement based 
substantially on intuitive, experientially-supported, 
hard-to-codify, even paradoxical knowledge (Agor, 1986? 
Quinn, 1988? Quinn & Cameron, 1988? Torbert, 1987). 
Expressed simplistically, the contrast is between knowing
8that and knowing how. According to Day & Lord (1992), 
experts and novices actually think very differently when 
asked to address the same problematic situations. It 
seems plausible, then, that the development of 
'strategic' expertise depends on gaining insights via 
experience as much, if not more than via formal training. 
Indeed, it seems evident to the writer from contacts with 
chief executives in a number of small firms that one can 
scarcely doubt that their expertise has been forged in 
the 'experiential heat' of enacting leadership roles over 
a number of years.
So an opening assumption of this research is that to 
appreciate something of executives' emerging 'strategic 
wisdom' is a worthwhile venture. Evidence from both the 
workplace and the classroom reinforces the belief that 
however hard it may be to define such knowhow elegantly, 
one can often recognise it in action. So the study sets 
out to explore how chief executives in small firms 
interpret strategic events and conduct, the constructs 
they invoke and how their patterns of thought relate to 
the development of their organizations.
It is therefore relevant to identify the issues 
these chief executives judge to be important (strategic) 
for the long run viability of their firms. The assumption 
made here is that knowing is ultimately subjective? in 
other words, actors will address only the problems they 
perceive, bring to the foreground of their attention and 
enact: Weick (1969). Even in the 'classic' strategy 
literature this idea is accepted to some extent, for
9example when Ansoff (1965) talked of a 'common thread' to 
underpin growth via diversification he accorded, in 
effect, a selective perceptual quality to strategic 
choices. Similar notions were expressed by Mintzberg & 
Waters (1982) and Tregoe et. al. (1989) when referring to 
single-brain gestalts and strategic visions.
Of course, management is ultimately about action. 
Mintzberg (1973a) documented what presumably most chief 
executives would accept, namely that they are generally 
so preoccupied with immediate issues that they appear to 
devote little time to reflective thought. Indeed, Peters 
and Waterman (1982) elevated a 'bias for action' to a 
major prescription for corporate success. Still, it would 
be wrong to infer that executives do not think about the 
future, even if they do not indulge in ivory-tower 
contemplation. To invoke Harvey-Jones again, this study 
is directed to executives' sense of knowing, and of 
knowing what to do next. Thus it seeks to explicate their 
verbalized reflections as they cope with the inherent 
ambiguity of an uncertain future. In particular, it 
considers their sense of their own conduct and priorities 
as encapsulated in the notion of 'role-identity'.
To appreciate something of this knowing, the 
researcher evidently has to try to access the beliefs and 
assumptions of strategic actors, mediated by the 'inner' 
and 'outer' contexts of the firm over time, notably the 
competitive environment and the outlooks of 'significant 
others' in the executive team. Insofar as executives can 
be persuaded to share their thoughts with an outsider,
10
one may seek to engage with them as 'reflective
practitioners' (Schon, 1983), a challenging task since,
as Schon explained, 'reflection-in-action' means
knowledge that is:
'ordinarily tacit, implicit in our patterns of action 
and in our feel for the stuff with which we are 
dealing. It seems right to say that our knowing is in 
our action' (1983, 49).
This construction accords with Polanyi's view of personal
or tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1958; 1969) as it relates to
complex and sophisticated tasks like medical diagnosis.
This study, then, presumes an analogy between
organizational and professional expertise.
Examining the knowing of human actors is 
methodologically problematic. Fortunately, others have 
offered encouragement and precedents in respect of 
strategic beliefs, ranging from relatively structured 
cognitive mapping methods (for which Huff (1990) offers 
an excellent compendium), to more client-centred 
approaches (eg. Mason & Mitroff, 1981; Schein, 1987; 
Schon, 1983). 'Script theory' in the domain of artificial 
intelligence and cognitive psychology also appears to be 
promising (Abelson, 1973).
Given the subjective nature of knowing, it will be 
argued in Chapter 3 that an appropriate mode of enguiry 
is to create rich pictures of a few cases via 
interpretive, loosely-structured interviews. In such 
research, findings rely principally for their validity on 
criteria of relevance, plausibility and insightfulness 
(Archer, 1988, Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Yin, 1984).
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Realistically, they must be treated as exploratory: 
management scholars and executives alike share an 
understandable ignorance of the details of mental 
(re)patterning of complex, problematic knowing. 
Furthermore, it is one thing to be guided by - and to try 
to articulate to others on request - one's theories-of- 
action (Argyris & Schon, 1974) in relatively unambiguous 
contexts like a restaurant or a business meeting, quite 
another to explicate the wisdom developed through guiding 
an organization over many years. Yet capable executives 
evidently enjoy such wisdom and its nature remains a 
fascinating research question.
1.4 The Small Firm Perspective
The writer wanted to explore strategic wisdom in small 
firms not only because it was of personal interest but 
also because it was thought that some of the practical 
research difficulties referred to above would be 
ameliorated by relatively simple organizational contexts. 
So it seems appropriate to acknowledge some perspectives 
on small firms from the relevant literature, albeit one 
must also acknowledge that the latter generally adopts a 
more aggregate level of analysis, in which the firm is 
treated as the proverbial 'black box'.
Small firms manifest a number of distinguishing 
characteristics. After Bolton (1971) a small firm has 
typically been defined as a modestly sized enterprise 
(under 500 employees and £5 million sales turnover, 
though often much smaller), with negligible market share
12
and managed in a personalised way, usually by an owner- 
proprietor who exercises considerable autonomy over its 
strategic direction.
Pitt et. al. (1991) and Bull et. al. (1993) noted 
the large, but volatile populations of small firms in 
most Western European countries. In the U.K. during the 
early 1980s for instance, according to Ganguly & Bannock 
(1985, 31), new firms formed at an average rate of 9% of 
existing stock per annum, but demised almost as rapidly 
(8% of net stock p.a.). Further, whilst small firms 
marginally increased their share of U.K. manufacturing 
employment during the 'enterprise culture' of the 1980s, 
jobs growth was mainly in services (Barber et. al., 1989, 
3) where birth rates were in the range 10-14% of stock 
per annum, and in the south east of England (10.5% of 
stock p.a). Birth rates were lowest in agriculture (3% of 
stock p.a.) and in Northern Ireland (5.6% of stock p.a.). 
To a degree, the recession of the late 1980s has halted 
or reversed some of these trends and the future for small 
firms currently appears problematic.
A small firm is most vulnerable in its early years 
(Harrison & Mason, 1987), though attrition is heavy 
during the first decade of life. Rates of growth and 
profitability are also highest amongst young firms 
(Storey et. al., 1987). By no means all small firms 
sustain high rates of growth, variability being greatest 
among the very small. Many quickly plateau in employment, 
net assets and sales.
13
Statistically speaking, the net balance of births 
and deaths supports the population ecology perspective on 
small firms (Aldrich, 1979; Hannan & Freeman, 1977), in 
which little interest is accorded the executives who 
found and run them. This may help explain why many 
academics feel comfortable with taking the population of 
small firms as the relevant unit of analysis and few make 
direct contact with small firm executives.
A good illustration of this point is provided by 
Amin et. al. (1986) who posited three distinct models of 
small firm population development, demonstrating the 
influence of unigue contextual factors on specific 
aggregate populations. In the so-called Birmingham model, 
deindustrialization and corporate restructuring creates 
'forced entrepreneurship/ as big firms shed peripheral 
low-technology activities which they subsequently buy in 
from local contractors. New small firms are the result of 
industrial decline, and are not a motor for innovation 
and economic regeneration. Rather, they provide large 
firms with a flexible workforce easily expanded or 
contracted in line with changes in demand: thus they 
constitute incremental capacity at low cost and risk 
(Berger and Piore, 1980? Goldthorpe, 1984).
In hindsight one can see that the resurgence of the 
U.K. small firm sector in the 1980s was also associated 
in part with the decline of medium sized firms through 
demise, disaggregation or takeover (Utton, 1984). For 
these reasons, only a modest proportion of small firm 
economic activity has been the result of what one might
14
call autonomous entrepreneurial vision and initiative 
(Fothergill & Gudgin, 1979; Shutt & Whittington, 1987? 
Storey, 1982).
In marked contrast, Amin et. al. argued that in the 
Boston (U.S.A.) model new firms create new, high- 
technology jobs, boosted by proximity to centres of 
academic excellence (Harvard and M.I.T. in the Boston 
case itself), high U.S. Government spending, and ready 
access to venture capital. Founded by highly qualified 
and technologically literate entrepreneurs, these firms 
grow fast and stimulate additional local jobs in low- 
technology manufacturing and the service sector.
Amin et. al.1s third (Bologna, Italy) model features 
clusters of small, flexibly-specialized firms in local 
industrial districts. They are generally found in 
traditional manufacturing sectors like ceramics, knitwear 
and furniture, but they use up-to-date methods and 
compete on efficiency and quality, not low price per se. 
Chains of subcontractors are coordinated informally by 
merchants with external market contacts. This model was 
considered effective because it achieves a 'critical 
mass' of firms which transcend the significance of any 
one.
Goffee & Scase (1987) and Smilor & Gill (1986) also 
emphasised small-firm development as a collective or 
social process within a mixed community or network of 
emerging and well-established firms, having competitive 
and collaborative aspects. One might therefore expect 
successful proprietors to enjoy significant external
15
linkages (Johannisson, 1986), participating in a variety 
of collaborative mechanisms such as the traditional co­
operative (Chaplin, 1982; Cornforth, 1986), franchising 
(Hough, 1982? Stanworth et. al. 1984) and technology 
transfer (Rothwell & Beesley, 1989; Watkins & Horley, 
1986). A wide range of other technical and commercial 
associations may also provide support. Though knowledge 
transfer generally proceeds from the larger to the 
smaller unit, small firms can be sources of innovation 
for big firms (Freeman & Barley, 1990? Oakey, Rothwell & 
Cooper, 1988).
These and other sources (eg. Hitchens & O'Farrell, 
1987? Pitt et. al., 1991) confirm that small firm 
executives cannot escape conditioning by their macro and 
micro environments, in terms of prevailing socio-cultural 
attitudes, formal and experiential learning, the 
availability of relevant skills and resources, and the 
constraints and opportunities deriving from local 
patterns of industrial development. Research in small 
firm management must therefore be sensitive to context 
and prevailing outlooks (c.f. Stanworth & Curran, 1976).
Yet despite the insights to be gained from studying 
aggregate effects, one should not ignore the impact of 
individual proprietors on and their contribution to small 
firms. Some manage seemingly mundane enterprises and once 
a threshold size has been achieved, enhancing the 
prospects of long run viability, they are motivated 
largely by considerations of independence and other, 
idiosyncratic personal goals. Conversely, other small
16
enterprises are highly dynamic (Oakey, 1984), led by 
archetypal entrepreneurs (defined by Garland et. al. 
(1984) as growth, profit and innovation oriented), and 
they sustain high rates of growth for long periods.
The evident contrast between autonomous, proactive 
small firms and subordinate contractors, it is argued, 
serves to underline the importance of personal knowing 
and conduct, especially on the part of their chief 
executives. This is particularly true if they are to 
capitalise on perceived opportunities and ameliorate 
shortcomings in their respective current skills and 
resources. Thus one returns to the nature of strategic 
management in the small firm. The literature is 
ambivalent as to whether - or in what respects - the 
management of small firms parallels that of large ones 
'writ small', or whether small firms present a special 
case, albeit one still informed by obsolete, but durable 
and overly-prescriptive myths (Curran & Stanworth, 1984).
On balance, the small firm literature does not adopt
a strategic management perspective, so that Robinson &
Pearce's (1984) comment that:
'the state of knowledge pertinent to the strategic 
management of small and growing firms is woefully 
inadequate'
remains broadly true. Thus to understand small firm 
strategies and processes, much remains to be done 
(d'Amboise & Muldowney, 1988).
Small firm executives, it is true, tend not to use 
words like strategy when explaining what they do and how 
they make sense of the world. It would be unreasonable to
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expect them to adopt the highly formalised planning 
behaviour of large firms (Robinson et. al.f 1984), but 
this should not lead us to suppose that small-firm chief 
executives have little interest in the long term 
viability of their firms, how so ever they construe their 
role in achieving this goal.
1.5 Implications For Research
The underlying premise of this study is that it is both 
appropriate and feasible to explore how executives in 
small firms make sense of their strategic roles and 
responsibilities, thereby exposing to some degree their 
'strategic wisdom'. There can, no doubt, be a variety of 
research designs appropriate to this end. The suitability 
of an interpretive, exploratory and cognitively-oriented 
approach has been implied, and will be explored in detail 
in Chapter 3.
In this connection the study of small firms offers 
several potential advantages. These are (i) relatively 
straightforward organizational contexts, meaning that the 
influences on the chief executive or proprietor should be 
discernable (ii) the suggestion in the small firm 
literature that executive outlooks will conform to 
reasonably predictable patterns (iii) the managerial 
coalition of 'significant others' with respect to the 
proprietor can be identified and accessed with relative 
ease and (iv) a case-comparative approach within and/or 
across firms (Yin, 1984) is practicable even in a case
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study approach, reducing the uniqueness risk attendant on 
a single instance (see Chapter 3).
To summarise, strategic executive knowing can be 
portrayed as the convergence of a number of influences. 
These are illustrated in Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1
Influences on Executive Knowing
Unfolding path External













notably the knowing of 
significant others in the firm
The knowing of chief executives, it is suggested, is 
complex, being mediated by a number of factors. Their 
accumulating experience is inevitably influenced by their 
enculturation in terms of background and prior work 
experience, the influence of stakeholders in and around 
the firm, and their understanding of the firm's operating 
environment. These are allied to their perceptions of the 
firm's developmental trajectory, appropriate personal and 
organizational goals, and available directions for 
achieving these over time.
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In principle one can explore this knowing directly 
with such individuals, and indirectly via the testimony 
of influential colleagues in the firm, in the light of 
known environmental and organizational circumstances.
Executive knowing can be represented and explored in 
a variety of forms, some of which will be reviewed in 
Chapter 2. These approaches open multiple 'windows' onto 
the subject. Of course, one does not claim that in so 
doing the totality of their knowing will be revealed. 
Still, the aim here is to provide a rich, detailed and, 






2.1 Knowing And Experience
Chapter 1 introduced the idea of reflective practitioners 
whose generally tacit knowing of the executive task has 
been portrayed as theories of action (Argyris & Schon, 
1974). These knowledge structures are implicit, construed 
by individuals in order to act. Theories are abstract 
mental models, belief systems constructed from the 
perceived realities of actors' organizational worlds and 
salient prescriptions for coping therein.
The focus of this chapter is the sense-making of 
chief executives in respect of the complexity and 
ambiguity surrounding (and perhaps subverting) the long- 
run viability of their firms. The aim is to define 
research mechanisms suitable for elaborating and 
analysing their tacit knowing in this domain. One can 
then try to address the nature of strategic knowing and 
how it develops and becomes wisdom as the individual 
learns.
Two routes will be explored. The first draws on the 
literature of cognitive psychology and related fields, 
the second on the literature of organizational process. 
Three proposed ways of illuminating the strategic task as 
perceived in particular cases are the elaboration of (i) 
experientially-derived scripts (ii) seemingly paradoxical 
conflicts of priority and (iii) robust role conceptions
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deriving from an executive's assumptions about the nature 
of managing in organizations.
Knowledge structures have variously been termed 
world views (Mannheim, 1936), personal construct systems 
(Kelly, 1955); frames (Goffman, 1974), cognitive maps 
(Axelrod, 1976), schemata or scripts (Schank & Abelson, 
1977) and linguistic codes (Huff, 1990). Other 
potentially useful terms include identities and 
orientations.
Exposing tacit managerial knowledge for subsequent
'treatment' is a major concern of clinicians and action-
researchers (Clark, 1972? Jones, 1987? Mason & Mitroff,
1981; Revans, 1980? Schein, 1987), in which they attempt
jointly with the client to identify functional aspects of
the latters' tacit knowing and mitigate what is (agreed
to be?) dysfunctional. But a vexing property of tacit
knowing is that, according to Polanyi (1958, 140), it:
'... is indeterminate, in the sense that its content 
cannot be explicitly stated', hence 'we know more than 
we can tell and more than our behaviour consistently 
shows'.
Much theoretical discussion has centred on 'knowing 
how', or performative knowledge of particular domains of 
competence such as riding a bicycle or making a medical 
diagnosis, and how such knowing diffuses (eg. the 
capability to produce a new scientific device such as a 
laser: Collins, 1974). A good deal of professional and 
executive knowing is evidently performative (Mangham, 
1987; Schon, 1983). Torbert (1987) has argued that 
executive expertise lies on a continuum, with strategic
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expertise at the pinnacle of human potential. Strategic 
organizational knowing differs qualitatively from knowing 
how to manage a meeting or ride a bicycle. It is 
concerned with ends as well as means, and it generally 
adopts a longer time horizon. By analogy, one might say 
it is no longer concerned with balancing the bicycle, 
rather with setting directions and avoiding obstacles 
after balance has been mastered. One would expect 
strategic knowing to manifest intentionality and a 
concern for the future, hence for what is still ambiguous 
and unfamiliar (McCaskey, 1982? Pondy et al, 1988). Hence 
it requires and benefits from considerable reflection and 
judgement (Vickers 1965).
The assumption that executive expertise is analogous 
to that of so-called professionals is not universally 
accepted (Mintzberg, 1991). But in the absence of 
disconfirming data it seems reasonable to suppose that 
the knowing of experienced executives shares 
characteristics of coherence and pattern similar to that 
of other professionals. Equally, strategic knowing 
parallels more prosaic knowing in that it derives from 
experience and practice. It is not inherent, it must be 
acquired, accumulated and refined in action. One might 
expect strategic knowing to become well-entrenched and 
thus to resist revision (Johnson, 1987).
It is generally accepted that the knowing of an 
actor is structured and conditioned by experience. As 
Argyris and Schon (1974) said:
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'All human beings - not only professional 
practitioners - need to become competent in taking 
action and simultaneously reflecting on this action 
to learn from it' (1974, 4).
The wisdom encapsulated in this knowing and learning
process forms the:
'theories of action that determine all deliberate 
human behaviour'.
Research suggests that pragmatic human actors aspire to
useful, interpretive heuristic theories. Our knowing,
manifest as a skill or competence, comprises our ability
to make sense of the particulars of a situation in terms
of a coherent, recognisable pattern and hence establish a
sound basis for action.
For example, a physician is expected to recognise 
symptoms and synthesise them into a coherent diagnosis.
In making judgements of this kind she exhibits focal and 
subsidiary awareness. This property of knowing directs 
attention to what past experience indicates is relevant, 
what is construed therefore as significant and having 
priority. Pattern recognition is evidently facilitated by 
experience. Insofar as it leads to closure (convergence), 
it legitimises some actions and precludes others. Of 
course, a pattern may be read into ambiguous symptoms 
which subseguent outcomes disprove? hence function 
contains the seeds of potential dysfunction.
Experienced or expert knowing is personal - in the 
sense that it resides in the brain of the individual - 
but it must be externalised if it is to generate 
organizational action. The extent to which knowing is 
actually shared is a matter of circumstances. Even though
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the diagnostic processes of expert physicians may be 
tacit (especially in the early stages of an event cycle) 
the clinical/surgical team must know and accept the 
diagnosis and its implications in order to take 
appropriate remedial action.
Theories of professional and organizational 
enculturation suggest that a major source of actors' 
experience is their exposure to prevailing norms of 
outlook and behaviour in and around the organization.
Such collective beliefs, informing and informed by 
behaviour, have been variously termed paradigms (Kuhn, 
1970; Johnson, 1987), logics-of-action (Hickson et. al., 
1986? Karpik, 1972), ruling myths (Hedberg & Jonsson, 
1977), frames of reference (Loveridge, 1990 ? Shrivastava 
& Mitroff, 1983); recipes (Grinyer & Spender, 1979; 
Spender, 1980, 1989) and (professional) ideologies 
(Beyer, 1981). Actors become aware of - and notionally 
come to share - core beliefs and assumptions about the 
world of the organization, how it works and how it should 
work. Everyday contacts promulgate taken-for-granted and 
context-specific knowing which complements and may over­
ride personal, idiosyncratic beliefs. Senior executives 
and professional status people generally are not immune 
to such influences, indeed they are likely to be active 
in their promulgation.
Theories-of-action are in principle both descriptive 
and orientating (normative), as exemplified in the quote:
'...their logic of action may be to press continually
for innovation' (Hickson et. al., 1986, 13).
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Influential theories predispose actors in favour of some 
outlooks over others, legitimise some conclusions and 
deny others. Less obvious, but still important, is the 
emergence of opposing theories which may generate 
tensions and disputes from their apparently conflicting 
inplications. How these are reconciled in practice is 
clearly a crucial issue.
Senior executives are particularly significant 
because their personal theories of action, mediating and 
mediated by the prevailing organization paradigm, are 
instrumental in making sense of past, present and 
anticipated organizational events. Salient assumptions or 
constructs from their theories prompt actions judged 
appropriate to cope with events and shape future 
directions. Understanding more about the nature of this 
knowing will therefore shed light on the nature of 
strategic competence. The following sections explore a 
number of perspectives on how such knowing may be 
systematically uncovered and represented.
2.2 Knowledge Representation as Cognitive Structures 
It remains something of an open question whether human 
cognitive processing creates understanding primarily by 
construing elemental propositions which are then 
integrated into a meaningful holistic pattern, or whether 
the mind intuits overall patterns from which particular 
constructs are subsequently educed. Recent cognitive 
research supports the view that processing majors on 
intermediate levels of generality or abstraction and
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proceeds quite flexibly up and down a knowledge hierarchy 
(Neisser, 1987? Rosch, 1977).
The internal workings of the mind are not the point 
of this enquiry. What is germane, however, is that 
alternative hypotheses suggest relevant and differing 
aspects of knowing, each of which can be used to inform 
an empirical study. Specifically, theories-of-action can 
be represented as sets of personal (dualistic) constructs 
(after Kelly, 1955), operational patterns or templates- 
for-action, drawing on frames and script theory (after 
Abelson, 1973? Minsky, 1977), or intuitive metaphoric 
gestalts (MacCormac, 1985? Morgan, 1980).
2.2.1 Knowing as dualistic constructs 
George Kelly argued that individuals make sense of 
(construe) the world of their experience by internalising 
a set of personal constructs - the construct system - 
(Bannister & Mair, 1968? Kelly, 1955). These help the 
knower to interpret the past and present, and to 
anticipate future events. They are invoked according to 
contextual utility, that is, they have a perceived range- 
of-convenience. Though individuals differ in their 
construction of events, to the extent that they have 
similar outlooks (common psychological processes and 
shared experiences), their constructions will be socially 
mediated and convergent.
Grinyer & Spender (1979) and Spender (1989) drew 
directly on Kelly's personal construct theory to 
formulate a view of shared theories-of-action or recipes.
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In their view elemental constructs cohere as an overall 
theory widely recognised in an industry arena. To explain 
the complexity of the organization and its environment, 
actors subscribe to propositions (including causal 
relationships) about this world. Spender's empirical work 
on the influence of the sectoral 'cognitive arena' has 
been supported by others (Calori et. al., 1992; Huff, 
1982? Child & Smith, 1987). At the firm level Johnson 
(1985) elaborated the recipe as two kinds of beliefs: 
frame constructs, mostly descriptive propositions about 
the firm's external environment and competitive position, 
and formulae, normative propositions about perceived 
'strategic best-practice' for the firm.
What has not perhaps been emphasised by these 
researchers is that for Kelly, a construct affirmed an 
intrinsic dichotomy or opposition. In formal logic black 
assumes meaning when opposed to not-black, whereas 
psychologically most people construe not-black as white, 
a useful, but particular instance of not-black. Polar 
dichotomization enables the construction of a cognitive 
continuum of meanings. Despite this, it has been 
suggested that an actor's sense-making tends at a given 
moment to emphasise, favour or prioritise one pole of a 
dualism over the other. At another moment the reverse may 
be true, signifying a so-called slot-change (Bannister & 
Mair, 1968).
Psychological oppositions are useful in everyday 
sense-making as devices for coping with complexity and 
ambiguity. In so doing, actors construe oppositions or
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dualisms which are personal and idiosyncratic, 
germinating the seeds of paradoxical or contradictory 
thinking (Ford & Backoff, 1988? McCaskey, 1988). For 
example, a construct defined by opposing black with 
consciousness might seem paradoxical, but could make 
sense to someone who equates blackness with 
unconsciousness, an equation that could be meaningful to 
someone who is afraid of the dark.
Kelly proposed ordinal relationships among 
constructs and a tendency towards internal consonance. A 
finite cluster or subset (typically 15-20 constructs) 
from a large array, he argued, establishes temporary 
closure of the system, enabling sense-making sufficient 
unto the immediate need. Closure implies judgements about 
relevance, sufficiency and priority. A closed system 
becomes problematic beyond its perceived scope, so one 
would expect multiple theories to be applied serially as 
the context changes. Accepting the limited scope of a 
theory is a mental strategy for coping with ambiguity? 
for instance, concurrent wave and particulate theories of 
light are widely accepted by and present few conceptual 
problems for most modern scientists, even though their 
concurrency is unquestionably paradoxical (Kuhn, 1970).
Spender argued that commonly accepted industry 
recipes also manifest closure around salient constructs, 
though he contended that shared industry beliefs are 
persistent rather than temporary. Brunsson's (1982) 
evidence was that shared, ideological beliefs are 
actually highly resistant to modification or rejection.
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This amounts to collective 'tunnel vision' (Hedberg, 
1981, 13, citing Schroder et. al., 1967). However, 
Chaffee (1985) invoked Boulding's (1956) notion of 
requisite variety to suggest that skilled executives 
avoid this trap by thinking beyond conventional bounds.
Be that as it may, it seems plausible that a
personal theory-of-action is somewhat fluid, dynamic and
permeable, as its knower interacts with the world at
large. It evolves as he learns (acquires experience),
adding new constructs, and modifying or discarding
others, ensuring that the set stays finite and
functional, for:
'A personal construct system is not a collection of 
treasured and guarded hallucinations...(it) is a 
theory being put to perpetual test' (Bannister & 
Fransella, 1980, 24).
Festinger (1957) and Salancik (1982) argued that
actors adopt beliefs which are not only internally-
consistent, but consonant with their behaviour because
dissonance-reduction is a powerful motivator. A dynamic
and influential theory-of-action legitimises and remains
consonant with evolving behaviour. But here one must
distinguish espoused theory,
'...the theory of action to which (an actor) gives 
allegiance and which on request he communicates to 
others'
from the
'theory that actually governs his actions...his 
theory-in-use' (Argyris & Schon (1974, 7).
Actors especially in organizational contexts have the
capacity to espouse positions inconsistent with their
behaviour, either consciously and perhaps deceitfully,
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unreflectively, or simply as a consequence of a wide 
range of cognitive limitations and biases (Barnes, 1984? 
Janis, 1972? 1985? Schwenk, 1984? 1985? 1986? Staw, 1976? 
1981? Sutherland, 1992? Whyte, 1986). So empirical 
research into executives' personal knowing must consider 
to what extent espoused theories are congruent with 
theories-in-use inferred from personal actions and 
organizational strategies.
To summarise, a theory-of-action posited as a set of 
dualistic constructs offers one route to represent an 
actor's knowing, particularly in respect of the tensions 
or dilemmas generated in the process of sensemaking.
Since strategic management is typically concerned with 
ambiguous, paradoxical issues, dualisms may be 
particularly relevant in this respect. Practically, this 
means inferring a set of context-specific dualisms from 
the actor's language of exposition, his actions and from 
the strategies of the firm. In addition, one would look 
for the emergence of new constructs over time, changes to 
the particularity or referential focus of constructs and 
the possible significance of slot changes.
2.2.2 Knowing as frames or scripts
Since the late 1950s doubts have been expressed by some
researchers over learning as:
'basically a bottom-up process of manipulating 
atomistic features', even though this notion has 
'displayed.... staying power' (McCauley, 1987: 289).
Influential current views of cognitive processing
emphasise that an actor imputes meaning to an idea as
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much by what it is not, as by what it is, which implies 
comparison and categorisation. The hypothesis of 
categorically and hierarchically structured knowledge is 
now widely accepted (Neisser, 1987), though research has 
refuted categorisation based on criteria of necessary and 
sufficient attributes. The notion of clear, unambiguous 
categories has given way to the notion of fuzziness 
(Zadeh, 1965), which implies criteria of representative­
ness, meaning typicality or exemplarity (Medin & 
Wattenmaker, 1987? Rosch et. al., 1976? Rosch, 1977;
Rosch & Mervis, 1975).
Research by Rosch and co-workers on typicality 
suggested that some levels of construct abstraction are 
generally perceived as more typical or fundamental than 
others. Rosch cited the example of tool (a superordinate 
construct), hammer (intermediate) and claw hammer 
(subordinate), with the intermediate level having 
prototypical utility (1977, 215). Porac et. al., (1987) 
reached a similar conclusion over executives' 
constructions of competitor types, though they posited 
five levels. The middle levels of the taxonomic hierarchy 
apparently enabled their respondents to make the clearest 
differentiations between competitor attributes. Thus, an 
actor is thought to structure descriptive knowledge in a 
loose categorical hierarchy in which intermediate levels 
of particularity have the greatest perceived utility.
Others have emphasised the organization of knowledge 
into prototypical structures variously labelled schemas, 
frames or scripts (Rumelhart & Norman, 1985; Minsky,
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1977). Minsky hypothesized that referential knowledge is 
contained in descriptive frames comprising slots or 
pigeon-holes which accept a limited variety of input 
values. A dog is invariably a mammal, but it can be 
brown, black or white. Some slots have default values: 
without information to the contrary, we assume a dog has 
four legs. So frames condition actors' expectations, 
helping to make sense of future observations. According 
to Johnson-Laird & Wason (1977, 342) default values are 
prototypical, thus a frame comprising an array of default 
values is a Roschian prototype: a prototypical bird has 
feathers, flies, sings, and lays eggs in a nest.
Some sources (cf. Medin & Ross, 1989) have advanced 
the case for a cognitive model or script based on 
exemplars (useful analogues) rather than prototypes (more 
analytical, but less pragmatic abstractions). This may 
influence our view of the content and range of 
convenience of a particular script but is less likely to 
affect its validity in principle as a representational 
model.
In a script-based view of knowing, then, actors 
acquire and structure knowledge in inference-facilitating 
frames or schemas. Lakoff (1987, 397) called these 
phenomena 'prototypical scenarios'. The approach has been 
used in artificial intelligence studies to program 
computers to simulate human cognition, of which the well- 
known 'restaurant script' is a good example (Schank & 
Abelson, 1977). Abelson (1973, 295) defined a script as:
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'a sequence of themes involving the same set of 
actors, with a change in interdependencies from each 
theme to the next? an evolving 'story' of the 
potentially changing relationships of actors.'
As will be explored later, he proposed that themes have a
nested, multi-level sub-structure decomposable down to
very basic elements.
A valuable characteristic of cognitive scripts is 
their capacity to guide behaviour by reference to encoded 
prototypical situations (the protoscript: Gioia & Poole,
1984). They are scenarios whose default assumptions are 
appropriate expectations and responses to common 
situations. The 'restaurant script' is a well-defined, if 
stylised script. This does not diminish its utility 
because, in learning from our experience of restaurants, 
we generate particularized sub-scripts to suit unfamiliar 
restaurant contexts. Most of us learned to expect a 
restaurant to serve food on plates and provide cutlery. 
The first visit to a McDonald's hamburger restaurant 
probably caused dissonance between expectation and 
observed reality. Our restaurant script required 
modification, but once done, we happily invoke the 
'McDonald's restaurant' sub-script in context.
Gioia & Poole (1984) called these strong scripts 
because they are quite specific and detailed. Lord & 
Kernan (1987) suggested that strong scripts encode both 
goals and multiple paths or strategies for achieving them 
(means-ends structures). Low level goals (ends) become 
the means by which high level goals are achieved. Scripts 
also encode sequence, since low level goals must be 
achieved in advance of high level goals.
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A script, then, is a mental model of appropriate 
behaviour adaptable to a putatively recognisable 
situation. Because it encodes prototypical knowledge - 
including precedents and analogies - it permits inference 
or gap-filling, allowing the actor to proceed beyond 
description to prescription. Empirical studies of young 
children suggest that scripts are useful representations 
of how humans acquire and activate knowledge (Fivush, 
1987). But it would stretch credibility to suppose that 
adults internalise an infinite variety of scripts. It is 
more plausible that they internalise a finite ensemble of 
varying generality and applicability.
Actors in organisations have been said to rely on a 
repertoire of tried and tested scripts or routines 
(Johnson, 1987? Nelson & Winter, 1982? Pettigrew, 1985b? 
Spender, 1989). Consistent with their patterning quality, 
Spender's (1989) account of shared, prescriptive recipes 
noted that:
'The essence of the recipe is more in the way its 
elements come together and synthesize into a coherent 
rationality than in the particular elements 
themselves' (1989, 194).
Well-entrenched frames resist challenges over long
periods because as Minsky (1977) said:
'We can think of a frame as describing an ideal. If 
an ideal does not match reality because it is 
'basically' wrong, it must be replaced. But it is the 
nature of ideals that they are really elegant 
simplifications? their attractiveness derives from 
their simplicity...we need not abandon an ideal... 
provided one can explain (excuse) the discrepancy.,.'
In ambiguous situations sense-making is predicated 
as heuristic pattern-matching, evaluating goodness of fit
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of new circumstances with trusted scripts, albeit amended 
as perceived necessary to cope (Gioia & Poole, 1984? Lord 
& Kernan, 1987). Failure to make sense of a situation 
with a familiar script creates uncertainty. One response 
is to invoke a script characterized by more abstract, 
generalised guiding themes and purposes (as implied by 
terms like master or metascript). If recourse to the 
metascript aids interpretation, a more particular script 
can then be developed from the more abstract level, or in 
extreme an entirely new script may emerge.
Much remains speculative about the mechanisms of 
improvisation on an existing script, as well as the 
processes of script creation and substitution. A 
dramaturgical analogy (Goffman, 1959; Mangham, 1987? 
Mangham & Overington, 1983? 1987) highlights the fact 
that although scripts are usually pre-specified and quite 
stylised, the quality of their implementation draws 
substantially on the interpretive and improvising skills 
of the actors. The dramaturgical analogy also emphasises 
the performative stimulus of a good script (cues for 
individual and collective action), and its status as a 
shared, orienting schema defining roles for the actors 
on-stage and off (the director, sound and lighting 
technicians, producer, agents and of course the 
audience).
Though intuitively attractive to apply the script 
notion to interpretive strategic thinking, Gioia & Poole 
sounded a cautionary note, arguing that novel situations 
require weak or elastic scripts, allowing considerable
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scope for interpretation, whilst wholly ambiguous
circumstances stimulate unscripted behaviour (1984, 454).
Invoking an appropriate script in a novel situation is
certainly not a trivial task, for as Schon (1983, Ch. 2)
noted, the 1problem7 must first be defined:
'In real world practice, problems do not present 
themselves to the practitioner as givens. They must 
be constructed from the materials of problematic 
situations which are puzzling, troubling, and 
uncertain. In order to convert a problematic 
situation to a problem, a practitioner must... make 
sense of an uncertain situation that initially makes 
no sense....
When we set the problem, we select what we will treat 
as the "things” of the situation, we set the 
boundaries of our attention to it, and we impose upon 
it a coherence which allows us to say what is wrong 
and in what direction the situation needs to be 
changed. Problem setting is a process in which, 
interactively, we name the things to which we will 
attend and frame the context in which we will attend 
to them. (1983, 39-40)'
Schon does not call this problem-setting activity
strategic, but it is an appropriate label insofar as
strategic thinking defines the context in which routine
problem-solving takes place. When the future is perceived
as unproblematic, reflection may be minimal, whereas
uncertain or problematic situations may receive much
reflection as the actor attempts to frame or reframe
unclarified concerns. The capacity to invoke a wide range
of tacit scripts in this process is an obvious indication
of experience.
A significant aspect of strategic thinking is 
often said to be its cumulative nature, the unravelling 
of a thread of coherence underpinning what the 
organization is and is to be (Mintzberg, 1978,
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Mintzberg & Waters, 1982? Pettigrew, 1985a). It is 
tempting to view this process as the reframing of 
essential ideas and values in the executive's 
masterscript for the organization. However, Bartunek
(1988), Hedberg & Jonsson (1977), Hedberg (1981),
McCaskey (1982? 1988) and Mintzberg & Waters (1983) are 
all agreed that something has to be rejected or 
unlearned before a new image or frame can be focussed,
'tearing down obsolete mental maps and starting
anew',
to quote Hedberg. This second-order or deutero learning 
(Bateson, 1972) is unlike the incremental updating of 
scripts to encompass new, but unproblematic situations 
(the McDonald's variant of the restaurant script, for 
instance).
Whilst the incubation of ideas for change may seem 
slow, frame substitution manifests the quality of a 
sudden gestalt shift, post hoc becoming identified with a 
discontinuity in the organization's development path 
(Mintzberg, 1978? Miller & Friesen, 1980? Tushman et. 
al., 1986). Radical reframing implies the need for actors 
to entertain seemingly contradictory or paradoxical 
outlooks concurrently. To view situations and issues from 
opposing perspectives is exceedingly problematic, 
requiring creative, Janusian thinking (Bartunek, 1988? 
McCaskey, 1988). This proposition in turn directs 
attention to the use of metaphor as a device for 
knowledge representation (section 2.3.1).
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To recapitulate, theories of typicality suggest that 
human knowledge can usefully be represented as self- 
contained cognitive packages or scripts. Scripts encode 
exemplary or prototypical assumptions and expectations, 
with descriptive and normative implications. A script's 
value lies in its status as a pattern-forming entity more 
than as a set of constructs.
The scope of a particular script is limited by de 
facto assumptions about its range-of-convenience. Generic 
scripts emphasise overarching goals and subsume 
particular ones. An element of 'fuzziness' permits a 
script to be used in somewhat unfamiliar situations and 
facilitates analogies with the past experience it 
encodes. Thus it provides a functional, albeit imperfect 
template for future action. Its use will be dysfunctional 
when subtle, but potentially significant distinctions are 
ignored (Gioia & Poole, 1984). Though a script can 
accommodate incremental revisions, a major environmental 
or other upheaval may cause it to be supplanted in a 
gestalt or revolutionary manner.
This study seeks to explore executive knowing in the 
form of scripts, the practicality of which is addressed 
in more detail in Chapter 3, drawing on Abelson (1973).
2.3 Executive Knowing as Conceptions of 'Role-Identity' 
Section 2.2 proposed cognitive structural approaches to 
representing executive strategic knowing. The script is 
an apparently utilitarian model that might provide the 
knower with few imaginative insights. But as Gioia &
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Poole (1984) noted, there is an implicit 'as-if-like' or 
metaphoric aspect to applying a known script to a new 
situation. In his discussion of shared scripts or 
recipes, Spender (1989) also acknowledged a creative 
contribution to managerial judgement under uncertainty. 
Scripts and metaphors both draw on categorisation and 
prototypicality (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1987).
So they provide complementary insights into personal 
strategic knowing. Specifically, one may represent the 
knowing of individuals via metaphoric descriptions of 
role-identity germane to the firm's context over time.
Here, role-identity is a synoptic label for the 
concept of 'what I believe I am, why I'm here and what 
I'm trying to do', or as McCall & Simmons (1966) defined 
it: 'the character and role that an individual devises 
...as an occupant of a particular social position'. Thus, 
like scripts, role-identities engender a sense of 
purpose, indeed imply and legitimise behavioural 
predispositions perceived as consonant with context, 
especially in occupational settings where identity is 
significantly a function of what people do, not just what 
they are (Stryker, 1987). Here, however, in addition to 
considering role-identity metaphorically, we will draw on 
process theories of management, notably in small firms.
2.3.1 Knowing as metaphoric images of role-identity 
An important aspect of a metaphoric, interpretive 
framework of personal knowing is its synthesizing 
quality. According to Polanyi, such a framework becomes
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'the centre of (the knower's) focal attention' (1958,
61). Knowing directs attention from the peripheral to the 
central, from the constituent parts to the overall 
pattern or essence, from background to foreground 
(Pettigrew, 1988).
Barnard (1938) described and advocated holistic
executive thinking, by which he meant the:
'sensing of the organization as a whole and the total 
situation relevant to it' (1938, 235).
He argued that skilled executives combine logic and
intuition, executive process being:
'...essentially one of analysis...(but) in practice 
much of the process will be intuitive... (1938, 201) 
.... (it) ....transcends the capacity of mere 
intellectual methods... a matter of art rather than 
science... aesthetic rather than logical (1938,
235)....not intellectual ....  (but) aesthetic and
moral... its exercise involves the sense of fitness, 
of the appropriate..... (1938, 257).'
In a similar vein Hedberg & Jonsson (1977) posited 
the notion of ruling myth: a potent, symbolic, shared 
image that informs and constrains executives. When 
integrated into the cultural assumptions of the 
organization it legitimise roles and postures; it 
provides cues for action and has great motivational 
power. Prahalad & Bettis (1986) discussed a similar 
notion they called dominant logic.
Yet a myth or logic simplifies and perhaps distorts, 
even as it promote a truth. If, as likely, it becomes 
relatively inaccessible to critigue, it encourages 
conformity? worse, those subscribing to a resilient myth 
are prone to ignore disconfirming or 'aberrant' data. So 
a myth can become increasingly dysfunctional, requiring
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explicit challenge before it is displaced, A number of 
sources (eg. Brunsson, 1982? Hedberg & Jonsson, 1977? 
Starbuck, 1982) have equated strategic organizational 
change with transformation or overthrow of the ruling 
myth.
Cognitive science research (Lakoff, 1987? MacCormac,
1985) helps explain this observation by noting that human 
actors reconfigure their mental images abruptly, after 
the form of gestalt shifts. Schon (1963a) and others (eg. 
Gentner, 1982? Leatherdale, 1974) argued that this 
process, to use Schon's term 'displacement of concepts', 
is the key to creativity and innovativeness. New images 
enable, just as cliched images hinder innovation and 
change. Analogy and metaphor appear to play a significant 
cognitive role for, according to Martin & Harre (1982), 
metaphors enrich otherwise utilitarian thinking, they 
should not be decried as 'mere flights of fancy' (Lakoff 
& Johnson, 1980).
Nonetheless, personal imaginings will influence 
organizational action only if externalised and shared, as 
implied by the ruling myth. This is likely to be a 
significant executive priority, consciously or otherwise. 
As Pettigrew (1979, 578) noted of entrepreneurs in 
particular:
'Visions with a simple yet ambiguous content, 
expressed in symbolic language...are not only likely 
to be potent consciousness raisers but also flexible 
enough to survive and thereby validate events. If 
visions are to be used by an entrepreneur as a potent 
mechanism for directing and influencing others the 
language contained within the vision is crucial.
Visions may contain new and old terminology, 
sometimes using metaphors and analogies to create
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fresh meanings. Words can provide energy and raise 
consciousness. The capacity to use the full power of 
words - to make words walk - I suspect is one of the 
unexplored characteristics of successful 
entrepreneurs'.
Morgan (1986) also emphasised the importance of
metaphoric thinking in the processes of organizational
sensemaking and interpretation:
'Effective managers... have to become skilled in the 
art of 'reading' the situations that they are 
attempting to organize or manage....If we take a 
closer look at the processes used...we find...an 
ability to develop deep appreciations of the 
situations being addressed. Skilled (executives).... 
are aware...that new insights often arise as one 
reads a situation from 'new angles' and that a wide 
and varied reading can create a wide and varied range 
of action possibilities....
The basic premise ... is that our theories and 
explanations of organizational life are based on 
metaphors that lead us to see and understand 
organizations in distinctive yet partial ways' (1986, 
11/12).
In suggesting that effective executives subscribe to 
myths or theories conveyed in a metaphoric or visionary 
style yielding potentially novel, transformational 
insights, Pettigrew and Morgan contribute to a growing 
literature on the role of language, ideology and myth in 
shaping organization affairs (Daft & Wiginton, 1979? 
Martin, 1982? Pondy, 1978? 1983). To decode and transmit 
meanings, executives must become skilled at 'reading' 
metaphors, a patently interpretive process (Kets de Vries 
& Miller, 1987)? Manning, 1979? Daft & Weick, 1984? Daft 
& Wiginton, 1979).
For Jeffcutt (1983) metaphoric imagery was a major 
sense-making device with 'explanatory and predictive 
validity'. Further, as Shrivastava & Mitroff (1983) said, 
the use of
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'metaphors embedded in the language and the jargon of 
organizational decision-making7...
promote collective meaning and in so doing...
'...go beyond being mere embellishments of language 
by stimulating the understanding of assumptions 
through a creative process of comparison and crossing 
of images.7
Whether or not she recognises it, one aspect of the 
role-identity of a chief executive vis a vis colleagues 
is arguably that of teacher; promulgating rich metaphoric 
images is germane to this role because communication 
skills have been related to representational ability 
(Wilson et. al., 1987).
All these sources, then, point to the contribution
of metaphor to knowing, especially in the domain of the
ambiguous and complex. As Lakoff (1987, 303) put it,
'Metaphor provides us with a means for comprehending 
domains of experience ...(without) a preconceptual 
structure of their own...(and is) one of the great 
imaginative triumphs of the human mind.7
Distinctively, a metaphoric image is not tightly-defined
and conceptually exclusive? rather, its influence resides
in its synthesizing and holistic qualities. But since
there can be no indisputable, objective test of the
aptness of a metaphor, it may promote action despite or
perhaps because of persisting ambiguity over its
implications. In sustaining ambiguities strong metaphors
do not merely obfuscate. Rather, according to Pondy
(1983), metaphor is a device by which ideas signify and
facilitate the articulation of new organizational
directions and priorities. For MacCormac (1985, 2),
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metaphors produce insights and new hypotheses without 
which knowledge could not develop.
Formally a metaphor is a trope (style of discourse) 
of resemblance. It can be a single word or a complex 
analogical construction. It encodes a relational style 
where idea X (tenor) is construed as if Y (vehicle), 
implying that X has Y-like qualities: 'In combat he was a 
tiger'. In more complex formulations metaphor conveys an 
expressive non-literal comparison of the form X:Y :: A:B, 
where the X:Y correspondence draws on the correspondence 
A:B (Gentner, 1982: 107).
Incongruence between the domains of the X and the Y 
is the source of novelty and difficulty (Ortony, 1979). 
Ricoeur emphasised the consequent tensions between the X 
and the Y, and between their referential domains? between 
the literal and the metaphorical? and between identity 
and difference whereby some notional truth emerges (1978, 
24? 246-7).
To say that X behaves as if Y in all domains is 
clearly to over-simplify. Likewise, emphasising the Y- 
ness of X diminishes the non Y-like, perhaps important Z- 
like aspects of X. Whilst a good metaphor generates 
insight, a stale, unremarkable and taken-for-granted 
metaphor misleads or denies insight.
To summarise, research suggests that actors 
subscribe to strong myths of organizational reality with 
analogic, metaphoric qualities. Within his perceived 
reality an executive construes and enacts a personal 
role-identity influential for a time in guiding and
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stimulating his conduct. It is suggested that this role- 
identity has implicit or explicit metaphoric qualities 
which should be detectable in his language of explanation 
(Boland & Greenberg, 1988? Pondy, 1983). Moreover, an 
intuited need for change should result in shifting 
metaphoric constructions of role-identity.
A model of executive knowing expressed as metaphors 
of role-identity is consistent with knowing as intuitive, 
symbolic and experiential. Metaphoric imagery goes with 
out-of-context, potentially creative thinking. The 
absence of contextual bounds in comparison with scripts 
removes any obvious limit to the number, scope and 
potential application of these images. The prevalence of 
multiple images in an individual's thinking could signify 
experience and expertise. Conversely, multiple images may 
promote ambiguity and dissonance unless qualified by 
sensible range-of-convenience assumptions.
2.3.2 Small-firm executive role-identities 
In the small firm literature a number of role identities 
have been widely acknowledged. Here, one refers to a 
synoptic outlook, predisposition or self-image, not a 
personality type in the sense used by Chell (1985? 1986), 
for example. This section draws particularly on Stanworth 
& Curran (1976? 1986), after Smith (1967). They addressed 
the link between effectiveness in small firm development 
and a number of executive identities and suggested that 
three archetypes occur frequently, as follows.
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(i^ The artisan identity. This identity emphasised
intrinsic satisfactions, notably personal autonomy,
freedom to select one's colleagues and to determine the
nature and quality of one's products and services. Income
was secondary to other forms of gratification. The
artisan was not unduly concerned with growth. Indeed,
survival and growth were frequently problematic, for:
'...the internal logic of the firm from the point of 
view of its chief actor contains ...contradictions'
which they interpreted as 'social marginality', arguing
that entrepreneurs were to some extent societal misfits.
In fact the artisan may come to see growth not as:
'a solution to social marginality (but) a situation 
reinforcing it.'
For example, one could infer that Amin et. al.'s (1986)
Birmingham entrepreneurs became artisanal subcontractors
to bigger firms, reinforcing positions of economic, if
not social marginality.
The artisan is similar to Smith's (1967) craftsman- 
entrepreneur who tended to come from a working class 
background, have a limited, technically-oriented 
education, be something of a loner, be autocratic and 
paternalistic toward staff, and adopt a short term 
outlook with little regard for planning. His desire for 
independence made him equally suspicious of trade unions 
and outside sources of capital. The firm's posture 
towards customer relations tended to emphasise excellent 
quality and rapid delivery, often to the detriment of 
profits. The success of the firm was strongly associated
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with the personal contribution and credibility of the 
craftsman himself.
Pitt et. al. (1991) reported a similar archetype 
they called the operator, characterised by hands-on 
involvement in the main value-adding activities of the 
firm. Operators were somewhat inward-looking and 
disinclined to delegate. However, there was a cross- 
cultural dimension to the identity; whereas British 
operators conformed to the artisan type, Italians were 
growth-oriented, albeit concerned to expand the business 
activity, not the size of the organization unit. Amin et. 
al.'s Bologna entrepreneurs parallelled the artisan to 
some degree, though they emphasised collective action in 
the local community of small firms. Lafuente & Salas
(1989) identified a somewhat similar type, the family 
entrepreneur, who combined strong family priorities with 
an otherwise artisanal outlook.
fii’) The classic entrepreneur. Stanworth & Curran 
commented that this archetype resembled the neoclassical 
economist's view of entrepreneurship. Growth in size and 
earning potential were significant motivators for these 
market and opportunity-driven individuals, held to be 
outward looking and innovative (Carland et. al., 1984). 
Unlike the artisan proprietor, the entrepreneur was said 
to be ambitious and impatient to break out of the 
perceived constraints of small-firm ownership, if 
necessary by seeking external finance and by recruiting 
specialists managers, despite these actions tending to
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dilute his personal control. His own contribution was to 
instigate and co-ordinate, rather than be directly 
involved in the value-adding activities of the firm.
Smith's (1967) opportunist-entrepreneur shared many 
of these characteristics, being relatively well-educated 
and socially integrated. Entrepreneurial status was 
likely to be part of a deliberate career plan. The firm 
typically grew faster than that of the artisan. This 
identity appears consistent with Amin et. al.'s Boston 
entrepreneurs, many of whom were well educated, eg. 
holding science Ph.D.s. In contrast, the chief executives 
of small, high technology firms in British science parks 
often appear closer to the artisan identity, lacking 
commercial realism.
Pitt et. al.'s (1991) director type also mapped the 
classic entrepreneur. The director was generally a 
founder-owner but adopted a more strategic outlook, 
controlling, planning, setting directions and delegating 
day-to-day responsibility to functional specialists. He 
was outward looking, concerned with frequency and quality 
of external contacts and seemed effective at growing his 
small firm comparatively fast, at least in the U.K., less 
obviously so in France or Italy.
(iii^ The professional manager. This type was likely to 
be second generation, well-educated, concerned with 
acquiring managerial status, notably the approbation and 
esteem of colleagues and peers in the business community. 
He was also very conscious of the custodian aspects of
49
his role. Pitt et. al.'s director type manifested some 
similarities with the professional manager identity, 
particularly among French small firms.
To some extent Curran & Stanworth's identities map those 
of Mintzberg (1973b) who offered a behavioural typology 
of the entrepreneur as hero, the heuristic adaptor, 
drawing on Cyert & March (1963) and Lindblom (1959), and 
the planner - after Ackoff's (1970) 'anticipatory- 
decision-maker'. Mintzberg posited hybrid forms as a 
consequence of organizational functions and subunits.
He also argued that chief executive identity
generally evolves with the stage of organizational
development (cf. Greiner, 1972). So there is a temptation
to see role-identity evolving progressively, for as
Curran & Stanworth noted:
'a small firm which survives the formative 
(artisanal) period and enters a period of sustained 
profitability constitutes a context conducive to the 
generation of a classical entrepreneur identity. The 
goals associated with the artisan identity will have 
been at least partially realised and the new social 
and economic situation of the firm is favourable to 
the possible emergence of a new self-definition for 
the entrepreneur'.
But they remained sceptical whether the transition will
occur, because it requires the artisan to reject many of
the assumptions about the firm's success to date, and to
effect major changes to his own behaviour. Even though
entrepreneurs learn and mature, such a transition is by
no means automatic, especially as personal traits and
conditioning promote continuity in behaviour and outlook
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unless and until there is an obvious life crisis to 
catalyse the transition.
2.3.3 Process Representations of Executive Knowing 
We now turn to the organization process literature for 
broader insights into the nature of executive role- 
identity, specifically to contingency perspectives on 
policy-making. In this context the individual is not the 
primary unit of analysis. However, individuals make 
assumptions about the nature of the processes in which 
they are engaged and the implications for managing 
effectively. Therefore, each archetype of process can be 
expected to legitimise a corresponding executive role- 
identity, an outlook predisposed to, or taking for 
granted, the underlying assumptions of that particular 
process mode. For, in the absence of such an outlook it 
is difficult to see how that process mode would exist.
A skilled executive may perhaps intuit a complex 
identity, invoking particular aspects of it flexibly 
according to his precise understanding of context at any 
moment. Another's thinking may be dominated by relatively 
static perceptions almost independent of circumstances. 
Either way, a review of theoretical process modes is a 
contribution to our appreciation of de facto role- 
identities, adding a new perspective on strategic 
outlooks and conduct.
The first systematic categorisation of executive 
processes was probably by Thompson & Tuden (1959) who 
posited four modes they called computation, judgement,
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negotiation and inspiration. These were contingent on the 
intra-organizational environment, defined by variables of 
goal and technology congruence. Implicitly, their theory 
proposes that executives act - and expect to act - via 
consensus or conflict.
Computational processes obtain when there is 
consensus among actors over goals and over technologies 
(which define the links between actions and outcomes). 
Failure to agree in either respect creates uncertainty, 
which executives are generally minded to reduce. These 
authors argued that disagreement over goals requires 
negotiation. Disagreement over technologies requires 
judgement. Disagreements in both respects requires 
inspiration for dilemma resolution.
Allison (1971) who presumably drew on the work of
Lindblom (1959) and Cyert & March (1963), posited three
sets of descriptive assumptions about organization
processes. The rational actor mode restated the classic
unitary concept of policy making: actors with common
world views, goals and choice criteria, broadly
equivalent to Thompson & Tuden's computational mode. His
other modes emphasised organizational bureaucracy and
political behaviour, both of which apparently subverted
analytic rationality in collective decision making.
However, Allison concluded:
'The three models are obviously not exclusive 
alternatives. Indeed, the paradigms highlight the 
partial emphasis of each framework.... The models can 
... be understood as building blocks in a larger 
model of the determinants of outcomes' (1971: 275).
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Allison's review has proved extremely influential (cf. 
Schwenk, 1988). Steinbruner (1974) extended Allison's 
bureaucratic model to incorporate human cognition 
producing, in his terms, the cybernetic paradigm (cf.
Q_
Morgan, 1983).
Anderson & Paine (1975) proposed contingency 
variables of perceived environmental uncertainty and 
perceived need for internal change to define process.
When perceived uncertainty and need for change are low, 
classic rational planning is the norm? at the other 
extreme adaptive contingency-planning, consonant with 
securing radical change, is the norm.
Miles & Snow (1978) posited four modes of 
organizational adaptation, with executive implications. 
Executives in defender firms pursue efficiency in 
relatively benevolent environments? prospectors are risk- 
positive, seeking opportunity-laden environments. 
Analysers, a hybrid mode, balance prospecting and 
defending behaviour? whilst reactors make aimless and 
unstable progress. The process implications were said to 
be that defender firms: PLAN > ACT > EVALUATE, ie classic 
decision-rationality, whereas prospectors in contrast: 
EVALUATE > ACT > PLAN, anticipating Brunsson's (1982) 
exposition of action-rationality (1978: 43, 62). By 
inference, executive role-identities in such firms will 
map these process assumptions closely.
Pfeffer (1981a) advocated a politicised decision 
process mode apparently informed by the 'garbage can' 
model of Cohen, March & Olsen (1972). In bureaucratic and
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politicized organizations he argued, unitary goals and 
optimal decisions are a myth: decision processes are 
fragmented, iterative and often biased to non-unitary, 
non-computational, negotiated and judgemental or 
inspirational behaviour (1981a, 30). However, he seemed 
reluctant to accept a contingency thesis, emphasising 
political bargaining as the dominant process.
Meyer, who contributed to the work reported as Miles 
& Snow (1978), detailed a separate study of hospital 
decision making (Meyer, 1984) in which he offered four 
contingent decision process modes: clinical, fiscal, 
political and strategic. The major influences on the 
mode-in-use were actors' values and assumptions arising 
from their professional status and experience, and their 
sources of influence and power in the organization. Thus 
administrators' outlooks clearly differed from those of 
clinicians. Meyer suggested that because an identity was 
associated with a particular group involved in the 
decision process, the latter inevitably had a hybrid 
quality. Lyles & Mitroff (1980) and Lyles & Thomas (1988) 
made similar claims, the latter asserting that any one of 
several outlooks might be invoked at any time since all 
are 'embedded in the firm's norms...and systems', indeed 
variety improves the quality of the process (1988, 139).
Another of Meyer's insights was that each process 
mode had symbolic as well as instrumental aspects, a 
claim supported by Pfeffer (1981b) and Smircich & Morgan
(1982). Successful process behaviour therefore requires 
(i) resolution of conflicts arising from the disparate
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identities and interests involved in the process and (ii) 
decisions in which instrumental and symbolic actions are 
mutually reinforcing.
Chaffee (1985) posited three strategic process
archetypes: linear (parallelling the rational actor
mode), appropriate in situations of low complexity and
uncertainty); adaptive (with both reactive and proactive
elements and appropriate in moderately uncertain
contexts)? and interpretive, involving the creation and
promulgation of
'orienting metaphors or frames of reference that 
allow the organization and its environment to be 
understood by stakeholders'
said to be appropriate in highly ambiguous conditions.
Drawing on Chaffee (1985) and Allison (1971), Pitt & 
Johnson (1987) explicated a chief executive's view of 
strategic process. They proposed that an individual may 
enact a variety of process assumptions synchronically, 
though their respective influences will change over time 
in line with evolving personal and organizational 
circumstances.
Of particular interest here, Shrivastava and co­
authors (Shrivastava, 1983; Shrivastava & Mitroff, 1983; 
Shrivastava & Grant, 1985) considered the collective and 
the individual level of analysis. Shrivastava & Mitroff
(1983) reported four policy making frames of reference 
(F.O.R.) informing senior managers in large organizations 
namely: entrepreneurial, professional, bureaucratic, and 
political. In their terms entrepreneurial was an 
individualistic and interpretive F.O.R., whilst the
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others equated nominally with Allison's three modes. Each 
executive allegedly subscribed to a dominant F.O.R. From 
apparently the same data Shrivastava & Grant (1985) 
identified four 'prototypical patterns' of policy-making. 
These mapped the managerial F.O.R.s closely, so one 
concludes that the F.O.R.s of senior executives had a 
strong bearing on the policy making processes in the firm 
and that hybrid processes either did not arise, were 
suppressed or simply not observed.
Quinn & Rohrbaugh (1983) offered a typology of 
process modes contingent on degree of centralization and 
internal/external focus, namely the rational goal 
approach (centralized, external focus), open systems 
(decentralized, external focus), human relations 
(decentralized, internal focus) and internal process 
(centralized, internal focus). One sees parallels with 
Miles & Snow's types, with defenders being analogous to 
internal process types and prospectors to open systems 
types. Goold & Campbell (1987) offered a superficially 
similar typology based on the degree of centralization of 
policy making and the nature of control (loose/tight) 
exerted by the centre.
Dunphy & Stace (1988) offered a typology of change 
management strategies based on the twin constructs of 
collaboration versus coercion (consensus - conflict) and 
incrementalism versus transformation (conservatism - 
radicalism). A contingent typology developed by Quinn, 
Mintzberg & James (1988) integrated stage of industry 
life cycle with organizational form (after Miller &
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Friesen, 1978, 1984; Mintzberg, 1979a). Finally, 
Whittington (1993) proposed four models of strategic 
process defined by the dimensions of deliberate versus 
emergent action and profit-maximising versus pluralism.
These studies suggest a correspondence between an 
hypothesised process and executive assumptions about the 
enactment of that process, which is in effect the notion 
of role-identity used here. For although an individual's 
role-identity draws on personal qualities to some extent, 
organizational contexts will have a major influence on 
that person's understanding of what are appropriate and 
admissible behaviours. This being so, one can ask how it 
may be possible to encapsulate salient features of these 
identities in a more synoptic form.
2.3.4 Reflections on process-derived role-identitv 
The thesis of section 2.3.3 is that an individual 
manifests a role-identity for the time being, based on a 
finite set of assumptions about executive process. 
Predispositions of this kind legitimise some forms of 
behaviour for that person, as for example, an implicit 
preference for consensus-seeking. Preference constructs 
or dualisms underpin a majority of descriptive process 
archetypes and by extension their associated role- 
identities.
Four such constructs appear particularly 
influential; each will be reviewed briefly, followed by a 
more general discussion.
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fi^  Change preference: conservatism :: radicalism. This 
dualism derives support from much empirical research on 
organizational process, some already noted. Burrell & 
Morgan (1979) and Pettigrew (1985b) referred explicitly 
to it and it has variously been expressed by others as 
incremental :: global change (Johnson, 1987; Mintzberg, 
1978;), evolution :: revolution (Miller & Friesen, 1980) 
and regular :: transformational change (Clark, 1987). One 
pole reflects an identity predisposed towards stability, 
continuity-seeking, and sustaining the status quo.
Change, when it occurs will be reluctant, incremental and 
reactive. The other pole is proactive towards change, 
valuing and seeking innovation, often desiring 
fundamental, destabilizing and irreversible change.
(ii^ i System focus; inward-looking :: outward-looking. 
Early writings on organizations tended to emphasise the 
optimization of essentially closed systems. Actors 
sharing the assumptions of Fayol (1949) for example would 
look inwards at the efficiency of the firm in 
bureaucratic, control-centralising terms. They would 
perceive the major complexities and uncertainties of the 
business to be within the firm. This appears to describe 
the defender mentality rather well.
Conversely, Lawrence & Lorsch (1967) and Thompson 
(1967) recognised that organizations have a wide external 
context, positing an open system perspective and hence 
the need for a less centralising, external-orientation, 
especially in pursuit of strategic effectiveness. Many of
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the major ambiguities are perceived to emanate from the 
world beyond the organization and hence beyond the 
control, if not the understanding of its executives. This 
seems to fit the prospector type rather well.
In the small firm context this dualism also contains 
elements of independence (manifest as self-reliance and 
personal involvement of the proprietor) versus 
interdependence (meaning a propensity to form network 
relations and to delegate to others).
fiii^ Basis of rationality: decision :: action. Decision- 
rational ity has unquestionably dominated theorising about 
organizational process, particularly in the strategy 
literature. Decision-rational actors perceive that 
systematic analysis and clear, optimising decisions are 
necessary and sufficient conditions for action. Generally 
their decisions pertain to substantive issues amenable to 
analysis, as exemplified in the priorities of 
bureaucratic, defender type firms.
But as Brunsson (1982, 1985) and Peters & Waterman 
(1982) argued, the evidence for a rational comprehensive 
process is rather unconvincing. Given the cognitive 
limitations of human actors, it is at best a notional 
ideal. The alternative, however, is not anarchic 
irrationality, but pragmatic action-rationality. Many 
executives, particularly when experiencing the stress of 
strategic uncertainty, perceive action (often of an 
exemplary, symbolic kind: Pfeffer, 1981b; Smircich, 1983) 
not analysis as the appropriate basis for proceeding. If
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they share Brunsson's views on appropriate and timely 
action, they are almost bound to support his contention 
that an action-rational outlook is an appropriate 
response to ambiguity, where actions precede and 
legitimise emergent strategies and plans, akin to the 
prospector type, not the reverse.
(iv^ Co-ordination: consensual, unitary :: pluralistic, 
conflictual. The consensus/conflict dimension emerged 
clearly in Thompson & Tuden's (1959) analysis, the latter 
perspective being endorsed by Pfeffer (1981a), Meyer
(1984) and others. It finds strong echoes in the work of 
Allison (1973) even though he may have regarded rational 
comprehensive processes with centralising, integrating 
tendencies as the norm, and bureaucratic and political 
processes as aberrations.
In any event, we know that when personal identities 
are grounded in individualism and executives perceive 
opportunism as legitimate, conflictual bargaining in 
pursuit of local, not global interests is likely.
Executive process becomes fragmented and decentralised.
The low level of co-ordination will itself then be a 
source of uncertainty and potential instability.
Conversely, when apparent consensus is observed, quasi- 
unitary outcomes should result. This may be because there 
is genuine harmony, or perhaps merely the result of the 
behaviour of an autocratic or paternalistic chief 
executive, not unusual in proprietorial small firms.
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Together, these four dimensions define a hypothetical 
'identity space'. It remains an open question beyond the 
scope or purpose of this discussion as to the 
independence of these dimensions. In the abstract one 
would incline to argue that they are orthogonal: for 
instance, a decision-bias should no more orient an actor 
to stability-seeking, than an action-bias orients her to 
change-seeking. Actions can create change, but they can 
equally entrench the status quo. It follows in principle 
that a wide range of empirical identities would locate in 
this space.
However, it is intriguing to speculate on the 
association of polar constructs around two archetypal 
positions or identities. For convenience these are 
labelled Type I and Type II, thus:-
Dualism Type I identity Type II identity
Change focus Continuity-seeking Change-seeking
Rationality Decision-oriented Action-oriented
System focus Inwardness and Outwardness and
self-dependence inter-dependence
Co-ordination Unitary outcomes Fragmented outcomes
via consensual via conflictual,
harmony/autocracy) opportunistic bargains
In respect of the small firm context, the Type I identity
seems to correspond tolerably well with the artisan type
of proprietor. It places a lot of emphasis on cautious
development based on rather inward-looking self-reliance,
allied to a concern for efficient operations. Progress is
preferred via consensus, albeit it may be a consensus
imposed by an autocratic or paternalistic leader.
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Though the Type I identity is conservative, this 
does not imply that his firm experiences no change. 
Rather, one would expect continuing incremental 
adjustments if it is to avoid the phenomenon of strategic 
drift from its environment (Johnson, 1987). (A counter 
argument by Meyer & Zucker (1989) is that some 
organizations survive for long periods in what the 
authors define as a state of high persistence and low 
performance, a condition of more-or-less permanent 
failure). The implication is that the typical failure 
mode of firms led by a Type I identity is gradual and 
protracted.
The Type II identity encodes assumptions which are 
diametrically opposed to the Type I identity. It appears 
to conform much closer to the classic entrepreneur. By 
the standards of the Type J, the Type II is likely to 
develop her firm unpredictably and in spurts, via 
outward-looking, opportunistic and seemingly unplanned 
quests for growth and effectiveness, usually at the cost 
of low efficiency. In opportunity-laden environments 
forming inter-dependent networks and alliances offers a 
realistic way of coping with uncertainty and inadequate 
resources. Success will generate rapid, if potentially 
unstable growth, as the firm exploits innovations whose 
potential is poorly understood at the outset.
The Type II identity is not afraid of conflict, 
understands the pursuit of local interests and finds 
these processes stimulating as well as potentially 
rewarding in financial terms. She is comparatively
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tolerant of the risk of failure. If a firm directed by a 
Type II executive should fail, it will probably do so 
abruptly and catastrophically.
Accepting that Type I and Type II identities are no 
more than plausible hypotheses, it is suggested that they 
provide useful additional agenda with which to discuss 
the role-identities of small firm executives.
2.4 Implications For Research
Several routes to representing the experiential, 
strategic organizational knowing of executives have now 
been explored. A construct-based approach highlighted the 
significance of paradoxical oppositions or dualisms. The 
implicit conflicts of priority in such dualisms, it is 
argued, have the potential to create psychological 
tensions that in principle give rise to both defensive 
and path-breaking motivational consequences for the 
individual and hence the firm. The exploration of 
dualisms in an executive's thinking is suggested to be a 
valuable source of insight for the researcher.
A script-based approach emphasised the contextual 
and experiential patterning of executive knowing. Scripts 
encode situationally relevant, utilitarian knowing. An 
actor makes sense of (interprets) a new situation by 
invoking a 'script of best fit' from her cognitive 
repertoire. Typicality theories help explain how this is 
possible and why a script transcends its constituent 
parts. Abelson's (1973) conception of the masterscript 
remains a useful prototype that will be developed in
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chapter 3. In suggesting that one can usefully represent 
executives' strategic knowing in terms of inter-related, 
multi-level goals and strategies, it too offers rich 
analytic possibilities.
A third generic perspective on representing 
executive knowing emphasised the need to explore their 
conceptions of role-identity. Arguably, the latter encode 
a good deal of what they regard as their main organising 
styles, personal contributions and priorities. One 
proposed approach to explicating role-identity is via 
metaphors, teasing out holistic, analogical sense-making 
and motivational images. In comparison with scripts they 
are expected to be situationally ungrounded, creative and 
inspirational, rather than utilitarian. A corollary is 
that they contain greater ambiguity between belief and 
action. Thus they may be able to mediate apparent 
contradictions and reconcile divergent positions and 
outlooks (Abravanel, 1983). The gestalt imagery of a 
dominant metaphor or myth can overwhelm competing myths 
and become a magnificent obsession, immune from empirical 
reality. Construing role identities in metaphoric terms, 
then, is a natural complement to the other perspectives 
described.
Finally, one may seek to illuminate role-identity in 
terms of theories of executive process, culminating in 
the hypothesis of two process-derived archetypes which, 
it was suggested, map well-known proprietorial identities 
extracted from the small-firm literature.
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These various approaches offer the prospect of a 
rich, multi-stranded representation of executive 
strategic knowing, portrayed schematically in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1:
















METHODOLOGY AND THIS RESEARCH
3.1 Basic Issues In Sociological Research
It is appropriate for the researcher to make and justify 
theoretical and operational choices over the objectives 
and conduct of an enquiry. This study was based on the 
assumption that one can usefully explore the experiential 
wisdom of executives. To uncover and make sense of their 
mental models in the strategic organizational domain is 
likely to require (i) direct contact with an appropriate 
sample of those having de facto responsibility for 
shaping the direction of their firms, and (ii) 
understanding 'reality' in intersubjective terms. These 
aims locate the study essentially in Burrell & Morgan's 
(1979) interpretive paradigm.
The assumptions and implications of this paradigm, 
therefore, are addressed in section 3.1, the practical 
and preferred research choices in section 3.2.
3.1.1 Research paradigms
The interpretive paradigm stands in marked contrast to 
positivism, although Burrell & Morgan (1979) acknowledged 
that interpretivism encompasses many phenomenological 
strands. Crucially, it attaches considerable weight to 
meanings as they are conveyed by and inferred from the 
words and deeds of the subjects of study.
Underlying the interpretive (or in Lincoln & Guba's 
term: naturalistic) paradigm are a number of assumptions
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about the nature of reality, knowledge, and appropriate 
forms of enquiry (Burrell & Morgan, 1979, 1-9; 28-32? 
Lincoln & Guba, 1985, 37):
* Reality (ontology) is individually and socially 
mediated, drawing on the cognitive and emotional 
factors specific to individuals and those with whom 
they share meanings. Meanings are multiple, 
circumstantial, holistic and constructed.
* Valid knowledge (epistemology) is personal and 
(inter)subjective, a mixture of facts and values.
The knower and the known are interactive and 
inseparable. Knowledge acquires meaning through 
insight and experience; its validity derives from 
its significance for the knower. 'Facts' are value­
laden, therefore have no verifiable truth content 
independent of the knower. This stands in marked 
contrast to the positivistic assumption of value- 
free 'objective' knowledge.
* Society and its institutions are an emergent social 
creation. Social reality, insofar as it exists 
outside the consciousness of an individual, is a 
network of assumptions and intersubjectively shared 
meanings.
* Human nature: individuals act to create and mould 
the environment to their will. Their relations with 
it are voluntaristic, not deterministic.
* Enquiry methodologies investigate what is unique or 
particular to the individual, not what is general or 
universal. They focus on subjective and relativistic 
(ideographic) data, not objective and absolute
(nomothetic) data.
* Causes and effects manifest mutual and simultaneous 
influences. Linkages may be neither significant nor 
discoverable, opposing the positivist assumption 
that causes and effects manifest discoverable, 
directional linkages in time and space.
Admittedly, these statements characterise an
idealised position. According to Archer (1988, 274):
'...from a strictly philosophical standpoint there 
are some fairly strong objections to positivistic 
external realism and to normativistic subjective 
idealism.'
As Kuhn (1970) noted, scientific enquiry is never wholly
value-free, and natural science acknowledges complex-
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system reality, as in the theory of quantum mechanics and 
ultimate limits on determinism in physical systems. 
Nonetheless, experimental designs attempt to control for 
that complexity. Conversely, absolute adherence to 
interpretive axioms precludes learning from other 
research perspectives, as Morgan (1983b, 13? 1983c, 381) 
advocated. For instance, should interpretivism 
automatically preclude generalizations, analogies with 
other contexts, or speculations over local causality, 
even if global causality lacks meaning.
Archer (1988) therefore argued for an intermediate,
more flexible theoretical position, advocating 'internal
realism', with an ontology of intertwined and hard-to-
disentangle facts and values, and epistemology as
'reality-for-us': intersubjective construction of shared
cognitions (1988, 273). He commented:
'One would have thought that there was ample room ... 
for research approaches which accepted the validity 
of multiple-observation statistically based studies 
and those involving more intimate study of a small 
number (often one!) of examples.'
Morgan (1983c) suggested that assumptions and practices
should link researcher and study phenomenon in a
methodology underpinned by an implicit
'logic or strategy of research (since) what is 
studied and what is learned are intimately connected 
with the mode of engagement adopted'.
Because the essentially complex, messy nature of
'interesting' research means that there is no one best
approach (1983c, 377, 379), he advised pragmatic choices
from which a research philosophy can subsequently be
elaborated.
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Further, he argued, it is more important to develop
insightful 'facts' via evocative research 'to be
sustained, rejected or refined through future studies',
than to conform to positivistic canons (1983c, 369, 392,
398). This advice echoed Starbuck's (1982) view that:
'misguided perceptions that objectively measurable 
phenomena are more real or more important (have 
justified) ...numerous studies of so-called objective 
phenomena... (whose)... aggregate finding is that 
almost nothing correlates strongly and consistently 
with anything else.'
However, the corollary of a pragmatic approach is that
researchers should accept, modestly, that at best they
illuminate a small facet of reality. Moreover, as
Thorngate (quoted by Weick: 1979, 36) observed, a theory
of social behaviour cannot be simultaneously general,
accurate and simple.
3.1.2 Quality/validity in research
For Morgan (1983b), it was impossible to evaluate the 
claims and contributions of different research paradigms 
independently of one's prior viewpoint. The key problem 
is that most researchers are reluctant to acknowledge 
alternative ontologies and epistemologies, and feel no 
need to engage in paradigmatic debate.
A consequence is that interpretive studies are
frequently exposed to inappropriate positivist criteria
in assessing their legitimacy. As Morgan highlighted the
dilemma (1983c, 394-6):
'...the hallmarks of good positivist research and the 
criteria that can be used to judge the quality of 
research generated by positivist and neo-positivist
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strategies (apply) ...only insofar as one accepts the 
assumptions that underwrite the positivist approach.
Research strategies that abandon the positivist 
standpoint of the detached, neutral observer cannot 
be fairly judged in terms of the evaluative criteria 
normally applied to positivist research, for they 
seek a different kind of insight, adopt different 
methodologies, and favour different criteria for 
judging their knowledge claims.'
In response to the difficulties of establishing the
legitimacy of phenomenological research in the eyes of
positivist peers, Glaser & Strauss (1967, 223) proposed
assessment criteria of trustworthiness, credibility, and
plausibility. Lincoln and Guba equated trustworthiness
with adhering to disciplined and systematic behaviour
(1985, 251, 290) informed by the chosen paradigm
assumptions, and conformity to a specified set of axioms.
The other two criteria require the researcher to derive
conclusions significant to herself and to her chosen
audience. As Reason & Marshall (1987) expressed it,
'valid enquiry rests on critical subjectivity, on the 
perspective of a personal view from some distance.'
The desire for rigorous quality criteria for 
qualitative research has led others to restate neo­
positivist criteria (eg. Cook & Campbell, 1979; Miles & 
Huberman, 1984; Yin, 1984):
* Construct validity: there must be operationalised 
definitions of and measures for constructs used to 
explore relationships;
* Internal validity (truth value) of a posited 
relation between variables must not be seriously 
compromised by shortcomings in sample construction, 
instrument, construct validity, temporal effects 
etc. (Lincoln & Guba offered credibility);
* External validity: the generalizability of findings 
across persons, contexts and times must not be 
compromised by invalid constructs etc. (in Lincoln & 
Guba's terms transferability, though context-
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specific enquiry rarely aims to generalise beyond 
the subject under study)?
* Reliability: the potential for replication: a 
second, independent study should reproduce the 
findings, given similar subjects and contexts.
(dependability for Lincoln & Guba, though context- 
specific enquiry is, virtually by definition, 
unrepeatable);
* Neutrality: a set of findings should be free of 
systematic bias due to the motives and 
perspectives of the investigator (Lincoln & Guba 
argued for confirmability, a transparent 
evidential trail covering instrument development, 
pilot tests, data treatment, explanatory notes, 
personal reflections etc.
Allison (1971), Bougon (1983), Miles & Huberman (1984)
and Yin (1984) all stressed the importance of (i)
systematic protocols to obtain, store and analyse data
and to draw and verify conclusions, (ii) coherent chains
of evidence in data interpretation and (iii) having draft
findings reviewed by key informants to establish
plausibility. Miles & Huberman advocated explicit checks
for potential sources of bias and for representativeness
of sources and findings. The investigator should also
seek contrasting cases and possible refutations via
outlying cases and rival explanations.
Many interpretivists would reject at least some of
the foregoing criteria, not least that of neutrality,
since at face value it denies the researcher scope to
generate meaning interactively with the subject. In any
event, qualitative research designs rarely meet all of
the above criteria concurrently.
The tactic of triangulation, perhaps better termed
multiple corroboration, has been advocated as a strategy
for enhancing validity (Bogdan & Taylor, 1975; Burgess,
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1984: 144? Cook, 1983: 76? Denzin, 1978? Jick, 1979). It 
calls for multiplicity in one or more of the following: 
methods, instruments, data sources, times, populations, 
investigators, theories. However, as Popper argued, 
triangulation remains flawed in theory testing, for 
though N instances corroborate a proposition, the (N+l)th 
can disconfirm it. Large values of N do not increase the 
probability of the proposition being correct (Magee,
1973: 25, 43). Furthermore, triangulational incongruence 
may constitute insightful data, rather than signify 
invalid conclusions.
Some sources have advocated the value of integrating 
seemingly opposed research approaches, for instance 
Archer (as noted) with respect to philosophy and Jick 
(1979) over melding qualitative and quantitative data. 
Ultimately though, as Morgan advised, the solution to a 
particular research question is best addressed 
pragmatically. What is vital is for the researcher to 
appreciate both the benefits and limitations of his 
preferred research and to behave transparently and with 
integrity.
3.1.3 Precedents and prejudices in management research 
During the last twenty years management research has 
greatly increased in scope and range (Fredrickson, 1983? 
Harrigan, 1983? Jauch, 1983). In a panoramic review of 
extant literature Thomas (1984) observed:
'Perhaps the only strong consensus...would be (the)
lack of interest in well-written but rather empty
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papers full of conjecture and plausible statements 
incapable of being tested or further researched'.
Thomas was perhaps mindful that part of the management
literature has always contained simplistic
prescriptions, ranging from the interesting but
unproved to the downright naive or disingenuous. Such
concerns have led many academics to advocate a rigorous
quantitative approach, even when working with 'soft'
qualitative data, as illustrated by these statements:
'Three central axioms...underlie the valid conduct of 
research in management science. First, the methods 
...should be objective? empirical observations should 
be impartial representations of managerial reality, 
unbiased by particular researchers' values or 
viewpoints. Second, the goal... should be the 
cumulative discovery of a common body of truth? the 
discipline should strive toward the establishment of 
a consensually validated core of knowledge. Third... 
management science should...yield directly applicable 
results...oriented toward the development of tools 
and techniques... pragmatically relevant to extant 
managerial problems'. (Astley, 1984, 259).
'The analyst faced with a bank of qualitative data 
has very few guidelines for protection against self- 
delusion, let alone the presentation of "unreliable” 
or "invalid" conclusions...' (Miles, 1979, 590).
'Although strategy researchers employ qualitative 
and...quantitative ....approaches, the trend appears 
to be toward the use of large sample, quantitatively 
operationalized research designs' (Venkatraman &
Grant, 1986, 71-2).
But if for some, management research has come to 
signify scientific, technique-oriented methodologies, 
there have been others who emphasise the subtle, 
performative skills of managers and the craft-like nature 
of research:
'The field of organization theory has...paid dearly 
for the obsession with rigour in the choice of 
methodology. Too many...results have been significant 
only in the statistical sense of the word... 
Increasingly in our research, we are impressed by the 
importance of phenomena that cannot be measured...by
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the role that personality and intuition play in 
decision making' (Mintzberg, 1979b, 583).
'The natural science model is sometimes called 
quantitative research...(its) advocates stress the 
importance of reliability, validity and accurate 
measurement before research outcomes can contribute 
to knowledge. Others of us would answer that 
significant new knowledge about organizations is the 
result of qualitative procedures...concerned with the 
meaning rather than the measurement of organizational 
phenomena' (Daft, 1983, 539).
'We are aware that our choice of vocabulary to 
describe techniques of dramatistic analysis is bereft 
of the kinds of words - "sampling”, "reliability", 
"validity", "interview", "generalization"... - that 
are customary for social scientists. We could have 
used such words; there is an audience for such 
"scientific" performance, but that was not our 
purpose. We think it unlikely that... those who 
respond favourably to the conventional melodramas of 
scientific presentations will...develop a taste 
for...our... mode for "seeing" organizational 
conduct.' Mangham & Overington, 1983, 231)
'...if rigorous management means the application of 
management science and technique, then a 'rigorous 
manager' must be selectively inattentive to the art 
which he brings to much of this day-to-day practice, 
and he must avoid situations - often the most 
important in organizational life - where he would 
find himself confronted with uncertainty, instability 
or uniqueness'. (Schon, 1983, 240-1).
Thus the polarization of outlook in sociological research
generally is brutally manifest in organization and
management research. If anything, lack of tolerance for
alternative perspectives is increasing, even in small
firm research (Curran & Burrows, 1987) and as Easterby-
Smith et. al. (1991) remarked, the researcher must be
'politically' aware.
3.2 The Format of this Study
Turning to the conduct of this enquiry, section 3.2 
begins with a discussion of appropriate strategies for 
data generation in relation to the study objectives.
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Attention focuses on fieldwork strategies, followed by 
sample design and selection, then data collection and 
treatment.
3.2.1 Basic design options
Three strategies for data generation were considered 
seriously, all with precedents in the literature. These 
were (i) a search of (auto)biographical literature (ii) a 
structured (large-sample) survey of executives, and (iii) 
face-to-face fieldwork, in essence a case-based approach. 
The first option, though having some attractions (Sims 
(1993) offers a particularly elegant example), was ruled 
out on the grounds firstly that detailed statements from 
small firm proprietors are unusual and secondly because 
the available data would be partial, secondary and not 
interactive.
Surveys work best when constructs are clear, 
uneguivocal and well-grounded in prior research, being 
generally associated with positivist testing of simple 
propositions. However, in exploratory research as 
envisioned here, one has no desire to impose constructs 
on subjects. Thus a survey instrument was thought 
unlikely to yield significant insights and, following 
Curran & Burrows (1987), it was ruled out.
Labour-intensive fieldwork aims to capture 
interactively the 'fine-grained7 detail associated with a 
few cases (Burgess, 1984? Calori et. al., 1992? Harrigan, 
1983? Schein, 1987? Yin, 1984). Attention shifted in this 
direction, given also the writer's prior experience of
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unstructured interviewing and awareness of the long 
tradition of case-oriented fieldwork in management 
research.
A much cited weakness of the case approach is the 
tendency to rely on a single instance. Weick (1969, 18- 
20) criticised case research as situation-specific, a- 
historical, one-sided, tacitly prescriptive and overly 
pragmatic:
'The usefulness of a theory is not determined by its 
usability in the everyday business of running an
organization in terms of pragmatics...(A case
study) will often provide a tacit 'prescription' for 
getting along in an organization. But we do not know 
the conditions under which that..prescription holds.7
A case study may show what works but it cannot refute,
though Campbell (1975, 38) argued that if multiple
predictions are made from a single theory, they may be
refutable via a single intensive case instance. Another
way of enhancing the value of a single case is to
redefine the unit of analysis (McClintock et al, 1979).
But theoretical generalization is clearly unwise unless
multiple cases are compared (Jauch et. al., 1980; Yin,
1981; 1984).
Conversely, the case study is particularly useful 
for exploring and developing theory in an historical- 
contextual perspective. It is also a surrogate for 
longitudinal (real-time) study (Child & Smith, 1987; 
Johnson, 1987; Jones, 1983, 147; Mintzberg, 1978; 
Mintzberg & Waters, 1982; Pettigrew, 1973; 1985b; Whipp & 
Clark, 1986).
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Thus, this study was conceived as essentially 
qualitative, interpretive, case-based fieldwork. 
Nonetheless, it was thought desirable to introduce an 
element of between-case comparison, as will be seen.
3.2.2 Fieldwork strategies and tactics
Available fieldwork strategies parallel the philosophical 
positions reviewed. Fieldwork implies interactive 
approaches (Blumer, 1969? Goffman, 1959), such as 
participant observation and unstructured interviewing, 
when the interest is in socially-constructed meanings 
(Berger & Luckman, 1967). Each approach has merits and 
drawbacks. The following discussion draws particularly on 
Bogdan & Taylor (1975), Burgess (1984), Denzin (1978), 
Schatzman & Strauss, 1973, and Schein, 1987).
Participant observation offers rich, real-time data. 
Given germane needs and access it is the obvious choice, 
though its efficacy can be compromised by inappropriate 
sampling tactics or inadequate resources to ensure full, 
reliable data capture. Because it is fundamentally 
intrusive, the observer must assess the affect of her 
presence on events. Conversely, if the research is covert 
there can be problems of ethics or of 'going native'. If 
an investigator is obliged to adopt multiple roles as the 
price of access, observations may be systematically 
biased in an unquantifiable way. Data capture over 
extended periods is difficult in practice. For all these 
reasons the data captured may actually be of dubious 
validity or shed little light on the research
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question(s). These concerns are especially germane in 
small firms, where the presence of an extra person is a 
substantial perturbation on the status quo. So although 
participant observation could in principle shed light on 
the research agenda, equally useful data might be 
obtained at lower cost and risk by other means.
Interviewing was considered an appropriate 
alternative, though it was recognised that interviews are 
at best a 'small slice of reality', especially when done 
intermittently. They can be (i) highly structured, where 
the researcher uses a pre-determined question schedule 
requiring simple responses, (ii) semi-structured, where 
the schedule allows greater scope for discussion, or 
(iii) unstructured conversations where the format is 
limited to a basic agenda of topics or themes, giving 
subjects considerable scope for self-expression (Burgess, 
1984, 108). Unstructured interviews have great potential 
for generating insightful data, yet require considerable 
interviewing skill (Mishler, 1986). The researcher should 
be undirective, beyond keeping the conversation on a 
broadly appropriate track. Above all, in seeking the 
subject's perspectives the researcher must be a good 
listener, alert to unexpected signals - to avoid 
foreclosing on unexpected, but pertinent discussion.
Interviews are evidently intrusive because they are 
instigated by the researcher. Data will be shaped, 
perhaps inappropriately in the context of the research 
objective, by a respondent's understanding of the purpose 
of the interaction. Many interviews in management
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research are retrospective, relying on subjects' 
imperfect recall of events, though some safeguards exist 
(Huber & Power, 1985). A subject's motivation to 
participate and his candour, particularly if a formal 
record of the discussion is made, are open to question. 
These concerns are surmountable by developing a trusting 
relationship over time. Several extended discussions with 
a respondent are highly desirable, to erode initial 
reservations and inhibitions. An assurance of 
confidentially is also of paramount importance.
If the dialogue is tape recorded (a generally 
accepted tactic: Burgess, 1984) there is no problem of 
data capture and a verbatim transcript can be produced 
later. At the researcher's discretion, this can be 
presented to the subject for content validation or (if 
appropriate and approved by the latter) to an independent 
observer for comment. A transcript also evidences whether 
the researcher has avoided 'leading the witness'. An 
objection to tape recording is that it may inhibit the 
subject. This can be overcome in three ways, by (i) 
developing trust, (ii) allowing the subject the power to 
veto recording at any time (in the writer's experience 
the veto was rarely used), and (iii) interviewing one-on- 
one, a tactic employed in this study. One-on-one 
discussions can be supplemented with group discussions 
and/or 'stimulatory' interviews where subjects are 
confronted with feedback or controversial ideas, allowing 
the researcher to gauge their reactions (Miles and Snow, 
1978; Salancik, 1979).
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A series of interviews with key subjects generates a 
wealth of descriptive data, opinions and perceptions 
about particular topics of interest. But documents are 
additional sources of data (Denzin, 1978). Personal 
documents include memoranda, reports, diaries, etc. One 
can distinguish private from public documents, and 
between primary (solicited) and secondary (unsolicited, 
produced for a purpose other than the research in hand). 
Life-history analyses rely heavily on documentary sources 
(eg. Jones, 1983? Mintzberg, 1978; Mintzberg & Waters, 
1982), though sometimes short, real-time accounts can be 
compelling (eg. Mintzberg, 1973a? Noel, 1985). In this 
study documentary data were used as an additional source 
where available. However, it was guickly apparent that 
small firms commit relatively little to documents, other 
than statutory accounting data.
Documents are often held to be unobtrusive sources. 
This is not necessarily so, because the significance of 
key documents is usually appreciated by a subject. Really 
informative documents do not lie around waiting to be 
read, one has to establish their existence and request 
sight of them. Detailed study necessitates their removal 
from the site or copying - requiring further 
justification and permission. In contrast, verbal 
comments are frequently spontaneous, gratuitous and 
irrevocable.
Potential biases exist in all forms of data, whether 
documentary, via questionnaires, interviews, or direct 
observation. They can arise from the investigator's
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choice of sources and from subsequent interpretation. It 
is important to consider the context in which data have 
been generated, as various texts on content analysis have 
stressed (eg. Krippendorf, 1980). Since unstructured 
interviewing was the main data source here, further 
comments on validity will be made specifically in this 
respect.
Construct validity; unstructured interviews, unlike 
surveys, allow the researcher the scope, indeed the duty, 
to clarify subjects' meanings. Sequential interviews 
permit the researcher to reflect ideas back, testing 
one's interpretation as well as the respondent's 
consistency of use. If properly conducted and analysed, 
interviews provide acceptable construct validity.
Internal validity: Statistical tests of qualitative data 
are rarely possible, save in the case of simple measures 
like frequency counts, so this aspect remains of some 
concern. As noted, the best safeguards are systematic 
protocols for data analysis and conclusion formation 
(Miles & Huberman, 1984). Difficulties can arise over 
face versus deep meanings and espoused versus action- 
informing beliefs. These problems magnify as the emphasis 
shifts from categorizing and counting to the 
interpretation of meanings. On the other hand, 
interpretive studies require the researcher to explicate 
his own sense of the data, systematically, with 
sensitivity to context, and with integrity.
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Obtrusiveness is arguably of greatest concern. The 
researcher's presence is bound to affect situations and 
to some extent create bias. Intermittent contact, 
however, minimises the risk of 'going native'. The writer 
sought to avoid systematic bias in the process of data 
generation, for example by trying not to inject arbitrary 
or personal opinions. For this reason a clinical style in 
which the researcher's opinions are routinely sought and 
offered (probably the main reason why access was granted) 
was avoided. The preferred approach was to act as a 
'mirror' to a respondent's comments. This does not 
eliminate the possibility of bias, to which the main 
counter must be vigilance. It is worth observing, 
however, that respondents who head business firms are not 
malleable objects; they impose their own priorities on a 
discussion and it is usually quite difficult to 'lead the 
witness', even if that were the intention. Verbatim 
transcripts allow one to monitor the use of open versus 
closed questions, 'air-time' ratios etc.
External validity: primary conclusions are specific to 
context and subject. Any attempt to generalise across 
sites, individuals, positions, firm types and so on, must 
be questionable. If generalisations are sought, two kinds 
of safeguard exist. First, the theoretical basis, if any, 
for generalisation must be explicit. Second, one can 
invoke the criterion of plausibility in relation to the 
contexts between which the generalization is asserted.
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3.2.3 Sample design and selection
A study of chief executives in small firms was predicated 
on the assumption that they would strongly influence the 
firm's strategic path, a situation likely to be well- 
understood by colleagues. Small firms would facilitate 
identification of and access to the dominant coalition.
It was also thought feasible to select a number of firms 
based on theoretical considerations, enabling a range of 
comparisons to be made.
The aim was to select established small firms in a 
variety of circumstances. Bases considered for possible 
selection included:
* Service, as opposed to manufacturing sector firms
* Specific industry sectors
* Entrepreneur identities
An initial design was conceived around six firms, of the 
form Yin (1984, 41, 48) termed 'multiple-case embedded', 
ie. multiple cases and multiple units of analysis. In 
principle this would permit both literal replication 
(where similar findings would be predicted) and 
theoretical replication (where contrary findings would be 
predicted for clear, theoretical reasons).
Killeya & Armistead (1984) argued that relatively 
few firms offer pure services, activities divorced from 
the production, conversion or supply of goods. This 
conclusion applies to the sample chosen here, all the 
selected firms best being described as distributors. The 
perception of the executives was that the service
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component remained a prime source of competitive 
advantage (Pitt, 1989).
Two firms were selected in each of three sectors, 
supply of industrial abrasive equipment and consumables, 
industrial services, and motor vehicle retailing.
Emerging ideas about executive identity affirmed the 
value of the set chosen, since it appeared to contain 
examples of artisan, classic entrepreneur and 
professional manager.
Comprehensive sets of interviews were conducted in 
all six firms which, it was envisaged, would enable a 
range of comparisons to be made. However, as the research 
became increasingly focused on explicating strategic 
knowing via the multiple lenses of Chapter 2, it was 
evident that the thesis would benefit by restricting it 
to a straight comparison of two chief executives and 
their respective firms. The ones chosen will be referred 
to by the pseudonyms Bill White of Wittenshaw Abrasives 
and Hamish Dean of Pyrochem. They were selected because 
intuition and preliminary analysis suggested that they 
were clearly different identities when considered in 
relation to their artisanal and entrepreneurial 
qualities.
3.2.4 Data collection
Initial contacts were typically with a subordinate having 
access to the CEO. Interviews began in late 1986 and were 
concluded in 1991. Thereafter informal contacts have been 
maintained. Interviews were one-to-one and tape recorded.
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Confidentiality was assured and respected. Although 
subjects were offered a veto over the recording of 
sensitive topics, this option was rarely exercised. Each 
conversation was transcribed in full. Notes of the recall 
of parts of a conversation not recorded were later 
appended to the relevant transcript.
As well as the CEOs, members of the dominant 
coalition or significant others were interviewed, 
together with a few others who had long histories with 
the respective firms. Approximately fifty discussions 
(generally one to two hours) with 22 people underpinned 
the exercise, with the report on the main cases based on 
seventeen interactions with eight people. Subjects were 
interviewed at least twice and in a few instances three 
or four times. Later discussions explored new topics and 
developed those discussed already. Diminishing returns 
appeared to set in after the second interview.
The first interview was based on a schedule of open- 
ended questions about the firm's development and the 
subject's views of that process and related matters 
(Appendix 1). Apparently significant events were teased 
out and later cross-checked with reports of other 
subjects. Agenda from a discussion with another party was 
sometimes injected into a later discussion when it could 
be done without breaching confidentiality.
The researcher attempted to be non-directive in 
style and to avoid expressing personal opinions other 
than where they could be presented as a form of devil's 
advocacy to stimulate reaction. Care was taken to
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understand the ideas and constructs invoked by subjects, 
typically by re-articulating a proposition to get 
rebuttal, or confirmation by elaboration.
Whilst the aim was to discuss themes and topics 
significant for the firm's development, the researcher 
tried to avoid 'leading the witness' in respect of what 
was to be classed as significant. The use of the word 
strategy and related terminology was avoided, since it 
was thought that using the word would lead subjects to 
espouse formal planning which, as might be expected in 
small firms, turned out largely to be absent. Likewise, 
one remained sceptical about claims to intended (as 
opposed to emergent) strategy. Rather, what was sought 
and is hoped generally emerged were the issues and 
priorities considered by the executives to be genuinely 
important in context.
Themes emerging in a first interview were quite 
often repeated in later ones by the same or another 
subject. Since the author was a constant element of this 
process, it seems plausible that these themes were 
authentic, not contrived, though one would not claim they 
exhaust any subject's repertoire of themes with a 
strategic content.
The evidence of actions and events was also used to 
infer theories-in-use. Evidence of events was taken to 
include corroborating testimony by two or more 
colleagues. Documentary corroboration was also sought 
where possible, but as indicated already, this was not 
always the case. Of course, even where the fact of a
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reported event is not doubted, its significance remains a 
matter for interpretation.
3.2.5 Data treatment: options and choices
Language is a powerful means to transmit and share
meanings in modern organizational contexts. As Pfeffer
(1981b, 9) argued,
'one of the tasks of management ...involves the 
construction and maintenance of shared meanings... 
paradigms ...languages and cultures'.
This study in effect tried to access linguistically the
reflections of executives pertaining to the processes and
priorities of managing their firms.
Everyday decoding of language is done incompletely 
and idiosyncratically. Systematic research decoding is 
problematic, even after transcription to text, as witness 
the differing aims and approaches of content analysis, 
semiotics, discourse analysis and literary criticism. A 
rich interpretation of textual material has three 
elements, syntactic/structural, semantic, and pragmatic: 
the interactional context of listener and speaker 
(Mishler, 1986, 74). Here the semantic component is of 
primary interest.
An excellent review of text analytic methods was 
provided by Huff (1990), including (i) content analysis 
(Berelson, 1952? Holsti, 1969? Krippendorf, 1980) (ii) 
cognitive mapping/modelling (Axelrod, 1976? Bougon, 1983? 
Eden et. al., 1979) (iii) repertory grid (Kelly, 1955? 
Fransella & Bannister, 1977? Reger, 1990? Ryle, 1975)
(iv) argument mapping (Huff, 1983) and (v) narrative
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semiotics (Fiol, 1990). Often several approaches are used 
in conjunction (eg. Calori et. al., 1992). In addition, 
one should mention (vi) theme analysis (Jones, 1977).
Content analysis has generally concentrated on 
manifest, surface-literal meanings, using mutually 
exclusive coding categories for the purpose of frequency 
counts. The technique has generally been used to ask a 
narrow range of questions of large quantities of 
secondary text.
Cognitive mapping techniques can be applied to text 
or to engage the subject interactively. Cause-effect 
'influence diagrams' are often modelled on computer 
(Hall, 1976; Morecroft, 1983) to highlight counter­
intuitive effects. Unless treated thus, typical 'spider's 
web' maps are difficult to interpret. Mapping policy- 
related constructs is associated with Axelrod's (1976) 
studies of political elites. Other notable studies 
include Bougon, Weick & Binkhorst (1977), Checkland 
(1981) and Eden et. al. (1979; 1986).
Repertory grid techniques work well with relatively 
structured approaches to data generation;, analysis is 
efficient, using computer packages as good (or as flawed) 
as the processing algorithms employed.
Mason (1969), Mason & Mitroff (1981) and Huff (1983) 
were prime movers in the application of dialectical 
approaches to the analysis of managerial cognition. 
Argument mapping applies the formal structure of logical 
argument, after Toulmin (1958). It is a powerful 
expository device, though it imputes logical thought
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patterns to the text, which is plausible for stylized 
texts such as company reports (Huff & Fletcher, 1984), 
but less justified in everyday communications. It is 
labour-intensive, though computer-aided analyses are 
possible.
Narrative semiotics (Fiol, 1990) has intriguing 
possibilities, analysing text via an 'actant' model based 
on the posited structure of fable (Gahmberg, 1983?
Greimas & Rastier, 1968; Propp, 1968). Mishler (1986) 
also interpreted in-depth interview narratives 
analogically as fables or myths. Manning (1987, 50) used 
a semiotic approach to explicate the meaning of policy in 
an organization as five levels of abstraction. Semiotics 
is claimed to probe the deep structures of meaning, 
though it also overlays the data with an arguably rigid 
and contrived template, in contrast to the more pragmatic 
and potentially insightful metaphor of organization-as- 
theatre (Mangham & Overington, 1983; 1987).
Finally, attention is drawn to Jones (1977) whose 
thesis paralleled research in cognitive taxonomies and 
scripts. She argued that the key to decoding a text is to 
identify its theme, 'central thread', or 'minimum 
generalisation'. Theme was also defined as referential 
prominence: that which the text seeks to explain in and 
of the world out there. Themes form a referential and 
semantic hierarchy; a key concept constitutes the theme 
of a point, a key point the theme of a script, a key 
script the theme of a metascript, (the text as an 
entity).
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Jones' approach mirrors Abelson's (1973) master- 
script approach. An actor's beliefs, Abelson proposed, 
can be inferred from his language of explanation and 
represented as a nested or hierarchical array of 
constructs (section 3.2.6). This structuring facilitates 
data reduction, as will be explained. Detailed, iterative 
codings of the transcripts can also be employed to tease 
out a range of concepts with seemingly paradoxical 
qualities. This analysis complements the script approach, 
along with the search for metaphors conveying executives' 
images of role identity.
Prior to detailed coding, raw transcripts can 
usefully be restructured into coding transcripts, 
temporally and by theme. That is, a subject's reflections 
on past events, view of the current situation and 
expectations about the future can be categorised and then 
further categorised by theme. This was the approach taken 
here, these coding transcripts being the principal 
sources of data for detailed analysis. The results for 
Bill White of Wittenshaw Abrasives and Hamish Dean of 
Pyrochem are reported in Chapters 4 and 5.
3.2.6 The approach to script-analysis 
The analysis draws heavily on the script approach. 
Accordingly, this will now be elaborated in more detail. 
Scripts are heuristics, caricatures of complex cognitive 
realities (Abelson, 1973). Still, the essence of good 
caricature is its ability to generate insight. Applying a 
formalised script approach to the comparatively
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unstructured domain of strategic thinking is a 
significant step, though consistent with the spirit of 
Abelson's (1973) research into masterscripts.
These invoked the elements of goal (desired end 
state), strategy for achieving this state, and 
confounding factors frustrating the achievement of the 
goal. Causality is an intrinsic feature of the 
masterscript, illustrated by Abelson's 'Master Script for 
a Cold War Ideology' with respect to superpower relations 
at that time. The formulation in Figure 3.1 is presented 
from the perspective of an American 'Hawk'.
Figure 3.1













— ^  victory
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Communist victory
The goal encoded in Figure 3.1 is simple: Free World 
victory over the Communists. It is perceived to result 
from the strategy of using Free World power to counter 
the multifarious Communist schemes that pursue aims 
inimical to the Free World. Sadly, from the Hawk's 
perspective, liberal thinking paralyses the will of the 
Free World, subverting its ultimate goal, justifying a 
concerted call to action.
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The masterscript indicates in general terms the 
means to a desired end and the perceived factors 
confounding that end. It is a cue for - and legitimiser 
of - certain kinds of behaviour, though it offers no 
specific prescriptions for action. For present purposes 
it can usefully be reconfigured as in Figure 3.2 which 
illustrates more explicitly the transformational nature 
of the script, defining the desired movement from a less 
to a more desired state (Newell & Simon, 1972). The logic 
of Figure 3.2 remains consistent with Abelson's text. 
Assuming that time flows from left to right in the chart, 
the restructuring also emphasises the emerging stimulus- 
response or problem-solution nature of the hurdles to 
goal achievement.
Figure 3.2

















From the perspective of the Hawk a paralysis- 
inducing atmosphere is a major confounding factor to 
emerge in the early 1970s after the difficulties of Korea 
and Vietnam, where a good deal of Free World power was 
applied. However one might take the view that
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relationships between these factors are still not fully 
represented in Figure 3.2. Developing this observation to 
a conclusion gives rise to a nested structure (postulated 
in a somewhat different fashion by Abelson himself).
Figure 3.3 illustrates how nesting enhances the 
representation of the Cold Warrior's outlook. The 
principal confounding factor or hurdle to the achievement 
of Free World security is still Communist schemes, the 
response to which in the mind of the Cold Warrior is to 
apply countervailing force. For the Cold Warrior the 
latter is therefore now perceived as a desired proactive 
state - in opposition to the perceived extant state of 
inertia. This proactive state, it is argued, therefore 
constitutes a second-order goal underpinning the Cold 
Warrior's primary goal of Free World security.
Figure 3.3

















Call to action 
(awareness, debate, incitement?)
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But the factor confounding the realisation of the 
Hawk's desired proactive state is intellectual paralysis 
perceived to derive from fuzzy liberal thinking. The Cold 
Warrior defines the solution as a concerted call to 
action.
In the format of Figure 3.3 the superordinate goal 
of Free World security is enabled by cognising a 
subordinate, goal, ie. the proactive use of Free World 
power to reverse Communist advances. This is a 
challenging subgoal in an environment construed as 
liberal, appeasing, disinclined to act. Hence the Hawk 
perceives the need to overcome liberal sensibilities by 
raising consciousness via political debate. This call-to- 
action becomes a third-order desired state whose 
existence elaborates a moderately complex, cognitive 
hierarchy.
The general proposition is that a nested, 
temporally-sensitive structure in the format of Figure 
3.3 will function equally well in representing the 
outlook of business executives. However, configuring a 
large transcript along these lines is not a trivial task. 
Despite systematic coding, the researcher coping with 
large quantities of relatively unstructured narrative and 
expositional text needs frequent 'judgement-calls'
(Noblit & Hare, 1988, 34; Geertz, 1973). Interpretations 
also rely to some degree on contextual knowledge 
negotiated between analyst and text originator.
A practical question is whether to reconstruct a 
script by identifying the most detailed constructs and
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working towards more general ones, or the reverse, 
addressing first the global sense of a text. In practice 
a full analysis requires several recursions upwards and 
downwards. Moreover, it appears that some constructs 
occur at different levels and times as the actor's 
thinking evolves.
3.2.7 The script approach applied to White and Dean 
To illustrate the process the respective master-scripts 
of Bill White and Hamish Dean, the principal actors of 




Big firm working 
environment/employee 
status







Run a successful 
owned-and-operated 
small business
# Meaning in practice, independence from arbitrary 
decisions, control of destiny, financial rewards linked 
to personal efforts, creation of a capital asset for 
ultimate resale.
Stated simply, White desired personal fulfillment 
and gratification from his working life. To achieve this 
state, he needed security and financial rewards linked to 
his own efforts. He also needed to feel he was in control 
of his destiny, which in practice he associated with
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creating a substantial capital asset for his retirement. 
This goal would not be achieved by continued employment 
in a big abrasives firm. At metascript level the latter 
was therefore construed as a significant confounding 
factor which could best be overcome by founding and 
running a successful small business in a similar industry 
sector.
Owner status became, in effect, the goal of a second 
order script. As will be seen in chapter 4, the level 
below the masterscript appears to be particularly 
important, since it shows the practical direction of his 
emerging strategies for ultimate goal achievement. Thus 
it will be referred to as the strategy level.
Delving further into White's account reveals lower 
level goals, the achievement of which would underpin the 
main goal of a successful business owner. These subgoals 
prompt initiatives which in turn are subject to 
confounding factors and contingent responses. The latter 
in their turn define additional subordinate goal states.
A rich picture thereby emerges of White's outlook, 
adequately represented by three levels nested underneath 
the masterscript.
Interestingly, however, multiple levels appear not 
to increase the number of confounding factors and 
responses exponentially. This is thought to be because 
White exhausts his repertoire and achieves cognitive 
closure around a limited number of solutions, about two 
dozen. Some appear at various levels; for example, the 
solution of 'reliance on personal involvement and
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efforts' is posited at levels two, three and four (see 
chapter 4 for greater detail).
Hamish Dean's masterscript is similar (Figure 3.5). 
Being younger, Dean was less concerned with security. He 
wanted to make his mark and have fun. He claimed that he 
set up his own firm because his employer would not agree 
to his being an 'employee entrepreneur'.
Figure 3.5
Hamish Dean's Masterscript
Lack of personal 









Run a successful 
owned-and-operated 
small business
# Meaning in practice, independence from negative 
thinking, being challenged and winning, having fun, 
getting financial rewards linked to personal efforts.
Dean's masterscript was reconstructed in a similar 
way to White's, in terms of levels and recursiveness. The 
nested structure of his scripts is exemplified in Figure 
3.6, covering the period when Dean had begun to operate a 
small distribution firm to handle special fire-protection 
paints in the U.K..
Unfortunately a major hurdle emerged, namely that 
his own enthusiasm for the product was not shared by a 
highly conservative marketplace. Dean assumed that the 
solution to this problem was to achieve a state where key
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market influencers accepted and would endorse his 
products. He defined these influencers as fire officers
Figure 3.6
An example of nesting in Hamish Dean's script
Level 2 (strategy level)
Conservative market 
is unreceptive to 
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independent)
V
Get regulators & 
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Level 4
Inadequate means to communicate 
an aesthetic sales message 
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(Functional 
appeal)
Commission top quality 
brochures and recruit high 








and other technical experts, whom he lobbied 
energetically. It then emerged that a major hurdle was 
their continuing scepticism over the product's technical 
performance and so, even in relation to his subgoal of 
successful lobbyist, Dean made little headway.
At some point, as a response to this problem, he 
reoriented his appeal to emphasise not only the 
functional, but also the aesthetic benefits, as compared 
with alternative forms of fire protection. This led him 
to redefine architects as the key influencers. They did 
indeed prove more receptive. But in pursuit of his new 
subgoal of endorsement by architects, Dean found he now 
had to overcome another hurdle, namely inadequate 
marketing resources to communicate his new message. This 
he solved by recruiting a small number of good calibre 
salespeople and commissioning extravagant, but 
authoritative literature, making his tiny firm seem as 
credible to a potential client as, say, I.e.I.
Thus Dean underpinned his ultimate goal of self- 
actualisation with a sequence of subordinate goals 
designed to tackle emerging difficulties. The second 
(strategy) level is of interest because it encodes his 
thinking as to the development path of the firm at that 
time, namely as a specialist paint distribution company. 
Level three informs us in more detail how the strategy 
was envisioned and developed in practice. Level four 
addresses quite tactical issues and is perhaps of less 
interest. In general it also repeats script elements from 
higher levels.
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To summarise then, scripts with nested problem- 
solution structures informs much of the analysis reported 
in Chapters four and five. The approach acknowledges and 
elaborates on the masterscript concept of Abelson (1973). 
However, it will also be argued that lower level 
'solutions' appear on occasion to invert in the 
hierarchy, becoming higher level solutions. As a 
consequence, the desired states they symbolise also 
become more significant in the thinking of the executive. 
This dynamic inversion or reframing process is 
comparatively infrequent and unpredictable. However, it 
is considered to be a characteristic of innovative 
strategic knowing and therefore highly significant.
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CHAPTER 4
A CHIEF EXECUTIVE'S STRATEGIC KNOWING:
Bill White of Wittenshaw Abrasives.
In this chapter Bill White's strategic outlook is 
examined in depth using the approaches outlined in 
Chapters 2 and 3, likewise in chapter 5 for Hamish Dean 
of Pyrochem. The discussion begins with a description of 
the firm's development, drawing extensively on White's 
own account. This is followed by a script-based analysis 
of White's outlook and perceptions, including insights 
from close colleagues, drawing on their own accounts 
transcribed from interview discussions.
In later sections of the chapter the notion of 
cognitive dualisms are used to explicate White's outlook 
further. This is followed by an exploration of his 
perceptions about role-identity, expressed in terms of 
metaphors and archetypes.
4.1 Synopsis of the Firm's Development
Wittenshaw Abrasives was started in 1980 by two partners, 
Bill White and Graham Shaw to manufacture and sell 
abrasive belts for industrial use. White, an experienced 
sales executive with a major manufacturer of industrial 
abrasive products, was prime mover. He believed there was 
a market niche not satisfied by the major suppliers of 
sheet abrasives. White's motives for setting up 
Wittenshaw Abrasives were both personal and market- 
oriented. In the first place:
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'I was a nervous wreck! While I was working for 
another (abrasives) company.... I always felt just a 
small cog in a big wheel. There was no real 
gratification to that....
I'm really a square peg trying to fit in a round 
hole. I'd much rather paddle my own canoe... for my 
own personal satisfaction and enjoyment.'
There was also the question of reward in relation to
effort:
'What you get out of life is directly related to your 
own initiative and effort. That to me is a more 
desirable situation than what I get is dictated by 
other people, irrespective of what effort or 
initiative I use. That really was the top and bottom 
of it, you know, to be in control of (my) own destiny 
to a greater degree.'
White was casually acquainted with Graham Shaw, a
college lecturer. He explored his idea with Shaw because:
'everybody's interested in setting up their own 
businesses, everybody wants to work for themselves... 
everybody would be keen in principle to set up their 
own business.'
After much discussion and many experiments in Shaw's
garage they formed Wittenshaw Abrasives with equal,
nominal equity stakes in the venture. Initially they
worked part-time, but White soon quit his paid job:
'I just (had) a belief in myself and a gut instinct I 
could fill a gap that needed to be filled in the 
market. It was just a gut instinct that if we bought 
in a thousand pounds of that material at that price, 
we could make (abrasive belts) and I ...could go out 
there and sell them...'
White accepted the need for extreme personal
commitment of time and labour, particularly during the
first 18 months:
'I went out in my Cortina and got an order at 10 
o'clock, made the order between 11 and 3 o'clock and 
went back and delivered it the next morning and got 
another order elsewhere. As basic as that. It wasn't 
a market I had any ...contacts in...but as soon as 
I'd walk through the door I'm half way there.'
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Subsequently he continued to see personal involvement 
as the price he paid for being an independent small- 
firm owner. Throughout he was helped by Shaw and by 
Shaw's brother, one of the first full-time employees 
and now production manager, though he has only a minor 
input to policy decisions. In contrast, Graham Shaw 
remained influential yet joined full time as late as 
1987 and still has other business interests.
At the start Wittenshaw served the smallest, most 
marginal industrial customers. It was a struggle to 
survive and make profits. Manufacturing was a core 
element of the project, producing abrasive belts for 
resale (a converter). White:
'I thought if I act as an agent (for big manufacturers) 
as a one man band I'm not going to get very good terms... 
and I'm not going to break my neck to sell (to users) at 
the (right) kind of prices ...in the marketplace. But if 
I can buy the raw material at the right price and convert 
it myself then I can come down to some very competitive 
prices and...stand a chance.'
This formula ensured immediate viability, albeit marginal
profits in the first year:
'No job was unviable, the object was to get the job 
and then create a viable way of doing it. Whatever 
method you have to do to get it done. Even if, 
literally, you're handmaking a batch of belts (and 
you) say, if I had to carry on making those that way 
for ever I'd be pinning pound notes to every bundle'.
After a period Wittenshaw moved to proper premises:
'We got a little first floor unit, 300 square feet., 
it amazes me that we actually set up - everything was 
really so basic., far too tentative. The sales office 
was four feet by six, it was an old toilet with the 
toilet taken out. The workshop was two rooms like 
these two offices [about 15 feet square] (and yet) 
it's amazing...if you've got the...flair for tackling 
obstacles and surmounting them...there are still ways 
and means if you've got the initiative to look at 
things, maybe just from that different angle.'
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Upto 1984 the firm grew moderately fast, catering
for the needs of customers within a thirty mile radius of
its premises in the centre of Wittenshaw. From the start
it relied heavily on two Scandinavian sheet abrasives
suppliers keen to gain share in the U.K. market. They
accorded Wittenshaw more favourable trading terms than it
could have hoped to get from alternative suppliers. As
White's confidence and knowhow increased he won business
with somewhat bigger metal polishing firms. By late 1984
it was clear that bigger premises and more staff were
needed, but Shaw now had other interests:
'The object was to build it up and get Graham into 
the business, (but now) we had to decide... whether 
to go forward with Graham as a part time contributor 
or to change it completely. ...he'd proven by that 
time that he'd got a flair for the commercial side of 
the business...the computer facilities... financial 
analysis...and I'd learned... how important that is 
to the success or failure of a business. And we 
thought there's no reason why we shouldn't carry on, 
on that basis..and..it (did) for about five years.'
They relocated to the present rented premises on a
modern, if downmarket industrial estate near the centre
of Wittenshaw in mid 1985. Concurrently, after a long
'courtship' White hired Mike Douglas, the sales
representative of one of his suppliers, as sales director
to accelerate growth. This happened with the supplier's
blessing, no doubt because it was thought cost-effective
to channel abrasives to small users via Wittenshaw and
similar distributors. White offered Douglas an 'excellent
package' including a 10% equity stake.
Bringing Douglas in was:
'...a key step, but it upped our overhead. To pay for 
it (ie. Douglas' salary and the rent on the new
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premises) we've had to achieve some more growth... 
two years...spent paying the price of that move, 
trying to build a fresh platform from which to go 
about doing things in a more sensible way.'
Douglas' contribution opened up a wider set of users
including stainless steel polishers and woodworking
firms, both big users of belts. Over the next 18 months
growth was rapid, but unfortunately at the expense of
profits. Given the higher overheads, the firm's financial
state became parlous and a deliberate effort was made to
refocus on sectors, customers and products which could be
served profitably.
In 1986 an M.B.A. student did a business analysis
and identified potential opportunities for profitable
growth. Though competent, he failed to inspire anyone:
'We had a study done by Guy, a pretty statistical 
kind of study... Graham being more of an academic 
type probably got more out of it. It had a lot of 
very relevant points in it, but the whole exercise 
wasn't done in a way, presented in a way that I, or 
Mike, could associate (with)...'
By 1987 it was becoming clear that longer term prospects
were unexciting, indeed White no longer expected growth
from the core business:
'We're not in an expanding market, we're in a 
shrinking market if anything...The ironical part is 
that (big abrasive firms) have realised this because 
people such as myself have pinched all this business. 
I'm not the only converter, a lot of other people 
have set up in the same thing....more and more people 
are after a slice of a shrinking cake.
I've got 60 big customers I have to look after now, 
so my capacity to prospect new business is very 
little....a smokescreen has been clouding the real 
truth, that our strength in the market to get new 
business has gone...'
To add to his misery:
'More and more (suppliers) are coming in from places 
like Spain and Italy, even Germany, at prices that
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will undercut the kind of raw material prices that we 
are paying.'
Despite the directors agreeing at the start of the 
1987/8 financial year to raise prices substantially, by 
mid year it was necessary to trim back to protect levels 
of business. At this point White and Shaw allowed a 
second M.B.A. student to examine the options for 
diversification. This chap, a Frenchman, was charismatic 
and greatly impressed everyone with his action-research 
style. His final report in October 1987 reached the 
conclusion that 'abrasives was a knackered market' and 
that new options were required. He identified several 
merchanting options, the most attractive of which to 
White were to supply polythene shrink films for 
protecting newly polished metalwork and honing stones for 
high precision metal finishing in engineering and medical 
applications. Before completing his project the student 
negotiated successfully with a French supplier of honing 
stones.
Though selling polythene films to existing customers 
was a logical extension of Wittenshaw's consumables 
business, it was a well-served competitive market. Only 
White believed it would capitalise on their image as a 
specialist supplier of abrasive belts. There was no 
consensus in the firm and it was not pursued, since with 
only 45% of the equity to Shaw's 45% and Douglas' 10%, 
White could be outvoted. Meanwhile, as an expediency to 
generate cash, White added protective gloves to 
Wittenshaw's consumables range. He instructed a clerk to 
sell them by telephone:
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'If you try to get Mike selling gloves, he's a 
confirmed coated abrasives salesman no matter what, 
he'll say, great, he'll agree...but his underlying 
mentality....'
White was critical of his colleagues for what he saw 
as their reluctance to embrace change, indeed in late 
1988 he said:
'I had a lot of doubt ...that the joint collective 
mentality was right...for us to really obtain the true 
potential of (the firm).'
However, he felt that the French student's intervention
had shifted the internal debate from shall we diversify
to what direction shall we diversify in:
'Jean-Claude's contribution ...was in terms of the 
mentality of the people, more so than the facts, 
figures and statistics. That's what we needed... 
we've got bloody papers everywhere with computer 
figures on. What was actually needed...was some way 
of breaking down the very difficult personality 
barriers and pointing them in a direction that can 
complement each other...
For a year or more I was saying.... something has got 
to be done. It's just no good me going out in the car 
five days a week, trying to find some more people to 
buy abrasive belts and getting nowhere.. But I 
couldn't actually make a case to the others to say 
that things have got to change. That our position in 
the market is bad... Through the efforts of Jean- 
Claude we were able to quantify that.'
Shaw had a different perspective? in his view,
talking achieved little without hard facts and a
disciplined approach:
'It's damned difficult because we could do with that 
bloody (market) information. It's...come out of both 
Jean Claude and Guy's report... We don't log 
information about who we are selling to, why we are 
selling, why aren't we selling.... We just don't 
know...it's always on one person's say so...We tried 
to say, this is what we must do, every new customer, 
we should log him all the way through the system.
From first call all the way through to whatever 
reason we didn't get (orders). So we can sit down and 
say why are we not getting penetration. Is it cost?
Is it quality? Is it the fact that we can't do enough
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calls a week or what is it? We just do not get it.... 
And it's bloody annoying to be guite honest... we've 
hammered this out a number of times and yes, yes, 
we've agreed we'll do it and it doesn't happen.'.
Though honing stones seemed compatible with the core
business, the technical knowledge needed to sell bonded
abrasives is different from coated abrasives and
Wittenshaw had no reputation in bonded products. White
remained the prime convert to honing stones:
'No way can I get Mike to prospect honing stones or 
anything like that...there is an inherent mentality 
block ...yes it's a great idea...but when it comes to 
doing anything about it...it just wouldn't happen.'
Despite their scepticism, White's colleagues allowed him
to go prospecting for this business. After six months he
became convinced that he was in the wrong segments of the
market. By now somewhat desperate, he identified a few
specialist segments to aim at:
'...other areas...very healthy profit margins...more 
specialized...more problems in continuity of supply 
... what they call super-finishing....for things like 
the ball bearing industry... I supply people who make 
artificial joints and they are working to very, very 
fine surface tolerances...
It happens to be where (our supplier's) strength is 
anyway. But of course we've wasted nearly 12 months 
farting around in the wrong areas... after six months 
or more ...I was at a point of having to ...say, hang 
on Bill, you've got to be strong enough if necessary 
to write off six or twelve months of work.
I really had to motivate myself. I had a very hard 
two or three months...trying to keep the momentum 
going...I'd flunked out of that initial market...one 
after another, bonk, bonk, they were going down like 
ducks. After two or three months I decided that I'd 
got to go and investigate other market areas. I had 
two or three enquiries... specialist applications...
I thought, I've got to see those through...if these 
... come up trumps, that says we should pursue those 
and forget about (the rest).'
After a further nine months he was optimistic that he had
found a viable business area. His stones were being
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evaluated by several firms for specific applications and 
though he had few firm orders, the omens seemed good. 
Meanwhile his co-directors kept the core business on a 
more-or-less even keel.
White also began to consider how they might extend 
their range of abrasive belts and cover new geographic 
areas:
'What's got to change to accommodate that is not a 
lot... it's an easier option as I see it...to take on 
a couple of guys and keep them within a narrow 
product range, chiselling away...',
whereas new products incurred all kinds of operational
costs and difficulties - new suppliers, stock holding
arrangements, more warehousing etc. In practice, however,
geographic expansion required them to prospect new
industrial sectors, and:-
'It's not easy to come up with a product that's in 
overall demand across so many different industries'.
So he was obliged to consider different products, either
as an equipment agent or as a consumables factor. The
absence of 'slack' resources for prospecting was a
continuing worry.
In parallel with honing stones, White explored 
several equipment agencies personally and found 
possibilities. One came to his attention by chance and 
greatly excited him. This was a scrubbing machine for 
recycling woodworking belts, which clog with resin long 
before they wear out. With this machine he could offer 
selected customers a service to reduce their belt costs 
by an estimated one third, yet still be extremely 
profitable for Wittenshaw. He envisioned a laundry
109
service like roller-towels, customers paying a monthly 
rental for a continuing supply of recycled belts. 
Admittedly,
'it's still got to pass the acid test...if it comes 
anywhere near the projections, it's going to be far 
and away the most profitable activity we've ever been 
involved in. It's one of those things you've just got 
to try. We've done the sums, you don't just go out on 
a whim, but... it's quite obvious that something so 
basic doesn't warrant months of investigation, just 
do it and if it works, it works, and if not, do 
something else, flog it (the machine) for what you 
paid for it.... You can overcomplicate things.
'The difference between Wittenshaw now and 18 months 
ago is that (then) we would probably have done 
exactly what all our competitors I hope will do, look 
at the machine and think, "that's bad news, I hope 
not many people buy those", and walk on. My guess is 
that if we can get this recycling project going it is 
a very quick-response growth activity and very 
profitable too.'
He attributed this new emphasis on a wider range of
offerings to his:
'...change of mentality...we're not in the business 
of making abrasive belts, we're in the business of 
trying to make profits. My mentality is definitely... 
(changing). If I had the money and someone could 
prove to me I could make twice as much opening a 
bistro or a doughnut factory round the corner than I 
can with honing stones, then I'd have no qualms about 
going into doughnuts or bistros.
I'm open to total diversification. I don't 
necessarily think that would be the case with Mike or
Graham I have very little inner commitment to our
traditional business. I'm thinking of Wittenshaw as a 
company that will give a service reducing customers' 
costs....filling the needs of very specialist niche 
applications in highly technical areas.'
Shaw and Douglas espoused more cautious enthusiasm 
for belt recycling. Intuitively, they seemed mindful of 
the merit of acting quickly and had agreed with White to 
order the first £2000 machine. If the project proved
viable it would get priority, in effect becoming the cash
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cow to fund growth of longer term projects, including
honing stones. Shaw's apparently cautious outlook
triggered an ironic comment from White:
'Bloody hell it's fantastic. I see it as something 
that could be the most profitable activity by far 
that we've ever had and the fastest (growing) and the 
strongest offer for customers in our lives..."We've 
got this little idea we are working on.../"'
White made numerous references to the mentality
block towards change and the problems of decision making:
'Graham is a practical bloke, likes to see things 
properly looked into... He is open to ideas, given 
that they can be proven to be viable 7
As regards Mike:
'After working with him for 3 or 4 years I am 
convinced I am on a loser trying to change him. I'm 
trying to tailor things to suit him. Rather than try 
to get Mike to sell polythene tubes, give him the 
recycling project and the abrasive belt business... 
and (get him) to improve on what we already do.
If we want to go into polythene, get someone else, 
form a separate company, avoid the built-in barrier 
... Mike has a style about him...we've got customers 
...where people go in and undercut us, but they chose 
to buy from us because of Mike's style. He has his 
own style. We are totally different in approach but 
we both get results. I don't knock him because if a 
salesman's style is conducive to getting results 
that's a good style as far as I'm concerned. It's got 
to be natural...otherwise customers see through you.'
Over diversification, consensus was under strain. 
Agreed task specialization reduced the scope of each 
player to criticise publicly the actions of the others. 
Failure to reach consensus meant that new initiatives 
were either still-born or pursued covertly, perhaps under 
disapproving scrutiny. White saw the internal politics of 
the firm grounded in narrow technical and market 
expertise, to which he attributed the anti-change 
mentality. For example, Shaw's analytical outlook
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emphasized the numbers-oriented, programmatic aspects of 
managing, a consequence of which was that Douglas had 
been strapped with difficult sales targets, making him 
defensive and unreceptive to change.
Arguably, the same could not be said of Shaw, 
however. One diversification option proposed light- 
heartedly by the French student was for Wittenshaw to be 
the U.K. import agent for his parents' winery. Publicly, 
this was laughed off. Yet for a time Shaw actually 
investigated this prospect and considered forming a new 
partnership to import organic wines.
At the peak of the economic cycle in the late 1980s 
Wittenshaw had grown to an organization of some 18 people 
including a few part-timers, and a turnover of around 
£500,000. Selling remained White's and Douglas' 
responsibility, though two agents also sent in orders. 
White acknowledged that the firm still needed to grow 
significantly to achieve a stable base. This would 
require a bigger, salaried sales force which he perceived 
as an expensive, up-front (and therefore high-risk) 
investment. He consistently refrained from taking this 
step:
'I could say, look, if I had half a dozen reps it 
doesn't matter how loyal they are, they are just 
selling tools... (but) I would rather have one good 
bloke, pay him well and gear a package to him that 
locks him into the business...can we as a small 
outfit... make his job that much more attractive than 
if he worked for a big firm.'
As regards other forms of investment, even after the 
expansion of 1985, expenditure on plant, equipment and 
other facilities was minimal. They treated belt
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production as a cottage industry: the firm never borrowed
money save for a modest overdraft facility, and had made
only minor investments in equipment to enhance
productivity. It was seen as the only way:
'We set up on a shoestring, we set up literally from 
nothing with nothing....other than having capital 
resources to do it on a respectable scale from day 
one and we didn't....'
Ordering the belt laundering machine was clearly out
of character. It was probably the single biggest capital
investment the firm had made to date, aside from motor
vehicles (purchased nearly-new, rather than leased). As
Shaw explained:
'We made steady progress..there was no real need, or 
we didn't think there was any need at the time to 
invest more capital. Both of us, I think, were not 
prepared to risk a lot of money ...we were not 
prepared to go and borrow £10,000 from the bank and 
put it into the company. Having said that, we did 
feel that the whole thing didn't need that kind of 
money, we could actually...self finance it the whole 
way...by making profits.'
In the early days White and Shaw contained costs by
not extracting proper salaries. In the late 1980s White
still used his spare time as an essentially free resource
in preference to hiring more full time staff, though he
acknowledged that he had less time to plan and manage the
business than he ought:
'I don't want to be in the workshop cutting and 
making belts myself...I've got a team of blokes doing 
that... (but) I would like to have done the same 
thing for sales. I haven't yet, but I'm determined 
to. I enjoy selling, but I don't want to be... making 
cold calls for the rest of my life...I'd like other 
people to be doing that for me, leaving me free to do 
other things, whatever those things may be.
It's a chicken and egg situation. How can I afford 
the time to just sit down...thinking (when) the 
orders aren't coming in and the viability of the
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company goes from bad to worse? On the other hand if 
you don't, you don't achieve your objectives as 
clearly or as well as you would have done.'
Shaw also gave his spare time freely in financial
management and administration. Douglas and Shaw's brother
were the other two with managerial responsibility.
To summarise, though the firm occupied a market 
niche it had remained marginal. From a stakeholder 
perspective, there are so many suppliers of abrasive 
products that it is hard to conceive of suppliers or its 
customers being seriously affected were it to cease 
trading. The banks had no significant stake in the 
business either. Naturally, employees would suffer if it 
ceased to trade, though most had skills that would in 
principle make them employable elsewhere. Indeed, it 
remains surprising that so marginal a business can 
survive in such competitive circumstances. All credit to 
the principals that by sheer doggedness and by offering 
good customer service it has survived for so long.
White:-
'We're hanging on because of the relationships that 
we've developed with customers and the service that 
we've given. We still give probably the best 
turnaround in the business overall. I don't think 
anybody would be able to match the kind of delivery 
that we give. It's a key thing to our keeping 
customers...not necessarily the reason for getting 
the business in the first place, but very much the 
reason for keeping it.'
4.2 Script Analysis of Bill White's Outlook 
Constructing a script analysis of White's strategic 
outlook required the identification of goal couplets:
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less-desired goal state <---> more-desired goal state,
followed by the hurdles apparently confounding the 
achievement of the more desired state. One then sought 
White's reactions to overcoming these hurdles. These 
become, in effect, subordinate goals enabling the 
achievement of the overall goal. But these reactions in 
turn define subtexts nested within the script. White's 
most general or masterlevel script was discussed in 
chapter 3 and is repeated for convenience as Figure 4.1.
# Independence from arbitrary decisions, control of 
destiny, financial rewards linked to personal efforts, 
creation of a capital asset for ultimate resale.
This script describes White's motive of personal 
gratification in terms of security (control of his 
destiny, financial rewards linked to effort and the 
creation of a capital asset for ultimate resale). He saw 
his big firm employee status as intrinsically 
unattractive because it stymied his personal goals, hence 
creating the drive to set up his own firm.
Figure 4.1
Bill White's Masterscript
Big firm working 
environment/employee 
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In the masterscript four levels of sub-script were 
used to represent White's outlook. It was necessary to 
work recursively through these levels of subtext, with 
the final stage proceeding from the top level downwards. 
The level immediately below the masterscript portrays 
what the writer understands to be White's key 'strategic' 
goals, as these emerged over time. Level 2 scripts are 
quite generic in character yet, in line with 
categorization theory, appear to have considerable 
utility for Bill White.
The following discussion concentrates on these 
strategically-useful scripts and their underpinnings. 
Three were identified: (i) Script 2a: Niche market 
opportunity (selling a responsive, semi-custom abrasive 
belt-making service to small, local customers in low 
technology applications) (ii) Script 2b: Grow towards a 
stable plateau in the abrasive belt market (thereby 
achieving financial security), and (iii) Script 2c: 
Develop a diversified business base. Each will now be 
discussed in turn.
4.2.1 The niche-market opportunity script (2a^
At the outset White was guided exclusively by this script 
in his quest for a successful owned and operated 
business. A number of hurdles emerged which had to be 
overcome, but their existence did not discredit the 
niche-opportunity script. Specifically, White had to 
tackle various confounding factors:-
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(i) personal intolerance of financial and other risks,
(ii) lack of technical and market-related knowhow,
(iii) lack of resources including finance, and
(iv) lack of (short-term) credibility with customers.
White relied on a number of facilitating or circumventing 
strategies, as detailed in Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2 




































To mitigate the perceived risks of a new business he 
(i) used intuition, doing what he felt instinctively was 
right (ii) entered an 'unburdening7 partnership with Shaw 
and (iii) was patient, tolerating slow, plodding growth 
as the consequence of avoiding risks, especially those he 
associated with debt.
To counter lack of product and market knowhow, White 
(i) used ad hoc contacts wherever possible (ii) behaved 
adaptively (being experimental, reactive and action- 
biased) and (iii) was heavily committed to and involved 
in the firm, evidenced by working late into the night, 
every day of the week, if needed. The latter ploy also 
countered the lack of resources, the solution to which he 
reinterpreted over time as being the substitution of
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labour for capital investment. Finally, to overcome his 
lack of customer credibility, White was highly responsive 
to customers' needs, which in practice meant delivering 
customised product quickly, when promised, and at a low 
selling price. By these means he won rapid acceptance of 
the firm's 'offering' in the short term.
White's emergent responses in the level 2 script 
constitute goals of level 3 scripts, towards which he had 
to strive in the face of a another set of emerging 
hurdles. The latter were circumvented by additional 
responses that in their turn became the goals of level 4 
scripts. To take one example, the Level 3 
'responsiveness' subscript defined initially in the 2a 
script required White to address the question of how to 
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The first barrier to being responsive was the 
(perceived) lack of support from raw material suppliers, 
a consequence White thought of Wittenshaw's poor 
credibility, and because these suppliers saw him as a
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competitor, rather than as a good customer. The second 
hurdle to responsiveness was the inability to offer low 
prices if he purchased ready-made belts from U.K. 
suppliers, due to his lack of bargaining power. A third 
difficulty was his customers' desire to use non-standard 
(ie. custom) belts.
White's solutions to these hurdles were to (i) 
purchase basic materials from a Scandinavian company that 
had recently entered the U.K. market and was therefore 
willing to offer him favourable trading terms, (ii) 
minimise the costs of made-up belts by setting up a 
rudimentary facility to 'cut and paste' belts from large 
sheets of abrasive materials, and (iii) make a virtue of 
manufacturing belts to clients' specifications on receipt 
of order.
However, White's difficulties were compounded by the 
lack of people and physical resources to convert 
materials efficiently and speedily into belts. Whilst the 
ploys above enabled him to minimise on-costs, the 
corollary was a process that had to be 'operated on a 
shoestring', giving rise to the Level 4 'manufacturing 
sub-script' shown in Figure 4.4.
In this fashion it is possible to map out a complex 
pattern of goals, hurdles and responses cognised and 
enacted by White. Observations come directly from his 
account of how the firm developed. These help us to 
understand his outlook in relation to the development of 
Wittenshaw. An obvious implication of this script
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approach is that an individual's changing outlook over 
time can be explored.
Figure 4.4
White's 'Manufacturing' script
Lack of investment capital, 
low mechanisation, 
small premises
Run a 'shoestring operation'
- Personal involvement
- Adaptiveness
- Cobble equipment together
- Use relatives & part-timers
It is also useful to note how White's early scripts 
match the testimony of his close colleagues. As White's 
partner since 1980 Shaw was in a good position to comment 
on the development of the firm. Douglas had worked for 
Wittenshaw since 1985 and had encouraged White virtually 
from the start in his role of supplier's representative.
Shaw had no prior knowledge of abrasives. His motive
for setting up the firm in 1980:
'was purely an opportunity. I hadn't been involved in 
any business enterprise before. I liked the idea. I 
could identify quite readily with the product, the 
market, being an engineer myself. I thought it would 
be a way of making money...which was totally...or 
partly under my control. My main objective was to get 
involved with something that looked exciting because 
it was new to me and hopefully after a few years make 
some money out of it and become involved in a 
business enterprise.'
Whilst his motives parallelled White's, his commitment





> cheaper in 
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days. In addition to his 'day job' he was involved in
another local startup:
'They both sounded interesting for different reasons 
... (I'd) go along with them both and see how they 
run, one's bound to... fade away. I was hedging my 
bets in that respect.'
The firm that stopped him joining Wittenshaw full time:
'was a high tech venture, big potential...it offered 
all the things (this) didn't. This was low tech, 
plodding, minimal rewards, easy to run, no great 
future.'
So Shaw presumably anticipated hard graft and wasn't sure 
if he liked what he foresaw. Douglas, however, captured 
the sense of excitement in a small owned-and-operated 
firm:
'It was a hell of an opportunity to be asked to work 
here. I still enjoy it. We have our ups and downs 
...but I still enjoy coming to work in the morning 
and I still want to achieve a lot of things here. 
(Before this) I was always going to be a product 
manager, never a director and...I saw the chance... 
the future is a lot better here...I've got a good 
position, the future is...there to go for.'
Was there really an opportunity in 1980? Shaw:
'... we slotted in between the tool merchant 
distributor (who) could sell in small quantities at 
very high cost (and) the big manufacturers we were 
not competitive on price with, (but) offering a 
better price and a better service than the 
distributors. We generally went after the small 
user.'
Though White and Shaw portrayed the opportunity in market 
terms, Shaw pointed out the significance of the supplier 
opportunity, that they were fortunate to find two 
Scandinavian firms trying to build U.K. market share.
They were targeting the less-profitable business from 
smaller, more marginal abrasives users and it was 
attractive to channel these small accounts direct to
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converters like Wittenshaw. From their perspective White
was a useful man at the right time. Equally, they were
excellent news for Wittenshaw as Shaw explained:
'the only capital we required was for the stocks... 
financed from the suppliers, quite good credit 
facilities...we were very astute, we certainly never 
made any offer to pay earlier than we had to. We 
started off with essentially one major supplier... 
soon started selling quite a lot of their material in 
this area, so they obviously must have felt that we 
were a good bet, we had fairly good relationships 
with them.'
which extended to technical support as well.
The combination of few resources and a cautious
outlook meant that patient, incremental development was
in order. Shaw:
'There was never any mention of any capital involved. 
It was assumed to be a shoe string operation. Take it 
step by step. So my contribution would be first-of- 
all part time, which fitted in with this shoe string 
approach.9
They entered the market as recession deepened:
'In the first 18 months prices actually dropped - I 
think we were talking about £6.00 to £6.50 for a 
five-by-two belt...we were selling them for £4.15 
soon after we started. It was really bad. We (said) 
if we can actually get through this, things can only 
get better. We were viable, just viable, for the 
first three years of trading. We were not making any 
money...9
As Shaw said, their inability to grow fast meant
that their ambitions had to be modest:
'My time was free, the only one we had to resource 
was Bill... We never really investigated what 
ideally we needed for resources. Any moneys we 
started to receive could be used to resource Bill on 
a full time basis, and then transport and then 
everything else, getting more production people, 
bigger stocks. We got a company car, then two...I 
didn't take a salary for three years...we were just 
about managing to get along and make a bit of profit.
I was still prepared to put the time in for free 
whilst having some sort of benefit out of it. And it
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went on and on...it still didn't look really viable 
for me to come in full time. We could possibly have 
looked at...a different kind of forecast based on my 
full time involvement...we never really looked at it 
like that because it didn't really seem necessary.'
Despite his perception of the marginality of the
business, from the earliest days Shaw had attempted to
budget and plan on a rudimentary basis:
'we did have to do a forecast,..to borrow money from 
the bank, we didn't borrow a lot of cash, we put our 
houses up for security, borrowed a couple of thousand 
pounds, and to do that we had to give the bank some 
sort of business plan. So we had to set targets... 
but they were guess-timated really. We did a very 
simple business plan, cash flow if you like, just to 
try and establish what sort of money we needed and we 
used that for the bank to agree a thousand pound 
overdraft.
Really we just bumbled through the first year. Then 
we started to get real forecasts together for the 
years afterwards. I would say we were only looking 
months ahead really...to try and fill orders and 
didn't think too much of sales targets, we knew we 
had to meet certain levels but there was no real... 
long term planning at all. We never projected 
anything more than 12 months....and when we got to 
about the tenth month we'd start looking at our next 
year's figures. Which is really the same today. We've 
never really looked forward more than 12 months.'
4.2.2 The stable plateau script (2b^
After a couple of years it was becoming clear to White 
that whilst elements of the 'opportunity script' were 
still germane, it was insufficient to secure his long-run 
ambitions. Increased competition especially on price was 
eroding the competitive advantage of the firm. Its 
position could be maintained only by retaining the 
loyalty of customers, which required frequent face-to- 
face contact by White, a heavy personal burden, as well 
as vigilant attention to containing costs of manufacture.
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These priorities demanded more resources, investment 
in equipment and people. White saw the problem as 
Wittenshaw's continuing inability to generate sufficient 
profits to fund these investments. Thus emerged the myth 
of incremental growth towards a stable plateau (script 
2b). When this notional goal had been achieved 
substantial investments would be justified and 
affordable. One might alternatively call 2b the 'critical 
mass script'.
The immediate concerns for White within the emerging 
script were several. The partners had to confront the 
limited growth prospects of the formative market niche, 
populated by the smallest and most marginal users of 
abrasive belts. The emerging script legitimised (i) 
extending the product range via merchanting (extra 
business from existing customers and as a spin-off 
keeping them loyal) and (ii) prospecting bigger belt 
users in proximate geographic areas and applications.
Expansion was consistent with the new script, 
provided that White's personal control was not 
threatened, as it might be if they resorted to debt 
financing. Debt was excluded from the original script, 
the partners consciously adopting the patient personal- 
involvement approach to growth implied in the adjective 
'shoestring'. This philosophy was perpetuated in the 
emerging 2b script, whilst the lack of investment capital 
meant that Wittenshaw continued to be labour-intensive, 
oriented to growth within its limited means (Figure 4.5).
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In persisting with a cautious, evolutionary approach 
White avoided the need to reject script 2a explicitly; it 
continued to exert some influence, particularly the myth 
that they catered for a narrow niche market. Indeed, it 
is doubtful if White perceived a significant shift in his 
thinking at this stage. For example, his fear of losing 
control legitimised the same solutions of personal 
involvement and avoidance of debt as before.
Figure 4.5 
White's *stable plateau' script (2b)
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After another 18 months or so, the 'stable plateau/ 
script was serving to highlight the conflict between 
Wittenshaw/s lack of resources and its ambitions to grow 
by extending the client and product base. This led White 
to acquire bigger premises, more production staff, and to 
recruit Douglas as sales director. It now makes sense to
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think of script 2a mutating irreversibly to 2b. White's 
initiatives certainly added momentum to script 2b because 
the commitment of extra resources explicitly required 
more profits to finance them. The subsequent, overt 
pursuit of growth in the prevailing competitive 
conditions depressed prices and compromised profits. In 
an atmosphere of crisis the first Aston M.B.A. student 
examined what was to be done. He affirmed script 2b, 
subject to urgent financial controls being implemented 
together with a profit improvement programme, which was 
duly implemented over the next year. Profits improved, 
but the belief that they were specialist niche players 
continued.
Meanwhile, between 1985 and 1987 new entrants 
similar to Wittenshaw and increased competition from the 
major abrasives firms (becoming more willing to deal 
directly with smaller users) increased rather than 
decreased the threat to Wittenshaw. The 'plateau' script 
and more specifically Douglas' efforts to enhance the 
attention given to existing customers countered the 
threat, but his efforts also compromised the growth 
aspect of the 'plateau' script by leaving less slack 
resource to prospect and develop new customers. White was 
obliged to expend his own efforts strenuously. Limited 
growth in sales continued, though profits remained 
disappointing.
By 1987 White saw fundamental flaws in the existing 
script(s). The original opportunity was collapsing, so 
his long-term desire for security and independence was in
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jeopardy. The problem was knowing what to do, given the 
resistance to change he perceived in his colleagues. 
White's initial solution was not to confront the lack of 
enthusiasm for change aggressively, recognising that he 
valued consensus (at least, absence of conflict). Then, 
enter by chance a vehicle for change, the second M.B.A. 
student, who prompted the chain of events that initiated 
the 2c 'diversification' script (section 4.2.3).
As regards corroboration of the 'plateau' script,
Shaw commented that after three years or so the original
small factory unit:
'was bursting at the seams...If we had continued 
there we would probably have done quite well 
(financially). With the number of people and sales we 
were profitable. But we felt that expansion in the 
way we envisaged was the right thing to do for the 
future because we would get a better, more stable 
company...it became fairly evident that running 
with...three full timers and a couple of part timers 
was a little bit dodgy, one person was away and the 
whole thing sort of collapsed.
We knew we had to grow to the point where we had a 
stable base ...such that (with) one person off the 
whole thing didn't grind to a sticky halt. And the 
only way to do that was by growing... getting more 
sales, getting bigger premises, more staff... to 
become more self sufficient',
hence the move to the current premises and the
recruitment of Douglas. White was so keen to get Douglas
that he delayed relocation until the two events came
together. For Shaw, 1985 was a turning point:
'Restructuring and financing the business into a 
bigger operation... meant it could support me on a 
full time basis. We could see that unless we expanded 
...to take on more staff to take over the individual 
areas of responsibility we would always be tied on a 
day to day basis to the company... We wanted to... 
provide the executive management, not to be tied down 
to making belts or doing accounts...'
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Douglas was hired to generate sufficient new 
business to cover the additional overhead including his 
own income. Even so, it turned out to be very marginal. 
Shaw:
'We did (it) again on a shoestring, simply by 
increasing our overdraft. We moved premises, 
increased rent, increased stocks ...we had a [modest] 
grant from the City for ...eguipping the premises, 
new machinery, new equipment.
The equipment was hand made, there was probably a few 
hundred pounds worth of equipment...the whole stock, 
overheads, debtors were all financed out of creditors 
and a thousand pounds overdraft...
We made steady progress...we didn't think there was 
any need to invest more capital. We were not prepared 
to risk a lot of money., we were not prepared to go 
and borrow £10,000 from the bank and put it into the 
company... Having said that, we did feel that the 
whole thing didn't need that kind of money, we could 
actually ...self finance it ...by making profits.'
Wittenshaw by now had four suppliers, mostly on
complementary rather than competing lines.
The drive for stability apparently sustained the
myth that the stable plateau would be reached when the
firm was just that bit bigger than it currently was,
affirming the need to continue growing incrementally.
This was articulated clearly by Douglas and Shaw
respectively:
'We are all very cautious and we like to think we'll 
go one step at a time, just see how this goes down 
and see if we can make a success of this. Give it 
time to work and level out, then we'll start thinking 
where else to go.'
'We're trying to progress on profits which., really 
speaking...are minimal in the sense of retained 
capital and bank overdraft facilities. Which 
inevitably restricts our growth considerably...If we 
suddenly decided...this is a really good opportunity, 
but it needs 40,000 quid or something, I'm sure I'd 
be sympathetic to try and work something out.
But...we've never been in that situation.'
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So they sought growth in existing areas of belt
production and by selling more consumables. Shaw:
'one complements the other... just trying to resell 
(consumables) wouldn't be viable.' Equally, 'take the 
resale away and we'd be scratching around because we 
couldn't make enough belts...to make a profit to 
sustain these overheads. The two are very closely 
linked, I don't think we can separate them out.'
The traumatic and nearly disastrous expansion episode
after Douglas joined caused them to try to manage the
business more carefully. Shaw's increasing commitment to
Wittenshaw after 1987:
'enabled me to ...do something positive.... we'd got 
a lot of systems implemented but not working properly 
because I wasn't here...cash flow in particular ... 
within a matter of three months we improved our cash 
flow by £17-18,000 and kept it at that.
We've also.... sorted out all of our redundant 
stock....we literally found we had something like 
£12,000 of stock which we shouldn't have.... really 
there was no control...we've achieved a lot just by 
me being here a bit more.'
As part of the profit improvement programme, Shaw
attempted to persuade the others to be more disciplined
in setting and feeling accountable for achieving sales
targets. The message was getting home, but slowly:
'They are different in their way of thinking and 
doing things. Bill shares... the concern for having 
control...(on) the financial side. It's just...not in 
his nature to be totally sympathetic to having other 
sorts of systems, it's just not in his make up. He 
just can't work - he never has worked presumably - 
that way. So he finds it very difficult to go along 
with the idea that you've got to have a system for 
everything and ... try and work to it and only that 
way can you see clear ahead.
Mike gives the impression that he's far more 
organised... he is far more systematic about doing 
things. And he will certainly go along with filling 
out forms and working to the system ...he seems to be 
doing all the right things, but when you get down to 
it, the bits of paper he fills in...he fills in the 
top, he files it and that's it, they never get filled
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in again. So it looks as if it's all being done but 
it's not really. We've got nowhere on sales records, 
absolutely nothing...'
Shaw's achievements were acknowledged by Douglas:
'Graham is very good with records, excellent ...he 
can run anything on that computer. If I want to know 
where we stood today there would be a piece of paper 
on my desk in ten minutes. For a little company we 
feel that is a big move, you go to some people and 
they haven't got a clue from one month to the 
next...(they) haven't got the luxury of Graham.'
However,
'I'm not a great lover of paperwork, I just haven't 
got the time...at the moment I'm 80% out selling, 20% 
in here looking after queries or anything else that 
might crop up.
But as far as planning goes, we are getting more into 
that side of it now...the first year I started, we 
didn't lay down a proper plan, so we were a bit airy- 
fairy on where we were going, what were we actually 
achieving, and we learnt by our mistakes, we laid 
down proper Its a lot better (now).
We've all got our own individual targets...we all 
know what we've got to do...It's a very open company, 
if anyone has a problem he only has to shout and we 
talk about it and get it sorted out quickly.'
But these improvements did not obviate the perceived
need to extend the product and client base by reacting to
opportunities as they arose. As Douglas said, they had to
respond where the growth areas were. From 1987 these were
in woodworking and the wide belt stainless business.
Woodworking offered:
'customers we deal with every month, it's repeat 
business, and we've got ongoing contracts so as long 
as (they) keep going... our sales...stay the same.'
What they lacked in efficiency they made up for in
enthusiasm and effort:
'Customers know if they come on (the phone) today they'll 
get belts tomorrow if they are in trouble. We don't like 
(doing) that because it makes Geoff (production manager) 
feel wobbly the lead time is more like five days on
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average... but there are customers who want it a lot 
quicker., if they run out...we'll always help them out.'
According to Douglas, much of what success they had
achieved was attributable to mutual trust and integrity
in dealing with their supply chain. However, growth was
also constrained because:-
'we wouldn't attack any other distributor (of a main 
supplier) in the area.... (conversely)...they are 
very sensible... they've only got ourselves and one 
other active distributor in the area....I know where 
90% of his business goes, I wouldn't dream of trying 
to undercut him, we've worked so closely for years..'
Despite close relationships, independence remained a
priority. They would not willingly sacrifice independence
to achieve faster growth. Borrowing money or accepting
outside shareholders was equated with being on a slippery
slope, as confirmed by Douglas:
'We were approached (by) a company in Sheffield who 
was prepared to buy into Wittenshaw or take us over
completely.......for Bill and Graham... they've
struggled for years to get a company together. For 
what? Just to be bought out before they've really 
done anything? Bill certainly wasn't very keen. I 
listened with interest... and amazement that somebody 
was sitting in that chair making this offer.
But we can control our own destiny here. O.K. the 
growth is going to be that much slower, but so 
what... it's one of those facts of life. We feel that 
we've still got a lot of work to do...I like the idea 
of working here...for ourselves. As long as we make 
money we know our jobs are safe and nobody's going to 
throw us out....'
Yet running ever harder without reaching the 
mythical stable plateau reinforced cautious attitudes 
towards new investment and recruitment, institutional­
ising the philosophy of incremental development. As 
Douglas explained:
'...if we want a piece of equipment or to renew 
something - like the telephone system...the money has 
got to be there. We are very strict with ourselves,
131
we might have seven projects on the go and we'll list 
them in priority and then when we get the money... 
down the list we go...even company cars...we don't 
just say it's summertime, we've got to have a new 
car...it's got to be the right thing and the money 
has got to be there.'
White:
'There are still bits of equipment that I'd like that 
would give us greater efficiency and productivity. 
That kit I've got a brochure on there - £30,000
investment, even now I have to look closely at that.
Douglas still saw opportunities for profitable
growth in the core areas:
'... we are always looking for new market areas. 
Certain areas are proving to be very good and 
others...we...ease up on a little.'
Shaw was more sceptical:
'I find it very difficult to get information 
regarding the size of the market. We've kept on 
growing by increasing our sales and what's to stop us 
carrying on growing? I don't know what the potential 
is within (our) geographical area...and nobody's been 
able to furnish that information...
Marketing is not our strong point...we've got nobody 
with real marketing skills ...information is not 
available so I don't know how far we can go on 
growing... What we don't know is how many (potential) 
users are out there... You should be able to do some 
market research....so...1 could feel convinced that 
yes, there's a great deal more growth potential or, 
we're perhaps reaching a point where we're not likely 
to see (sales growth) other than by really dropping 
our prices.'
4.2.3 The diversification script (2c)
Despite the lack of solid data which Shaw desired, by 
1987/8 White was convinced that the current script(s) 
would not secure growth. He wanted to reduce the 
vulnerability of the business, based on a narrow market 
platform. His thinking eventually crystalised as a 
diversification script (Figure 4.6). To address his
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colleagues' perceived conservatism he felt intuitively 
that it would be necessary to challenge their status quo 
assumptions, but how? For some time he had no answer. 
Then, he was aided by the fortuitous intervention of 
Jean-Claude, the second M.B.A. student. White had not 
anticipated the unfreezing potential of an external 
change agent, but he was quick to exploit the possibility 
when it was demonstrated. He allowed Jean-Claude to act 
as devil's advocate, openly confronting the collective 
'mentality block' towards change, challenging in 
particular the prevailing belief that the solution was 
merely to do more of and better what they were already 
doing. By encouraging Jean-Claude, it seems that White 
hoped the 'mentality block' might be overcome without 
overt conflict.
Figure 4.6
White's 'diversification' script (2c)
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But despite White's faith in Jean-Claude's charisma, 
success was apparently limited to a recognition that 
things would have to change sooner or later. Strong
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personalities, indifference and inertia seemed likely to 
stymie any effective action in the short term. The 
outcome was that once again White took the initiative 
whilst the opportunity to use Jean-Claude's help was 
there. His 'challenging the status quo level 4 sub­
script' is portrayed in Figure 4.7.
Figure 4.7 
White's 'challenge status quo' script
'Mentality block' Strong personalities, 
on change and inertia/indifference &






















In this limited sense then, the status quo 
assumptions were successfully challenged. But there was 
evidently no practical consensus over the best growth 
option of several that the student identified. Indeed, 
there was a continuing lack of resources to pursue any of 
them (refer back to Figure 4.6). So White decided to take 
action personally, pursue multiple options and accept the 
need for patient plodding as before.
The Frenchman found a supplier of honing stones and 
White began prospecting for sales, a process his 
colleagues supported indirectly by relieving him of his 
other selling duties. He began to explore other options
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as time allowed. Thus, despite his incrementalist 
tendencies, White enacted a third, level-2 strategy 
script of diversification that was quite radical in 
comparison with previous scripts. He behaved adaptively 
and experimentally, by his own admission making a lot of 
mistakes, wasting a lot of time, learning painfully as he 
went. In exploring multiple options he could be likened 
to a gambler hedging his bets. The indifference of his 
colleagues merely reinforced his belief in the old 
formula of heavy personal commitment of time and energy.
After a protracted period of sales prospecting, it 
looked as if he would generate enough regular business 
to justify adding honing stones to the 'portfolio'.
When the belt recycling opportunity later emerged and 
attracted consensual support, even modest enthusiasm, 
it assumed priority, since White saw it as a 'cash cow' 
to fund the development of longer-term opportunities.
Shaw and Douglas remained ambivalent about
diversification. Shaw commented:
'Bill tends to be looking round, thinking of new 
ideas, Mike just wants better growth (in current 
market areas). ... When I started, the idea was to 
make a successful business that would carry on... 
that's still fairly important, but I'm thinking now 
of possible other ventures and I'm sure I wouldn't 
have done that two years ago.
'We've sat down and said right, we've got to look at 
diversification. We feel that's...inevitable. When it 
will come it is difficult to say, but I think we've 
accepted that diversification will come at some time. 
Whether it is slight or total...remains to be seen. 
We've started the ball rolling.'
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Because White took responsibility for prospecting
new areas, Douglas was put under pressure to sustain
current business. Shaw:
'We restructured the company such that Bill purely 
concentrated on new areas, new markets, products, 
diversification, current selling was really split 
between (Mike) and Fred. ... we (are (now) really 
looking towards diversification...to give us growth.'
Yet, in reality:
'...it is unlikely that diversification will be so 
great that we will be in completely different 
markets, reguire a whole new approach. If we decided 
there was nothing really close enough to our market 
to go for, it was all too different, then I guess we 
would leave it. We would try and get growth on the 
present product and then look again next year (or) 
another year when we were more financially sound....'
Shaw's attitude to new projects was that:
'Whatever proposition you make it's got to be solid, 
it's got to be based on something and that's what 
we've had difficulty with. Lots of ideas but no... 
real feel of what we should do, what should our 
objective be, how to measure performance and so on.
We have a lack of skills ...to guickly put on paper 
the rough pluses and minuses, costings and market 
projections, to be able to say look, I've got this 
idea, what do you think of these figures?'
As for Douglas, growth was likely to build on
current markets. He took a narrow view of their
collective expertise:
'We need to plan, we need to be able to put forward a 
sales forecast that we know we can achieve... and 
make sure that we are all exactly clear on what we 
are doing.
We are the experts in coated abrasives. Bill and I 
are coated abrasive people. Our personal backgrounds 
stem from abrasive belt manufacturers and it's what 
we know, that's where our expertise lies. And we've 
got a lot of contacts in the area and in certain 
business sectors and obviously we've got to utilise 
those and push them as far as we can....
But even we have got to accept that we've got to 
learn. There is nothing wrong in going out into a new
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business area and learning. And say, oh, I'm not 
sure, how do you do that? And we are prepared to do 
that. We are prepared to learn. We've got to be.'
As regards out-and-out diversification he was 
cautious:-
'We don't really envisage setting on a lot more 
labour in the works, we envisage going over to more 
semi-automated equipment to up the production 
figures. The expansion is going to come on the sales 
side.... We've thought about how we could raise cash 
... We thought about buying out smaller distributors 
and taking their business... If (an opportunity) was 
that good we would certainly look at moving premises, 
but it would have to be good.
It's a thing with me, if we are going to do it we 
either do it properly or just leave it alone....we've 
got a good reputation and I don't want to...start 
doing things (where customers say), Christ they've 
let me down, they don't do this or they don't do 
that... I just want to run it right. And Graham does 
as well, we'd rather just wait until the time is 
right. Because we're specialists in coated abrasives 
doesn't mean we're specialists in portable tools or 
diamond products or whatever, I mean, you can't be 
good at everything.'
In acknowledging the possibility of diversification 
there were real differences in outlook. If specialism was 
interpreted as coated abrasives, growth prospects in this 
competitive and mature market were poor, since many users 
were in decline. If specialism was interpreted more 
broadly, it reguired investment in people, equipment and 
facilities and except for the belt recycling project 
there was a reluctance to take any financial risk.
The belt-recycling concept had focused their
thinking. Shaw:
'I must admit (it) does look interesting. We've done 
all our costing, in fact we've gone ahead and bought 
the machine. ..and we've got two customers lined up 
who will probably take half the capacity anyway.
Instead of making 15% margins we might be making 60% 
on a slightly reduced turnover. The euphoria we had 
for this was unbelievable, you know, we'd have banks 
of machines...this is fantastic...
137
We've only made that investment because we all feel 
confident. It's not the typical euphoric reaction... 
which then decays. I know that we'll...find all kinds 
of problems... and it will make the whole thing 
slightly less attractive or totally unattractive.
This is what happens, you see, we get built up very, 
very early on.'
On his own, Douglas was also less than sanguine:
'In this case it's obviously...take the risk first 
and then hope. If we fill the capacity of that one 
machine we would have to review ... whether we put 
another (in) or whether we say, O.K., we've filled 
that, now leave it at that...
I still don't think we've hit on the right thing yet. 
This washing machine is the nearest we've come 
because it's so allied to the business we are in and 
it's going to produce so much more gross profit...
(but) once you've filled the capacity of that machine 
... you are not going to be able to go on and on 
offering the service because ...the delivery times 
will just go way out the window and you will become 
ineffective.
I don't think it will ever take over from (belt) 
making here. I see it purely as an add-on to the 
business we are already in... giving us a good inroad 
into some new business areas. We just haven't the 
resources to go too quickly...'
Douglas probably summed up their collective thinking
as regards the medium term:
'I'm not really one for building empires, so I'm not 
too bothered about how many more people we've got or 
how large we are. I'd rather see the company 
diversified, more profitable and more stable, more 
consistency. But I don't think we'll ever achieve 
that...
We need to get this washing machine thing proved. The 
honing stones, get that on a more stable flow of 
business. And I think in three years time if we've 
achieved those two or three things we'll have done 
quite well.'
There was a shared concern to keep the firm 
somewhere they all wanted to work. They all praised the 
staff. Getting the 'wrong' person was seen as a big risk. 
Douglas:
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'when you are small and you're expanding, it becomes 
very hard to add the right person to that team. The 
last recruit was young Stephanie...(she) stood out so 
much from all the others.'
For a sales position the situation was even more acute:
'we had this guy ...prepared to work as an agent on 
commission for six months and then if he likes us and 
we like him, we can take him on. We look at all sorts 
of things like that instead of...taking all the 
gambles of taking somebody on, getting a company car 
...a new salesman is a hell of an investment.'
Douglas saw continuing growth mainly as:-
'a way to achieve a solid base, a good company for 
everyone to enjoy. A lot of people have been with the
company since it started and (only) now are they
getting the rewards because they've stuck it out.... 
we have been over the moon that we've been able to 
reward them this year...they were all amazed ...If we 
can continue to give them a good standard of living 
... it makes for a happy ship.
If we wanted two lads to stay behind tonight to get a
rush job out you'd have two without saying you, you 
and you. We like that atmosphere, those working 
conditions. We wouldn't want to change that.
We have a good balance here, we've got Bill who's 
very outgoing and will say yes to anything really and 
Graham who's very down to earth and goes by what the 
figures tell him. And me, who is cautious...and won't 
jump until I've looked at all the different angles...
We've all got our own strengths and weaknesses which 
makes it a good working relationship. I don't tell 
Graham how to do his ...financial reports and he 
doesn't tell me how to sell coated abrasives. It 
works out very well. You could have three directors 
that are all salesmen...it just wouldn't work. But 
all three of us have got our own areas of 
responsibility, we know what they are, - it's all 
about communication, letting each other know what 
we're doing....'
4.2.4 Commentary on the script-analysis of White's 
outlook
White's evolving outlook has been described in terms of 
scripts. His masterscript was portrayed as a personal 
gratification script, operationalised via three second-
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level, strategy scripts, namely a niche opportunity 
script, a stable plateau-seeking script and a 
diversification script. It was suggested that the niche 
and plateau scripts were probably concurrent for some 
time, whereas the transition to a diversification script 
appears to have been comparatively abrupt.
The strategy scripts - as the label implies - are 
posited as fundamental to an understanding of White's 
development of Wittenshaw Abrasives. Initially he aimed 
to capitalise on a narrow niche opportunity. A relevant 
script unfolded as he confronted emerging obstacles to 
its successful implementation. Later this script 
apparently mutated into the plateau script as they 
pursued a limited-growth strategy towards the goal of a 
stable, if arguably mythical, state.
For a time these scripts were probably un­
differentiated in White's mind. Thus their diverging 
implications were not recognised, much less addressed. 
However, as the growth imperative of the plateau script 
became more salient, it legitimised a number of important 
'investment' decisions. These investments (moving to new 
premises and hiring Douglas) mandated an acceleration of 
growth. Only later, when White realised that the price of 
greater market penetration was a catastrophic erosion of 
profits and, in cutting costs and service levels, an 
impending loss of competitive advantage, did he confront 
implicitly the validity of these scripts. As a 
consequence, the diversification script emerged.
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In the analysis underpinning this conclusion, each 
of White's scripts were elaborated via systematic coding 
of the interview transcripts into a vertical hierarchy as 
posited for script structures. Two levels were explored 
below the 'strategy level', the findings being summarised 
in Figure 4.8 where subscripts are linked to the three 
strategy scripts. Some thirty two such script elements 
are listed. Most are judged to have influenced White 
throughout the period under scrutiny, which seems 
plausible given what we know of White's preference for 
cautious, incremental change.
Not evident in Figure 4.8, recursiveness arises in 
the vertical structure, with some level 3 elements re- 
occurring at level 4. This is predictable if an 
individual's thinking is to manifest cognitive closure, 
ie. White has a finite repertoire of solutions to 
problems, which he redeploys as he deems appropriate in 
context. In other words, new difficulties that threaten 
his masterscript directly or indirectly prompt him to 
find new solutions or reapply those that have already 
'worked' in a different context. However, until such 
difficulties must be confronted, White tends to persist 
with his current outlook.
It seems fair to conclude from the commentaries of 
Shaw and Douglas that they largely understood and shared 
White's assumptions. In particular, there was strong 
support for those beliefs which reinforced a narrow, 
patient, risk-averse approach. Yet they recognised that 










Avoid major debt x x
Rely on intuition x x
Patient plodding x x
Use outside contacts x x
Adaptiveness x x
Personal involvement x x
Labour intensive ops. x x
Be responsive to clients x x
Extend client base x
Extend product base x
Profit improvement prog. x
Challenge status quo (*) ?
Explore multiple options
Additional scripts found at level 4
In house belt-making x
Improve customer service x
Reactive investment (**) x
Mutual respect/consensus x
Rely on 'doers' x
Low risk recruitment (#) x
A few key players tied 




Use overseas suppliers x
Supply to order x
Reinvest profits x
Preferred firms (##) x

















































(*) articulating a sense of crisis
(**) rent, cobble together, do without until there is no 
alternative (whether people or equipment)
(#) eg. part-timers, agents, relatives
(#) Close contacts with key suppliers and 'quality
customers'
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now on the agenda. This was largely because of the 
interventions of the two external change agents, 
particularly the charismatic Jean-Claude. The latter won 
over White to the need for change, though it is doubtful 
if the others genuinely accepted his insistence on the 
need to spread risk by engaging in new projects. Thus 
diversification remained for them espoused theory.
Agreement over the pace and direction of change was 
evidently superficial because neither Shaw nor Douglas 
accepted that Wittenshaw had extracted all the possible 
returns from supplying small and medium sized regional 
users of abrasive belts. They supported the belt 
recycling project because of its apparent synergy with 
current activities, hence it did not require major 
changes or resource commitments. As regards the other 
options explored by White, they paid lip-service to his 
initiatives, but offered little direct support.
Paradoxically, Shaw had considered a new venture 
with different partners. This suggests that he saw 
Wittenshaw's scope as essentially static, ie. coated 
abrasives, so that if either he or White identified a 
more attractive business option they would be free to 
pursue it independently. By contrast, White espoused the 
idea of Wittenshaw as a holding company for a range of 
activities drawing on the skills and enthusiasms of the 
current actors.
Turning to the process of script analysis, 
explicating White's outlook in this way offers valuable 
insights. Particularly at the so-called strategy level,
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the analyst can map the emergence of new patterns of 
strategic thinking over time. This format accommodates 
White's evolving attitudes and responses to adversity. As 
we see how the script-in-use evolves, we detect the 
emergence of new strategy scripts. Moreover, by operating 
at progressively more detailed levels of script analysis, 
relating super- and sub-ordinate goals to perceived 
problems and attempted solutions, we are in effect using 
increasingly powerful 'microscope lenses' to expose the 
coping strategies and tactics construed by the actor.
Based on the analysis of White's outlook, it would 
seem that an emerging strategy script does not 
automatically supplant its predecessor. They may 
influence the actor concurrently for a period. This is 
thought possible for two reasons. First, as in White's 
case, many low-level components persist from one strategy 
script to another. This makes it likely that the shift is 
simply not recognised. Moreover, although it was argued 
that White ultimately rejected the niche opportunity 
script in favour of the plateau script, important 
elements stayed the same, underpinning an incremental, 
risk-averse approach. Second, to the extent that the 
actor becomes aware of concurrent scripts with differing 
implications, pragmatic range-of-convenience assumptions 
would seem to limit their perceived applicability. Thus 
White construed moving to new premises and hiring Douglas 
as consistent with the emerging plateau script, whilst 
precepts of parsimony and high personal involvement 
remained consistent with the 'low-rent' niche-opportunity
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script. Unlike Dean, as we shall see, there are few 
instances where White unequivocally rejected an old 
strategy - demonstrated not just in words but in actions.
4.3 Paradoxical Dualisms In White7s Outlook 
A key assumption of script analysis is that when 
difficulties have the potential to frustrate goal- 
achievement, actors react to overcome or circumvent them. 
Each time White intuited a hurdle likely to confound his 
script-in-use, he sought a counter measure. From the 
perspective of the external analyst, his thinking 
sometimes appeared to contain contrary priorities and 
imperatives. These, it is suggested, can be presented as 
paradoxical dualisms in his outlook.
A paradoxical dualism means a juxtaposition of ideas 
which at first sight have opposed or mutually exclusive 
implications. To reconcile consequent implicit tensions, 
the actor tries implicitly or explicitly to find a 
constructive equilibrium, although probably favouring one 
idea or position more than the other.
Some dualisms are logically irresolvable. For 
example, business growth normally requires investment. If 
an actor's growth ambitions are juxtaposed with a desire 
to avoid investment, it could be said that there is a 
logical contradiction. She could cope with the 
contradiction in at least three ways (i) ignore the 
contradiction and its consequences for as long as 
possible (ii) rationalise away the contradiction by 
assigning differing ranges-of-convenience in space or
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time to opposing priorities, or (iii) she can confront 
the contradiction aggressively and with imagination.
Some dualisms, however, constitute psychological 
oppositions in the sense that the actor construes 
idiosyncratic contradictions not substantiable via the 
rules of logic. For example, being personally involved in 
a business does not in a formal, logical sense preclude 
delegation. Still, an actor is free in principle to 
construe involvement and delegation as opposed and 
perhaps mutually exclusive. Because psychological 
dualisms are beyond logical critique they may prove 
highly persistent. Hence the empirical study of dualisms 
offers potential insights into the thinking of 
idiosyncratic actors.
White's dualistic thinking is now reviewed. The 
analysis paralleled the elaboration of White's scripts, 
with particular attention given to the identification of 
apparent contradictions. In what follows the symbol [::] 
will be used to signify opposition. To try to summarise 
White's outlook in this way, one points to two broad 
dualisms and their underlying assumptions:
* self-reliance :: dependence on (trust in) others,
* 'small firm' approach :: 'big firm' approach.
Much of White's thinking was grounded in the
legitimacy of behaviours that he associated both with 
self-reliance and the small firm context. The respective 
oppositions of 'trust in others' and 'big firm 
behaviours' dimensionalise his interpretation of 
situations.
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He attributed to small firms the characteristics of 
informality, unsophistication, operating on a shoestring, 
responsiveness and being action-oriented as opposed to 
being ponderous and deliberate. In contrast he tended to 
devalue the qualities he imputed to big firms. Likewise, 
(although the dichotomy was evidently less extreme), he 
valued reliance on his own efforts in preference to those 
of others. Thus his view of Wittenshaw as a small firm 
and himself as a pivotal, highly-involved, small-firm 
owner was not merely descriptive, but normative.
4.3.1 Dualisms relating to self and others.
The following dualisms were interpreted from White's own 
account of self in relation to others in the context of 
Wittenshaw.
fil Personal expectations: financial returns :: non­
material gratification. In setting up his own firm White 
sought personal gratification in terms of freedom from 
the perceived oppression of a big firm employer, hence to 
feel that his destiny was in his own hands. Independence 
meant that material rewards were in principle linked to 
his own efforts, not to the arbitrary whims of others.
The autonomy to trade material rewards (profits) for non­
material rewards was important. Although achieving good 
profits does not preclude intrinsic rewards per se, White 
tended to believe that actions to increase profits would 
have undesirable consequences, such as diluting his 
control or incurring unacceptable risks. So he tended to
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perceive non-material and financial rewards as somewhat 
opposed goals.
CHI Gettina-Jesylts: self reliance :. depending on 
others. From the outset Wittenshaw was White's project. 
He took for granted his total dedication to it, 
exemplified by long hours and being a 'jack of all 
trades'. Quite simply, he associated the success of the 
firm with his own contribution, in quality and quantity. 
His own input had to compensate for the lack of other 
people and facilities. Enthusiasm and long working hours 
were central to the low price/fast service formula for 
success. Later, he continued to see his 'action man' 
style as crucial to the success of the business.
Maintaining personal contacts enabled White to 
mitigate market and technical uncertainty. Information 
from his personal network allowed him to retain the 
illusion of control, contacts also provided a chance to 
explore and test ideas in lieu of formal research, 
expanding Wittenshaw's de facto resource base. Good 
customer contacts insured against rejection and were 
personally gratifying, elevating his self-esteem. 
Accordingly, self-reliance came to be perceived as 
intrinsically virtuous, not merely a response to 
circumstances. It was arguably a justification in later 
years for not investing or recruiting.
Nonetheless, White was not totally opposed to 
collaboration. Self-reliance imposed a heavy personal 
workload and burdensome responsibilities. So from the
148
outset he entered a partnership which, though it diluted 
his control, he accepted as a price worth paying. He came 
to see Shaw as a trusted colleague because Shaw was a 
flexible and committed evening and weekend worker. Hence 
he allowed Shaw to challenge and improve his ideas. In 
this way, partnership eased White's burden and partly 
compensated for a lack of investment.
Later White espoused the view that being salesman 
and managing director was counter-productive? to detach 
himself from day-to-day pressures by delegating had 
become highly desirable. But the tension between the 
priority of order-winning (his forte) and creating 
personal space for a more relaxed and detached view of 
the business prevented it from happening. Frustrated by 
his colleagues' scepticism over diversification, he was 
determined to secure the desired changes himself. So 
Wittenshaw continued to depend on his direct contribution 
and White persisted in his preference for self-reliance 
over collaboration and delegation.
fiii1) Basis for getting results: doing (intuiting) :: 
analysing (evaluating). To White, succeeding - getting 
results - was about doing, implying reactivity, being 
experimental and intuitive. Urgency was a valued 
characteristic of the early service formula to win orders 
and differentiate against competitors, especially big 
firms. This was consonant with the short-term, expedient 
'shoestring' philosophy. But a 'bias for action' tends to 
devalue thinking and planning and later, if White were to
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sit back and reflect, he feared criticism by the other 
'doers' in the fold.
Besides, he associated reflective thought - being
systematic and analytical, planning properly ahead,
being 'professional' - with the 'big firm' approach.
Thus despite (or because of) years of reacting to
circumstances, his natural style remained intuitive,
involved and biased to action. Indeed, he was
suspicious of thinkers like Guy, the first M.B.A.
student, to whom he listened politely but largely
ignored. In Jean-Claude he saw a doer:
'Jean-Claude with his... flamboyant style could get 
ideas across to me and Mike ...He's not a man to 
shilly-shally about with statistics ....his 
contribution was in terms of the mentality of the 
people, more so than facts, figures and statistics.'
Jean-Claude offered White directions he could go in, 
things he could do. Ironically, whilst all three 
Wittenshaw principals espoused the need to analyse and 
evaluate proposals, only Shaw could be convinced by 
statistics. White and Douglas had to be convinced at the 
intuitive level. Predictably, then, White resolved 
dilemmas by 'doing his own thing', responding to a 
perceived opportunity, learning, making mistakes, and in 
the end getting results. But he was increasingly aware 
that different projects had different time frames, so 
that a more reflective-evaluative approach might reap 
dividends.
fiv^ i Attitude to human resources: labour-intensive 
operations :: unwillingness to recruit. The 'shoestring'
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approach was labour intensive, principally of the 
partners in the early days. Over time it necessitated 
recruiting in all areas of the business. White's cautious 
outlook made him reluctant to recruit, even though some 
growth options clearly required extra staff. Even in 
production he made a point of hiring as few staff as 
possible. He used part-timers to test their skills and 
'fit' with the culture. Aside from Douglas he recruited 
no permanent sales staff. A bigger headcount would 
require more formal structures and increase the chance of 
untrustworthy staff. Recruiting good sales staff was seen 
as especially problematic, reinforcing his perceived need 
for self-reliance. This reluctance to recruit hampered 
Wittenshaw's growth, a fact he recognised but did not act 
on, arguing that a bigger, more professional team could 
be afforded only after further growth had been achieved. 
Thus there emerged one of White's most fundamental 
dilemmas.
(v^  Consensus decisions: changing the 'collective 
mentality' :: tolerating conservative colleagues. In the 
early days White and Shaw decided issues jointly as they 
arose. Later, all three share-holders desired progress 
via consensus. No-one saw White as 'the boss' even though 
his personal contribution and his 45% shareholding put 
his de facto status beyond reasonable doubt. The dilemma 
for White was that to diversify when only he believed in 
it was at odds with a consensual decision-making. Indeed, 
he could not be autocratic, since Shaw and Douglas could
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outvote him. So White linked progress with collective 
mentality change, a shared mindset where all would 
embrace new options. But although he valued colleagues as 
friends and for their contribution to the survival of the 
firm, White saw them as conservative and sceptical. The 
gap between their reading of the situation and his was 
widening, which frustrated him and created tensions.
White ultimately decided he could not allow 
diversification to be stymied by colleagues' 
indifference. Reflecting on the internal politics of the 
firm, he concluded that goal achievement was not 
necessarily linked to consensus: he would make progress 
in the face of passive opposition. But this approach 
committed him yet again to day to day prospecting. It 
exposed him to bruising pressures, physically and 
mentally, as he sensed that they waited for him to fail, 
testing his self confidence and resilience to the limit.
No wonder that the belt recycling project seemed 
like nirvana. White had by now virtually accepted that he 
would not get consensus over, much less the active 
participation of colleagues in, schemes that they were 
unenthusiastic about. Rather, he would allow individuals 
(Douglas to begin with) to do what they could be relied 
on to do well and enthusiastically. Yet in truth White 
continued to wrestle with the dilemma of how to reconcile 
his natural desire for consensus with likely 
confrontation over diversification.
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(vi} Internal structure; integration s: separatism. 
Historically, all the activities of the firm were lumped 
together for accounting and control purposes. It was not 
possible to say how profitable each activity was. Even 
after systems were improved, they still debated whether 
and how much one activity ought to subsidise another. 
White saw benefits in keeping all activities under the 
same roof. But the trend was towards spheres of expertise 
which made it harder to challenge the actions of 
colleagues, whilst still allowing each to blame another 
for failures to achieve targets.
For White, the logic of this situation increasingly 
pointed to an activity area being assigned to an 'owner1 
who would be clearly accountable for its well-being and 
development. This embryonic divisionalisation philosophy 
acknowledged that ownership of favoured projects should 
improve morale and results. But if implemented, 
divisionalisation would compartmentalize the business and 
perhaps further inhibit future collaboration and 
consensus decision making.
4.3.2 Dualisms relating to small-firms versus bia-firms
fvii^ Organization culture: 'big firm' professionalism :: 
small firm expediency, adaptiveness. The original 
opportunity was defined very much by what it was not, ie. 
a business area served badly by the big abrasive firms 
because they did not see it as an opportunity. 
Objectively, one might agree with their assessment,
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certainly in financial terms. But for a small firm there 
evidently was a gap vis a vis the big ones. So White 
thought in terms of 'what the big firms would not do'. He 
intuited a 'small-firm formula', a responsive approach 
for serving the needs of other small, insignificant 
firms.
After several years with this formula, lurching from 
one minor crisis to another, White appeared to accept 
that his masterscript would be stymied if he persisted 
with it. Indeed, it implied a definite constraint on 
Wittenshaw's development, since growth would ultimately 
destroy its small firm status. His longer term goals 
would be better served if the firm were positive, 
proactive and increasingly professional. Thus to improve 
growth and profits he espoused being more professional: 
he would have to be more of a thinker than a doer.
Much later, this style was still perceived as a 
luxury. Even over diversification White's attempts to be 
less reactive and more analytical soon reverted to 
charging around the country prospecting new leads. 
Meanwhile Shaw had implemented more professional control 
systems and was frustrated that neither White nor Douglas 
were taking them seriously!
fviii1! Attitude to investment: continue the 'shoestring' 
approach :: invest to support growth. There was a 
continuing tension between investing in plant and 
facilities to increase productivity and drive down costs, 
and the low-rent, shoestring approach White felt
comfortable with. Investment was essentially a big-firm 
approach, creating other costs and risks in its wake. 
Long after the shoestring approach could arguably have 
been rejected or reinterpreted, he persisted with the 
myth that there was no practical alternative. This 
justified further expediency, tolerance of inefficiency, 
minimising the overhead burden.
Paradoxically, White rationalised the shoestring 
approach as circumstantial, not intrinsic to the culture 
of the firm. To be fair, prudent investment was a more 
obvious feature of his later outlook, but tension 
remained over the timing of investment. The dualism 
shifted from investment: yes :: no, to investment: now : 
later.
Later still, he subtly reconstrued the dualism as 
investment: shorter term :: longer term. He was clear 
that the current market was no longer worth investing in 
whereas recycling was innovative and beneficial in the 
shorter term, to be supported by other projects with a 
longer term payoff. But he still associated small firm 
status with an inability to invest. The conundrum of 
having to be more profitable to justify investment, yet 
having first to invest to raise profitability was never 
truly resolved. Thus it is doubtful whether he has ever 
made a significant investment.
(ix) Risk; growing the business :s staying in control of 
the firm. For the first year or so White's goal was 
survival. Then it became patient growth to secure longer
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term viability and the means to afford and induce Shaw 
and others into the firm full time. Scale offered the 
prospect of better facilities and a lower cost base.
Patient growth was consonant with staying in control 
and provided White with an obvious rationale for a strong 
personal involvement in the firm. It was safe, though it 
delayed the onset of the mythical 'stable plateau'. 
Conversely, to the extent that rapid growth had to be 
underpinned by debt, outside equity, or the hiring of 
numerous staff of unproven ability and personal 
qualities, it was unacceptable.
To make sense of the dilemma of wanting growth, but 
rejecting the risks associated with it, White encoded his 
ideas in terms of progress, signifying growth without 
risking loss of control. The paradox was that to achieve 
the security he associated with notions of 'critical 
mass' required unacceptably risky actions. This dilemma 
went unresolved, since White refused to consider long 
term debt or external equity, guaranteeing that the firm 
remained small and on a knife edge of financial 
viability.
(x^ Making progress: keeping current customers :: 
prospecting for new customers. Early customer acceptance 
at the 'rough' end of the trade led to repeat business 
and long term loyalty, which reduced the need to prospect 
new accounts. It mitigated much of the risk of the new 
venture. But the need for higher margin business soon 
focused attention on more demanding customers, and more
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systematic prospecting. Maintaining the right balance 
between servicing current customers and winning new ones 
was never truly resolved, and priorities oscillated 
between them, notably after White realised that Douglas 
was an ineffective prospector. Despite this assessment, 
when White began to explore new market areas, Douglas 
continued prospecting in the old market, exposing current 
accounts to predation by competitors.
(xi^ Making progress: product-led :: customer-led. Over 
time the narrow market niche of small-firm customers was 
extended geographically. When the decline of this core 
market was clear, Wittenshaw had around 200 regular 
clients. Extending this customer base was problematic in 
that it required prospecting beyond the locality, thus a 
bigger sales force was needed. Equally, if they offered 
Wittenshaw7s current products to larger customers, or a 
wider spread of served applications, more sales staff 
would be required.
So White looked for compatible products to sell to 
existing clients, but he found none that conferred any 
competitive advantage on the firm. Thus, developing a 
wider product range for the current clientele proved 
scarcely more attractive than extending the core offering 
to a wider clientele. Priorities oscillated between these 
options and a clear direction was not established.
fxii^ Adding value: making :s merchanting. One suspects 
that White7s sales background made him unsympathetic to
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manufacturing. True, the firm had a factory of sorts 
because making belts was originally seen as the key to 
low cost/price and customer acceptance. But it produced 
margins generally no better than reselling industrial 
consumables - nowhere near as good as the projected 
margins from belt recycling. Shaw argued that they needed 
both manufacturing and merchanting: one recovered the 
fixed overhead, the other generated the profit. White was 
less sure.
The truth value of this 'myth' was not really the 
point: White associated manufacturing with capital 
investment, so in his view extending the production base 
would cripple short term profits. By 1987/8 his mindset 
had changed, they were no longer there to make belts, but 
to make money. He inclined more and more towards 
reselling as a key element of the revised formula. As a 
salesman he also wanted a flexible, commercial outlook 
which militated against manufacturing. Accordingly, White 
became too sceptical to invest in manufacturing, but too 
locked into it to quit.
4.3.3 Commentary on paradoxical dualisms.
The proposition is that White faced a number of dilemmas 
arising from the juxtaposition of opposing, sometimes 
inimical priorities. In some cases they presented a 
natural contradiction, whilst others reflected a 
personal, idiosyncratic construction. In some instances a 
dilemma parallels an obstacle highlighted in the script 
analysis. In combination they illuminate his personal
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outlook, helping us to understand his motives more fully 
and why some actions are apparently legitimised, others 
are proscribed. In particular, we appreciate White's 
outlook better when we are aware of two fundamental, 
unresolved dilemmas arising from his biases to self 
reliance and the small firm approach.
It is suggested that when White construes an 
opposition, he is prone to favour one pole over the other 
and to regard them as mutually exclusive. Whilst he pays 
lip-service to a balanced posture, the evidence of his 
actions suggests that he cannot readily do so. True, he 
managed to combine self reliance with partnership, but in 
general he tends to think in terms of 'or' rather than 
'and'. Thus he struggles to achieve a reconciliation of 
opposing ideas. He seems aware of this difficulty, but is 
unwilling or unable to overcome it.
To be sure, he espouses the need for a different and 
contextually more appropriate balance between opposing 
priorities, for example to be less reactive and 
opportunistic, more systematic, professional and 
reflective in style. But in practice he finds such 
changes to his theories-in-use problematic, presumably 
because they challenge deeply held assumptions about his 
identity as a resourceful, independent small-firm owner. 
Moreover, when he does attempt to shift his position, the 
tendency is either to relapse into old patterns of 
thinking or to oscillate indeterminately between poles of 
a dualism. Thus decisive, effective action is stymied. In
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general, his thinking is better described as 'either/or' 
than as 'and/both'.
Neither is there much evidence of radical new 
dualisms emerging. Rather, White's outlook appears to 
evolve by modifying dualisms instead of outright 
substitution. For example, his attitude toward growth and 
investment changed, became more positive, and perhaps 
more sophisticated. To what extent are such changes now 
part of his 'theory in use', as evidenced by his actions? 
In this particular example the evidence is that White's 
actions and espoused changes in outlook were converging, 
though it was still too early to know if the shift would 
prove irreversible.
Analysis of dualisms sensitizes the observer to an 
actor's assumptions about managing effectively in 
context. Without this sensitivity one would be tempted to 
portray a small firm owner like White as misguided or 
confused. Rather, it becomes clear that he reflects a 
complex bundle of assumptions and competing priorities 
one would associate with the genre of impecunious small- 
firm owners. That said, the purpose of the exercise is 
not to judge, but to explicate.
The complementarity of dualistic and script-based 
analyses is worth further comment. White's scripts were 
strongly contextualised in respect of his firm and its 
environment. For example his perception of niche 
opportunity makes sense when we know of his background in 
abrasives and his lack of resources. Other elements of 
this script were also circumstantial, including his
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choice of small firm clients in and around Wittenshaw.
Yet we may suppose that similar assumptions and 
conventions (ie. build on the industry and locality you 
know) underpin the niche opportunity scripts of many 
founder proprietors. Given White's assumptions and 
constraints, one could predict which hurdles and 
responses will emerge. Although they will vary in their 
particularities, there is arguably a generic pattern that 
is recognisably niche opportunity.
In contrast, the emergence of dualisms depends on 
the psychological context provided by the individual. Her 
constructions will to a significant degree be personal, 
idiosyncratic and not necessarily or obviously related to 
external context. Thus for example, White preferred 
consensus whereas many in his situation will prefer 
autocratic decision making. Conversely, many 
entrepreneurs evidently temper a bias to self-reliance 
with a desire to delegate.
Both scripts and dualisms encode descriptive 
assumptions. To the extent that an existing theory-of- 
action is imposed on a new situation, its assumptions 
become prescriptive for the knower. However, the 
inference that past scripts-in-use are recycled may prove 
unreliable. The fact that White used a niche opportunity 
script does not necessarily help us to predict either how 
it will be interpreted in regard to future perceived 
opportunities, nor to predict the mutation to another 
script like the plateau script. Thus for the external 
analyst a script appears to have only moderate predictive
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value in relation to the anticipated actions of the 
subject under study.
On the other hand, White appears to manifest 
considerable continuity with respect to his construed 
dualisms, presumably because they reflect fundamental, 
largely unchanging aspects of his outlook. To that 
extent, they may have predictive power. Of course, it is 
difficult to avoid predictions that are essentially 
hypothetical conjectures. For instance, the question "if 
White had £1,000,000 in the bank, would his outlook still 
be parsimonious?" is interesting, but irrelevant. White 
does not have £1,000,000 and his circumstances make it a 
highly unlikely scenario. Provided that his circumstances 
evolve in a manner broadly consistent with his past 
experience, we would expect his dualisms to persist and 
evolve incrementally as observed, offering the observer 
useful insights into his prospective knowing as it 
pertains to the world of his work experience.
4.4 Metaphoric Analysis of White's Outlook 
In this stage of analysis White's outlook is described in 
terms of generally implicit metaphors characterising his 
inferred role identity in Wittenshaw.
(i^ A rat in a maze. Many external obstacles had 
continually to be negotiated, especially in the early 
days. White would inevitably make mistakes in a process 
of repeated trials - like a rat in a maze - and like the 
rat he would slowly learn from the results obtained.
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fii1) The commando on an assault course. This is a more 
purposive analogue of the rat-in-a-maze metaphor. White 
was on an obstacle course, getting fitter, learning, 
accepting the challenge of tackling problems proactively. 
The military metaphor emerges in terms of defending the 
current business against attack. The idea of putting 
himself to the test, more generally, was expressed in a 
variety of ways: getting out and having a go, seeing it 
through, cleaning up, accepting the need for personal 
challenge etc., soldiering on. At times there was an 
element of machismo: 'action man' coping with impossible 
odds, dragon-slaying, David against the bureaucratic, 
slow-moving Goliaths (the big firms) and the ogre of the 
tax man.
Initially the 'Alamo script' also came to mind:
White battling to grim, ultimate defeat against 
impossible odds. But, arguably, perceptions of the heroic 
soon faded. Like Davy Crockett, White may have seen his 
original cause as worthy, but later he began to form 
contingency plans and in the end, unlike Crockett, he 
might leave his colleagues to be 'massacred' if they 
insisted on defending indefensible positions, rather than 
accompany him on the escape route of diversification.
The mountaineer is an analogous metaphor, evoked by 
various expressions of climbing, hanging on grimly, 
aiming for the ultimate plateau or higher (profit-making) 
plane. A significant change occurred as White learned
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that the option of getting round a barrier can make more 
sense than trying to scale it.
(iii^ The experimenter. An alternative interpretation of 
doing, getting out and having a go, is the metaphor of 
experimentation, encoded in White's use of the word 
'project'. This was frequently associated with regard to 
creating a portfolio of business activities, exploiting 
synergies, integrating separate initiatives. 
Experimentation was about gaining and building on 
experience. Initially White saw this as time sequenced, 
but the portfolio approach could enable him to transfer 
positive lessons from his 'experiments' more or less 
concurrently.
fiv^ The pathfinder/pioneer. This is probably the most 
pervasive metaphor evoked in White's account. It 
expresses the self-reliant, exploratory aspects of what 
he was doing, in phrases like charting new ground, 
patient exploration, paddling my own canoe, dipping a toe 
in the water, going it alone and so on. Equally, the 
metaphor emphasizes the journey, the waggon driver on an 
unmade road, finding a viable way through, generating 
momentum, looking ahead, reaching a crossroads, changing 
course, taking an indirect, lower risk route.
Though he accepted that he might not get through, 
feeling that he was making progress, mapping out a 
notional course, being in transit, was probably a more 
significant motivator for White than arriving. Indeed,
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for long periods there was no progress, conjuring the 
image of wheels stuck in a rut, being on a treadmill, 
running ever harder to stand still.
Nautical metaphors intrude here: charting a course, 
taking new ideas on board, launching new products, having 
a fleet of representatives, getting on a growth trend. As 
time progressed, White's interpretation of the pioneer 
metaphor shifts to a recognition of his pathfinding and 
co-ordinating leadership role. He was now the coachman 
controlling the horses, the captain of the boat, Moses 
leading his weary and fractious compatriots to the 
promised land.
fvl The surveyor/prospector. Here the metaphor evoked 
images of mining and prospecting, plugging market gaps 
where discovered. The central image of the niche market 
is analogous to the seam of coal or gold, needing to be 
chiselled away at, seeing how things would pan out. In 
his mapping of potential new territories and market areas 
White implied the metaphor of the geological surveyor.
The urge to find a new opportunity remained strong: shown 
a glimmer 'just try and hold me back...'
(vi ^ The shoestrinaer. This metaphor was interpreted as 
meaning a hobbling, step-by-step, low-budget approach. 
Others might call it 'bootstrapping', levering up the 
firm from nothing with nothing. It encodes the notion of 
incrementalism, building on what you've already achieved, 
taking one step at a time, ploughing back what you've
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reaped so far. White's commentary implies adopting 
minimal risks, operating in the most basic, tentative and 
slender way, notably during the privations of their early 
sweat-shop working conditions.
fvii^ Game-playina: the sportsman. At times White was the 
sportsman. Shooting was a popular metaphor: hitting 
targets, scoring fast, bagging a clutch of customers, 
finding only dead ducks. Poaching was a variant on the 
theme, expressing a perception of marginality, perhaps: 
swiping or snatching customers from the big boys, 
scrumping - picking the plums, and then coping with the 
inevitable reaction of the big-firm 'gamekeepers'. He 
made periodic references to playing cards, waiting for 
initiatives to come up trumps.
Over time, he realised more fully his role as team 
captain or referee. He was increasingly concerned to 
promote team-work, break down (mentality) barriers 
preventing good team work. He wanted complementarity and 
co-operation, mutual trust and understanding, and to get 
people into positions where their natural talents and 
inclinations would be used to best effect, recognising, 
so to speak, that full backs and strikers are not the 
same breed.
fviii't The advocate. White perceived the need for 
advocacy, to make the case to colleagues. Failure to do 
so could result in 'being laughed out of court'. 
Conversely, he sometimes had to act as judge and lay down
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the law. The latter might arise in relation to 
diversification and his unwillingness to tolerate a 
change-averse mentality for ever. However, the Anglo- 
Saxon legal tradition is adversarial, a fact White was 
still reluctant to accept in his own context.
fix'I Being in service. Finally, there was the notion of 
being in service, a Jeeve's butler in the sense of being 
a useful intermediary, supporting and facilitating, the 
latter on behalf of clients especially. This included 
developing and exploiting supplier relationships in ways 
which might ultimately be useful to clients.
In particular, the new projects such as belt 
recycling would allow Wittenshaw to reinstate its 
traditional service formula, something for White to build 
on and feel good about. The metaphor of bespoke tailoring 
also springs to mind here in the sense of adjusting the 
product to the clients' needs.
The most striking observation based on the metaphors 
inferred from White's account is that they create a 
strong impression of man against the uncontrollable 
elements. For example, the imagery is of man pitting 
himself against the hazards of voyaging, exploring and 
hunting, experimenting with nature, or of coping with 
man-made adversaries on the assault course, or in the 
game. Even in the concept of service there is a 
perception of client as master, an environment in which 
White will inevitably find himself in a subservient role.
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Despite his desire for control he feels that he is 
not fully in control. The world of his firm is one of 
continuing challenges to his ability to stay in control 
of the firm, but ultimately of his own destiny. This is 
patently a disconcerting situation to which he may react, 
but has no solution.
To use a different analogy he is a high-wire man 
with a constant fear of losing his balance. The pragmatic 
observer might advise him to quit in favour of a less 
stressful occupation. He does not; part of his outlook 
requires him to prove he can handle the challenge. In a 
perverse way he enjoys it.
In some instances the metaphors convey ambivalence. 
In the legal metaphor White is sometimes judge, sometimes 
advocate. As a pioneer he is sometimes driving the 
horses, sometimes the waggon is being dragged out of 
control. As a sportsman he is sometimes the player, 
increasingly the captain.
To return to the pioneer metaphor, like the early 
American pioneers White is on a transcontinental journey 
to a mythical 'Pacific coast' destination. If he stopped 
to reflect, he might conclude that he is simply not going 
to get there, but like the early pioneers he does not 
confront that possibility. Having spent several years 
fighting marauding Indians in the Appalachian mountains, 
and draining the Mississipi swamps of alligators, he is a 
long way from where he wanted to be. On the other hand, 
he could be said to be approaching the New Orleans of his
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diversification projects? should he arrive, there are 
worse places to bei
In summary, the metaphor analysis of role identity 
produces some rich insights, though not to the extent 
initially hoped for. The metaphors evoked in and from his 
account convey a strong sense of insecurity, consistent 
with his many risk-limiting actions. The individual 
metaphors are for the most part neither evoked explicitly 
nor especially evocative, nonetheless, in concert they 
convey an interpretation of White's role identity as 
concerned primarily to explore and prospect in directions 
that are seen as likely to locate a safe, rewarding 
haven. In so doing he desires to keep his partners from 
falling behind and becoming lost, though there could be 
limits to his patience.
4.5 Process Interpretation of White's Role Identity 
In Chapter 2 it was suggested that executives' role 
identities could be portrayed in process terms, 
specifically those derived from the small firm literature 
(Stanworth & Curran (1976), and paralleled by posited 
Type I and Type II archetypes (p. 60). What insights do 
these identities offer in the case of Bill White?
In fact he seems to be a classic artisan. He valued 
independence and intrinsic satisfactions over financial 
rewards and he continued to perceive his own contribution 
as central to the output and success of the firm.
Further, as Stanworth & Curran posited, he was ambivalent 
towards growth, being extremely reluctant to borrow to
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finance it, largely because he equated debt with loss of 
control, a basic concern of the artisan. Wittenshaw's 
growth was therefore constrained to what was achievable 
by reinvesting its modest profits.
However, as Wittenshaw became better established,
White considered prudent diversification to accelerate
growth as the pre-condition for long run stability, as
the theory predicts. But as Stanworth & Curran said
(1976, 105) of the artisan:
'whether any dramatic take-off into sustained growth 
is likely, even when the external logic...is highly 
favourable, is a matter for debate and even 
scepticism.'
In Wittenshaw's case not only did the internal logic 
from the standpoint of the chief actor contain apparent 
contradictions, the firm's external logic in terms of 
market, competitive and customer relationships was also 
problematic. So one should not be surprised that 
Wittenshaw's growth was stymied. The continuing dilemma 
for White was that the means to grow could endanger all 
his achievements to date, whereas failure to grow would 
prolong Wittenshaw's marginal status and quite possibly 
threaten its long run survival.
As Stanworth & Curran noted:
'a sustained high rate of growth may change the firm 
from a solution to [the artisan's] social marginality 
to a situation reinforcing it'.
White's sense of marginality can be inferred from some of
the role metaphors reported in the previous section. He
related to the world beyond the firm as an unknown,
hostile context for an exploratory, pioneering voyage, or
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as a continuing obstacle or assault course. At best it 
was a relatively unknown land needing cautious surveying 
and prospecting. Thus for the most part White was 
predisposed to an orthodoxy of 'shoestring development', 
well understood and accepted by his colleagues.
Moreover, White was increasingly sensitive to an 
internal rather than external system focus. Although 
small, the firm was fairly bureaucratic, with spheres of 
influence understood and respected by the various actors. 
Though arguably an espoused theory rather than a theory- 
in-use, White wanted his firm to become more organised, 
systematic and professional. To this end he manifested 
only modest political skills, though his political 
awareness seemed to be improving. Since many of his 
difficulties were seen as within the firm, he now 
recognised the need for team-building and advocacy to 
manoeuvre his colleagues into accepting the rules of a 
new game. But one can argue that he had in fact failed to 
convince colleagues of the need for diversification, and 
in the final analysis he would continue solo, self- 
reliant progress if he could not mobilise active support 
for it.
Turning to White's other perspectives on process, as 
noted on several occasions, White preferred consensual, 
trusting unitary processes, though it did appear that 
fragmented, conflictual outcomes were no longer 
inconceivable. As regards rationality he clearly espoused 
the virtues of being decision-rational. In practice he 
was largely action-rational, as defined in Chapter 2.
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Indeed, White was convinced by the results of (his own) 
actions, not by analyses such as the one done by the 
first Aston student. This was typified in his 
experimental approach to the unknown: try a course of 
action, evaluate the results and then tackle the next 
phase by incorporating lessons thus derived, exemplified 
in the way he prospected the honing stone opportunity.
The latter is also understandable as symbolising to his 
colleagues and himself his commitment to change. As 
regards his posture with respect to continuity versus 
change-seeking, his inherent conservatism and preference 
for incrementalism has been noted already.
To summarise, although White had various artisanal 
characteristics, it seems fair to observe that he is not 
a pure type. Likewise he is not a pure Type I identity. 
Though closer to Type I than Type II, there was some 
evidence of contrary movement in his seeking to diversify 
proactively, albeit one could argue that the means he 
adopted were comparatively incrementalist. Thus White 
presents a largely conservative, artisanal outlook with a 
mix of posited Type I and Type II qualities biased to the 
former. This conclusion substantiates the continuity 
manifest in his various scripts.
4.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter began with a description of Wittenshaw 
Abrasive's development, drawing extensively on the 
account of its proprietor, Bill White, and elaborated by 
those of his close colleagues in the venture. Thereafter,
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the nature of White's strategic knowing was considered 
via the twin approaches of scripts and dualisms, as 
outlined in Chapters 2 and 3. These findings were 
enriched by drawing on the observations of close 
colleagues. Attention then shifted to a complementary 
interpretation of White's strategic knowing based on 
metaphoric and process approaches to role identity, as 
outlined in earlier chapters.
The result is a rich, multi-faceted interpretive 
picture of White's outlook on his responsibilities as 
steward of his young firm. There is no suggestion, of 
course, that White would necessarily concur with the 
conclusions drawn. Nor is the picture is necessarily 
complete. Still, it is to be hoped that the account is 
coherent, plausible, and descriptively useful.
The various approaches have addressed somewhat 
differing aspects of the subject's knowing. The question 
of synthesis remains open. The assumption has been that, 
as in the use of microscope lenses of different powers, 
the images need to be interpreted on their individual 
merits. Indeed, they may not be amenable to synthesis.
Each approach however, especially the script 
approach, mapped an evolving outlook. If a strategist's 
knowing evolves, it is legitimate to enquire how. It 
seems that White's espoused theories change quite 
significantly at some stages, as he acknowledges signals 
from the operating environment and from particular change 
agents, including perhaps the investigator here. However, 
White's theories-in-use evolve for the most part
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incrementally. This appears particularly true in respect 
of the lower level components supporting his 'strategic 
scripts', many of which appear largely unchanged and well 
embedded. His role metaphors also suggest an evolving 
pattern, rather than discontinuities in his outlook. 
Likewise, though the dualisms inferred in his outlook may 
change over time, some basic conflicts seem likely to 
remain essentially unresolved. As such, one predicts that 
White will be frustrated in his endeavours to develop the 
firm much beyond the status quo.
These observations therefore raise questions about 
an individual's capacity to know and learn in an 
organizational context. The case of Hamish Dean, 




A CHIEF EXECUTIVE'S STRATEGIC KNOWING:
Hamish Dean of Pyrochem
5.1 Synopsis of the Firm's Development 
Hamish Dean's is a remarkable entrepreneurial case 
history. His parents moved to the English city of 
Lanchester from the Scottish Borders when he was a 
youngster. They were committed members of an exclusive 
religious sect, the "Clan”, whose beliefs influenced all 
aspects of their lives. Hamish, the young adult, was 
intellectually capable but forbidden on religious grounds 
to continue his formal education beyond school. He became 
a computer programmer. In 1971 when in his early twenties 
he married into another Clan family and took a selling 
job in a relative's wholesale firm in the Borders. He 
plunged enthusiastically into his new role, but after 
some 18 months he was increasingly frustrated by the 
proprietor's disorganised approach and lack of ambition.
As a sideline the firm supplied and maintained fire
extinguishers. Dean became aware of new fire regulations
imposing more stringent constraints on small businesses
like private hotels. He discovered that even fire
officers were poorly prepared to advise proprietors on
compliance with the regulations and few contractors were
able to offer cost-effective improvements:
'The national boys were used to putting in huge 
systems for factories, (they) couldn't cope with 
small installations. So you had local electricians 
charging £2000 for a £500 job... Legislation was
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demanding something and there was no single company 
geared up to supply it.'
Dean wanted to set up a new business to service this
market. His boss refused, so Dean guit. Back in
Lanchester, with encouragement from his wife and a small
bank loan, he began to trade as a fire protection
consultant, using subcontractors for installations:
'Learning literally by the minute...flying by the 
seat of the pants. Every minute a new problem came up 
and I had to find a way of solving it...it was 
fabulous fun.'
He was fortunate that his early clients paid cash on
completion. His business avoided serious cash flow
difficulties and grew rapidly. Within 18 months he
employed about 20 full time staff and many part-timers:
'The guys I took on came on the understanding that 
they were going to do chippying and if we hadn't any 
chippying that week they would help the electricians 
....if there wasn't any electrical work they could 
help the steel fabricators put up fire escapes, and 
if that didn't work they could help prepare for 
redecorating at the end of the contract...(they) had 
to be very, very flexible.'
Several significant developments occurred during 
this period. First, Dean become a distributor for a fire 
alarm manufacturer, selling to third parties as well as 
to his own clients. This highlighted the profitability of 
merchanting. In 1974 he unearthed a special so-called 
intumescent paint, whilst looking for an alternative 
fire-retardant to asbestos sheet. The paint was applied 
by brush or spray in two stages (basecoat and sealer), 
creating an inert, thin film (about 1mm) which would 
swell to a 2-3 inch thick charred cladding in the heat of 
a fire. In theory this cladding would protect the
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supporting structure long enough for the fire brigade to
arrive and put out the fire. According to Dean:
'Within six months we were the biggest distributor 
(of intumescent paint) in the country. We weren't 
selling very much, but we were selling far more than 
anyone else.'
In 1975 Dean was asked to quote for protecting a
large new factory in the locality. He couldn't handle a
job of that size, so he quoted what he thought was a
ludicrously high price. He was given the order and
despite misgiving he accepted it! When:-
'We got halfway through, they doubled the size of the 
contract... we suddenly realized there were jobs around 
with a lot of profit potential....'
Still only 26 years old, he immediately decided to sell 
the contracting business to specialise in intumescent 
paints. He called his new firm Pyrochem. In 1976 he 
scoured Western Europe and found German and French 
intumescent products for protecting wood and steel 
respectively. Apparently, neither was selling well in its 
own country and Dean managed to negotiate U.K. 
distribution rights.
Subsequently he had great difficulty persuading the 
U.K. regulatory authorities that his products were 
trustworthy. It was easy to give spectacular 
demonstrations of their efficacy in test conditions, but 
would the products perform in situ? The most serious 
objection was that in a serious fire the promised 30 
minute protection would be inadequate. Also, because 
clients and regulators perceived his products as paints, 
they assumed that re-treatment would be needed every 4-5
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years, costly and often impractical. Dean assured them of 
his products' reliability, but in truth no-one knew how 
well they might perform in, say, three decades time. In 
contrast, any 'expert' knew that asbestos sheet or 
asbestos-based cements were safe ....
Nonetheless, Dean persisted with niche applications 
protecting exposed woodwork in hotels and offices where 
regulations were less stringent or clients could be 
persuaded to use his paints essentially as an insurance 
policy. From 1976 to 1980 the firm grew unspectacularly. 
Major industrial projects like the first one were 
elusive. Dean's self-belief and powers of promotion kept 
the firm afloat. In retrospect he claimed:
'Without Pyrochem intumescents would have died a
natural death in this country, if not far wider'.
Initially he ran the firm from his home in Lanchester, 
storing chemicals in outbuildings and then in a separate 
800 sq. ft. store. Limited stocks meant that they 
frequently had to rush imported supplies to impatient 
contractors. But the absence of competition allowed 
Pyrochem to charge high prices; keeping overheads low 
ensured a profitable, cash-rich business.
As the firm grew Dean recruited new staff from the 
Clan, to which he remained committed. By the end of 1980 
Pyrochem employed eight full-time staff and distributed 
up and down the country to regional agents, most of whom 
were also Clan members. They in turn applied the product 
or used subcontractors. At this stage the products were 
marketed under distributors' names and Dean was becoming
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concerned that there was little awareness of the Pyrochem 
name.
Dean's brother, an industrial chemist, had joined 
the firm in 1977 and worked on product testing and 
improvement. Pyrochem subsequently sent products to the 
independent Fire Industry Research Association for 
testing. The results were good, allowing Dean to claim 
(somewhat optimistically) a one-hour protection 
capability. This advance, coupled with growing awareness 
of the health risks of asbestos and the convenience of 
intumescent paints, began to legitimise its use in 
structural fire protection, save for the most demanding 
applications.
Dean accelerated growth from the late 1970s by 
targeting structural specifiers (principally architects) 
as opposed to builders or fire protection agencies. This 
ploy widened awareness of the product and improved its 
chances of being specified, especially on steel-frame 
structures which were increasingly popular because of 
rapid construction and lower cost than reinforced 
concrete methods. A Dean 'masterstroke' was to offer the 
topseal in the full British Standard range of colours. He 
took this decision, it seems, with minimal thought to the 
operational consequences! Architects could now leave 
steelwork fully exposed as a design feature, yet be 
confident that by specifying Pyrochem the structure would 
be well protected. So Pyrochem's thin film products 
effectively established and came to dominate the U.K.
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'aesthetic fire protection market', with a peak share by 
value of around 70%.
By 1980 Pyrochem had generated sufficient cash for 
Dean to acquire commercial building land in a down-at- 
heel part of Lanchester where he commissioned several 
small industrial units. Pyrochem relocated to one of 
these in early 1981 and Dean short-let the others. 
Relocation proved to be a symbolic and seminal event. The 
Clan Elders had become increasingly concerned at Dean's 
ambition and Dean in turn was disillusioned with the way 
Clan policies obstructed his commercial scope. Matters 
came to a head when the Elders decided that he should 
hand over his equity and become the manager of Pyrochem. 
He declined. His employees - including his brother - 
walked out and his trade distributors severed relations.
Several respondents including Dean himself talked of
his excommunication from the Clan. But if the Elders
thought their draconian action would make him crumble and
recant they were wrong:
'In anticipation of what was going to happen I'd set 
on a guy ...he's in the next office now...two days 
before (the walk-out) and he and I and my wife ran 
the company.'
Dean hired a new sales office administrator and a
storeman; a few months later he hired three people as
field sales representatives, building to eight within two
years. The first of these, a trained architect, was later
promoted to technical director. Another became field
sales manager. Many of the early recruits still work for
Pyrochem in one capacity or another.
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Over the next two years Dean's determination allied
to shrewd decisions and luck overcame adversity, enabling
substantial sales growth of Pyrochem products. Though the
economy was in recession, the strategy of targeting
architects paid off, as the Pyrochem name became widely
known for protecting steel structures. More immediately,
there was the problem of distribution. Several former
distributors attempted to compete directly with Pyrochem.
Dean avoided direct contracting, rather he opened up the
distribution channel by encouraging the application of
intumescent coatings by any reputable contractor:
'We took technology that previously had been regarded 
as sacrosanct to specialist users...and we said, 
really the specialization is in defining the requir­
ement, not in the actual application. So there is no 
reason why non-specialist contractors can't use this 
product without any problem, simply follow the rules 
in the same way as for ordinary decorative products.
Because local contractors can do it at far less cost 
than specialists - they have to travel a long way and 
put men up in bed and breakfast - we were able to 
transfer to ourselves in the form of additional gross 
profit...a proportion of (the cost saving)... which 
we invested back in sales and marketing activity.'
To demystify the process Dean produced a detailed 
specifiers' manual to guide architects and contractors 
through the regulatory and technical aspects. They 
devised simple tests to ensure adequate standards of 
workmanship and instituted a system of application 
certificates whereby the sub-contractor confirmed to the 
client, in writing, his compliance with specifications. 
Thus Pyrochem avoided the expense of 'flying squads' of 
specialist contractors and contingent liability arising 
from faulty workmanship.
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In retrospect, Dean and his senior colleagues 
attributed market acceptance from 1981 principally to 
effective marketing. In addition to showy 'live' 
demonstrations, the sales force became much more 
systematic in identifying and monitoring new building 
projects. The firm made intensive use of direct mail 
promotion with high quality, professional literature.
Dean himself lobbied the Industry Association for higher 
standards and for registration and regulation of bona 
fide operators.
By 1984 Pyrochem employed some 20 staff, mostly in 
sales and promotion, working under a new sales director. 
In late 1984 Dean hired an experienced chemist from a 
major competitor to set up a small, on-site R&D facility. 
There was still little direct competition from the major 
U.K. chemical manufacturers, though some offered less 
convenient, 3 mm thick film intumescents. Pyrochem's 
expansion continued through 1985 and 1986, by which time 
headcount was about 60. Dean reclaimed extra units as 
leases expired on the Lanchester site.
Pyrochem also began to export to the Far East and 
North America. This initiative came to the attention of, 
and apparently displeased the French supplier, itself a 
relatively small firm recently taken over by a major 
chemicals company. Pyrochem began to detect variability 
in the quality of its bulk supplies, a major concern 
since most customers assumed that Pyrochem was the 
manufacturer and therefore controlled product quality. 
When major contractors complained Dean insisted that
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French technicians visit his clients. In the event, no 
obvious improvements were forthcoming, so Dean stepped up 
Pyrochem's efforts to develop its own products. He 
recruited a French chemist who established a parallel R&D 
unit in Paris. By autumn 1985 relations with the French 
supplier were critical and Dean launched Pyrochem's own 
range of steel intumescent paints. His U.K. laboratory 
prepared the magic ingredients and a local subcontractor 
mixed and repackaged the final product. As far as 
customers were concerned the only change was improved 
product consistency. Not surprisingly, the French 
supplier took exception to summary termination of 
contract. There then followed litigation which took 
several years to resolve.
Pyrochem's growing technical expertise in Lanchester
led to a range of improved intumescent paints, whilst
Paris developed intumescent mastics and solid foam seals
for structural gaps and cable ductings. By 1987 Dean
could claim that:
'there is no-one else in the world selling as much 
thin film intumescent paint for steel as us, to our 
knowledge ...we know most countries.'
In saying this he included the major chemicals firms.
Even so, the U.K. market now harboured over 20 actual or
potential competitors:
'Others are beginning to follow now because we have 
laid the tracks....so far none of them have been 
successful but there's always the threat. If they 
posed too big a threat we would probably go into a 
different market.'
In 1986 Dean remained highly involved in the 
business. Excepting in sales, he lacked the management
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support one would associate with a multi-million pound 
business. His instinct was to manage in an involved, but 
informal and quite paternalistic way. He provided a range 
of benefits such as Christmas bonuses and company-owned 
holiday accommodation for staff and their families. That 
way :-
'If the guy is asked to work for a couple of hours 
one evening the family just don't mind (because of) 
the lovely holiday a few months ago in Lanzarotti 
which they wouldn't have had otherwise. They know 
those perks aren't just ...directors' perks... 
selection for staff perks is based on length of 
service not seniority. Staff see that and they know 
it's a mark of respect for their efforts. I want them 
to benefit from (the firm). I genuinely appreciate 
the amount of commitment I get from them. I would 
like to be the best employer in Lanchester.'
Not all recruits liked the atmosphere and Dean's
involved and charismatic style, but those who did became
fiercely loyal. Trusted staff had considerable discretion
to do as they saw fit, provided that they 'made things
happen'. This approach produced results, but it also
contributed to poor budgetary controls and inconsistent
staff remuneration. Dean saw himself not as a man for
detail, rather as ideas-driven. He wanted to have 'three
good ideas by the time I get to work each day' which
subordinates would implement without delay. But his role
had become increasingly burdensome and 1986 proved a
financially disappointing year:
'I was getting bogged down in the detail, I didn't 
mind it but I wasn't coping with it very well...I 
leave loose ends. I define a strategy and a general 
sense of direction and I expect people beneath me to 
pick up the threads...I need(ed) a senior management 
level to take up strategy very professionally, very 
thoroughly. I didn't want to get to the stage of so 
many businesses where... the guy who set it up gets
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to his late fifties and he hasn't practiced 
delegating and he can't...I want(ed) to delegate... '
He confronted the possibility that his style was creating
a 'management bottle-neck', holding them back. He sought
outside professional advice. The upshot was that he
recruited an experienced managing director, a new sales
and marketing director and various other experienced
staff into middle management positions. Dean assumed the
role of Chairman which he saw as liberating:
'I want to be more objective about Pyrochem..more 
time (to think)...six months ago the phone would have 
rung at least ten times in the last hour or so..'
Subsequent reports varied as to how well Dean coped with
his new circumstances. Colleagues acknowledged his
partial withdrawal from day to day affairs, which pleased
some and disappointed others. Some doubted the extent of
change, saying he still meddled in operational details.
Though Dean claimed not to have detailed control of
operations, his view was that:
'I do have the ability to go round any department and 
put my finger on a letter that should never have gone 
out or a customer complaint..or I'll find out we 
didn't get a supplier discount we should have done.
I'm always putting my finger on the pulse, almost as 
if it's a sixth sense....'
From mid 1987 the new managing director, Mike 
Simmonds, set about improving Pyrochem's operational 
controls, implementing new budgeting and business 
planning systems. With Dean's endorsement, he directed 
attention towards diversifying into new industry sectors. 
Given the still healthy state of the structural fire 
protection market, he promised Dean to grow the core 
business threefold to around £12 million in three years
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(a target which was broadly achieved). He also began to 
tackle the issues of systematic personnel appraisal and 
remuneration.
After hiring this cadre of professional staff, Dean 
acquired much larger premises in another district of 
Lanchester. The move was reminiscent of his 1981 
thinking:
'I bought three factories, (this) one..is 25,000 sq. 
ft., the others are 20,000 each. We only had 7,500 
(on the old site) so this is three times the size and 
we've still got another 40,000 to expand into if we 
want to ...the other two are on short term leases. I 
can't for the life of me imagine how we would fill 
65,000 square feet but we've got it and we've just 
secured over the road an office block and factory 
unit...adding an additional 20,000 sq. feet or so.
We'll rent it out until such time as we need it if we 
ever do'.
Shrewd timing of the deal meant that the new premises 
were acquired for a net outlay understood to be only 
around £50,000. Subsequently, Pyrochem weathered the 
recession of the late 1980s and early 90s, albeit with 
some difficulties including redundancies in the core 
business as Simmonds grappled with the task of increasing 
efficiency.
Anyone who thought Dean's chairmanship after 1987 
would inhibit his entrepreneurial flair seriously misread 
his motivation and drive. These traits are exemplified by 
a 1983 decision to set up a graphics design agency. 
Pyrochem was then promoting its name and its products 
heavily:
XI was very frustrated with the creative designers we 
were using. Although I'm not at all creative myself 
I'm an appreciater of the art. The firm we were 
dealing with and the others we were looking at all 
seemed to put their energies towards creating award
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winning designs for themselves - if they were any 
good at all - instead of coming up with designs that 
had empathy with the overall objective of the 
exercise, which was to get business for the client.7
Dean's solution was to hire the agency's chief designer
to establish a new firm. Its prime objective was to
create eye-catching and informative selling materials for
Pyrochem, but over the next few years it gained some 20
external clients as its reputation grew. Whilst not
hugely profitable, its six designers created excellent
promotional material at much lower net cost and with
greater empathy than Dean felt an external agency could
achieve.
After this synergistic diversification Dean set up a 
variety of new ventures conferring benefits on the core 
business. His increasing need to travel prompted him to 
learn to fly and then acquire a twin-engined light 
aircraft. He chartered it on a per-day basis to defray 
running costs, employing professionals to fly the plane 
and manage it as a business. When the plane was fully 
utilized he bought a second. In 1987 he seriously 
considered expanding into executive jet charter, but held 
back in the light of airline industry deregulation. 
Instead, he acquired a retail travel agency. Between 1981 
and 1987 he set up or acquired eight business activities, 
all of which were reasonably successful in financial 
terms, though the fast-growing Pyrochem remained the core 
business.
After the 1987 reorganisation, Dean began to 
investigate new opportunities for diversification. He
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began by looking at products complementary to fire 
protection:
'I'm able to look at possibilities in terms of 
acquisitions, new product ranges, new uses for our 
present products. If I add a completely new product 
range it will be the first time I've done that for a 
while and that will be interesting and challenging.
But it won't take that long to set it up because I 
have the management structure to implement it. Once 
I've done the product sourcing and set the parameters 
...those guys will take it and run with it.
I've suddenly realised our product range is terribly, 
terribly narrow. At best I was thinking in a rut 
within structural fire protection...I was saying we 
were in intumescent structural fire protection ...
(but) I started to look at our resources and say, 
well, actually, they could cope with an awful lot of 
products in a far wider context without diluting our 
effort on anything... there is scope for broadening 
our product base, markets and geographic 
territories.'
Domestic flame retardant paints and flame-proof fabrics
for industrial and commercial use initially appealed to
him. He identified a potential target for takeover:
'Their product range would fit superbly with ours: 
decorative, flame retardant, specialised, sold 
largely to architects... it would also give us a lever 
into a new area, shop fitting and exhibition areas 
and those could utilise some of our existing products 
as well. So it seems logical...I wouldn't mind taking 
them over.'
In the event, he followed Simmond's contrary advice,
Pyrochem's first acquisition being a small firm
manufacturing epoxy intumescents for the defence and
aerospace industries. A year later, advised by an
industrial consultant, Dean acquired another specialty
chemicals company on the South Coast and immersed himself
in its reorganization:
'It does appeal to me to look at a company ...and, 
with a bit of trepidation think, if I try hard I can 
improve the management structure, improve their
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marketing and turn a good chunk of their turnover 
into profit...go into the company...and sort it out.
I'm definitely needing a challenge...it's a different 
size of business and a very, very different culture 
and it won't be easy for me to ...turn it into 
something highly profitable. I'm in the process of 
turning it around. Got rid of half their products, 
maintained their turnover, got rid of loads of costs, 
moved part of (it) to Lanchester....I'm turning it 
around, getting rid of lots of dead wood...
It's got some unique products...I didn't know they 
were there...overall it was definitely a good move.
I've learned an awful lot, I'll make a bit of money 
out of it....I want to get (it) right and having done 
that I want to do another acquisition. I've learned 
so much from this one...I feel I've been cutting my 
teeth.. '
In turning round a problematic situation, the secret of
success he felt was to back his judgement, not tolerate a
lot of waffle. He reduced headcount from 105 to 70 and
brought in a new managing director in the process of
sorting things out:
'I've got this new guy who was production director, 
then managing director at M****. The first day he was 
there (they said) you can't do that...he said why 
not, I've being doing it for five years! A tiny 
(example), there's lot's more....
I've made some bad decisions because of lack of 
experience and if I'm going to do any more 
acquisitions I've got to make better decisions next 
time. (This one) is my time at school in short 
trousers. Getting the odd rap over the knuckles!'
As to his thinking, the next firm in his sights was:-
'...a logical fit to our existing product range ...We 
either....buy them outright or we attack and weaken 
them, (then) buy them, take their turnover and put 
the prices back up. If we attack them first, we might 
have to spend a quarter of a million....it might take 
a few months longer... That kind of strategy excites 
me just planning it, playing monopoly to win...
As Pyrochem entered the 1990s Dean's concerns over 
future competition in the core business had proved 
largely unfounded. In line with their plans, turnover had
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grown rapidly with the introduction of new products and 
under Simmond's stewardship Pyrochem increased to about 
125 staff. During this period, gross margins were also 
maintained. Growth of intumescents compounded with the 
acquisitions expanded the group faster than Dean had 
anticipated and in 1990 he promoted Simmonds to Group 
Managing Director.
Yet, as with his acquisitions, Dean could be
ruthless in Pyrochem, as evidenced by the rapid exit of
the sales director
'...because he screwed up the whole department... he 
was a good bullshitter and no one had any respect for 
him. Instant appeal, but after a couple of weeks they 
found he was very shallow and had all sorts of 
problems himself.'
At this point, had Dean achieved his life's
ambitions? Hardly:
'The things I hate about myself now I hated fifteen 
years ago. I get to the end of a day and I'm always 
totally dissatisfied with what I've achieved. I'm not 
worth the salary. I wonder how the company copes.... 
I've learned to delegate a little bit in fifteen 
years..I've learned how to read a balance sheet... 
and I've learned from experience how to recognise 
fairly good people and fairly bad people, (likewise) 
companies...but the fundamentals of how I deal with 
people remain the same.'
Dean was comfortable making deals of all kinds. For 
example, he speculated in commodities and generally made 
money? when he lost he regarded these episodes as 
education:
'I made one big mistake...but it hasn't put me off. I 
had a computer on my desk in direct contact with 
stock exchange information for a year. I played with 
that and learned a bit...I guess I do have to do 
something different every year as part of the 
learning process.
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... I'm not inclined to follow the line of maximum 
profitability, I intend to follow the line of maximum 
ultimate achievement which might or might not be the 
same thing. I will definitely do things I enjoy 
rather than things that will get me a lot of money.'
Rapid response to problems and opportunities,
experimentation and flexibility of outlook continued to
be Dean hallmarks. For example, the graphics design
subsidiary originally invested in printing equipment; it
became clear that this was a mistake, so the equipment
was sold and all printing was then subcontracted. Dean
explained his philosophy thus:
'I always prefer strategies that have lots of 
options. I like there to be permutations that can be 
exploited. I like everything to be very, very 
flexible. Flexibility doesn't necessarily incur a 
liability or sacrifice. It simply requires forward 
planning and anticipation of what might happen.
I never planned to build a second floor (on the 1981 
premises). I planned in case we needed to. I didn't 
expect to be using three units (on that site) or 
leaving (it) but I designed it such that we could.'
Looking ahead Dean rejected any notion of Pyrochem
becoming a public company:
'The megastars like Branson have had to come to grips 
with (the fact) that you are answerable to a lot of 
investors who aren't very keen on mavericks and 
unconventional management styles...You can end up 
killing the inspiration and killing the fun. One of 
which is no good for the business, one no good for 
personal satisfaction. I think I'd sell out first....
I like to do different things. I like challenges. If 
I hear that lots of firms have tried and failed at 
something and I still believe it is right and there 
is a way through, I'd like to try it just for the 
hell of it.... (I want) to enjoy tomorrow, I want new 
challenges.
I do like doing things better than anyone else... I 
can't do that in an academic sense, because I'm not 
bright enough. I can't do it in a physical sense 
because I'm not strong enough. So I try and do things 
better commercially. I don't mean within the company 
in terms of managing, but against competitors, that 
is the arena in which I operate.
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I wouldn't mind being a micro Lord Hanson...buying up 
companies and injecting some enthusiasm into their 
management, giving them a good image, putting in a 
good management information system and letting them 
run themselves with a bit of supervision. I'm hungry 
to have a go!'
I like Pyrochem or any company I'm involved with to 
be thought of as doing things better than anyone 
else, very professional. That to me is actually much 
more important than making money (which) ...I don't 
believe... is necessarily a very accurate yardstick. 
I'm much more concerned with being around in fifteen 
years time - because we have consistently done things 
better - than making a hell of a lot of profits today 
and (only) breaking even in five years time....
I live, eat, sleep and breath Pyrochem....the five 
year plan is in the subconscious and evolving all the 
time, changing shape slowly, responding to what I 
hear about the competition, products, costs etc. If I 
sat down and worked out a (formal) five year plan I'm 
sure a few inspirational things would come out of 
brain-storming with the other directors, but I don't 
think it would fundamentally be that different from 
what's in my mind. My guess is that when you have 
someone heading an organization who has been there 
for some time and emotionally, not just practically 
involved, the five year plan is an unwritten thing in 
the head.
Mike (Simmonds) has said that I have this ability to 
think broad and then focus all my attention on some 
minutiae because it is very important... I don't see 
it ...Mike has that ability, though I think broader 
than him sometimes (but) I can't focus as tightly.
Our accountant ... he sees no difference between a 
pound and a million, as long as it balances it 
doesn't matter. He doesn't see scale at all.'
Dean remains a man of apparent contradictions in the
eyes of colleagues, having great charm and charisma
allied to a penchant for incisive and ruthless action.
Certainly, there appeared little disagreement among
colleagues over his unusual talents and style. Dick
Thomas (product manager):
'Hamish is intuitive, therefore he sometimes makes 
mistakes, but because he's proved himself successful 
it's difficult (for) his management..they have to
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justify (ideas) with logic and facts and figures...
But he doesn't have to.
One of the ex-directors used to say he had to have 
all his ducks in a row, be sure of his facts, do all 
his preparation, spend an enormous amount of time 
assembling a logical argument for doing something and 
then find all that shot away...Hamish will just 
overturn it and say no, we're not doing that.'
On the other hand, Thomas conceded that:
'He is touched with genius...and terrific courage. If 
you were to go through the figures you would probably 
not make a decision. But he doesn't do that, he just 
thinks it and does it. You can make a go of anything 
fairly sensible, even marginal, providing you have 
the willingness to throw everything, all your assets, 
all your energy into that one thing. But if you fart 
about... play with it....He has had good fortune, but 
he's also had the guts to do it and the determination 
to make a go of it. '
Jimmy Jones (facilities manager) defended Dean's style:
'He's very sharp...very clever...he sees a situation 
... that doesn't mean to say he's rushed in... He 
used to use me as a sounding board. He goes through 
the permutations ...before making his decisions...
It's not just, let's try that one and see how that 
fits and if it goes wrong we change. He does do a 
method of elimination....because nobody can be right 
that many times without doing it.'
Mike Simmonds (managing director):
'He is the most creative person in terms of marketing 
concepts that I've ever come across...he never stops 
having ideas, some of which are absolutely awful but 
some of which are absolutely brilliant...he's got 
that inherent ability to always look at things from
the punter's point of view...he does it quite
instinctively. As a result Pyrochem has grown very 
quickly in a very unstructured way.
It was somewhat ironic, then, that he was refused a place
on the Part Time M.B.A. programme of a well-known
University Business School. However, as Thomas observed,
there remained question marks over his credentials, not
least as a team player:
'Dean's a very complex person...you have to know the 
way he'd feel about a situation before you can expose 
your own views. He doesn't really take very kindly to
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people who think differently to him. On the other 
hand he will change his mind immediately if somebody 
puts a point of view which he sees is correct, better 
than his...'
Simmonds had experienced just such a situation:
'Most people I handed my (visiting) card to after I 
joined (said)...yuck! I said to Hamish... I'm not 
very happy about the logo, I think we ought to get 
away from the current (design)... Like most things 
you say to Hamish, he says good idea...which I took 
to be the case
... I've subsequently learned that good idea can be 
said in one of several different inflections from 
bloody awful idea to really good idea... I think deep 
down he was really quite against it, but we did it..'
5.2 Script Analysis of Hamish Dean's Outlook 
The approach here is similar to Chapter 4. Unlike 
Wittenshaw Abrasives, Pyrochem had experienced 
significant upheaval and staff turnover during its 15 
year history. None of Dean's present colleagues were with 
the firm prior to 1981, and of the new managers only 
Simmonds had been in post for more than a few months when 
the research began in 1987. In addition to Dean himself, 
the analysis is based on discussions with a cross-section 
of his colleagues, including Mike Simmonds, Dick Thomas, 
Jimmy Jones, and Paul Quinn (technical director, formerly 
architect and Pyrochem salesman). Thomas and Jones were 
hired directly after the 1981 Clan crisis.
As already indicated, all acknowledged with no trace 
of sycophancy their respect for Dean, his substantial 
achievements and his charisma. The long-servers were on 
first-name terms, yet claimed no special benefits or 
favours. Simmonds' insights derived from his scrutiny of 
the firm prior to giving up his good salary and promotion
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prospects as divisional operations director of a U.S. 
multinational.
Dean's masterscript is repeated from Figure 3.5 in 
Figure 5.1. It is nominally similar to White's, but there 
are significant differences. Whereas White sought 
gratification principally in terms of reward and 
security, Dean was oriented to fulfillment or self- 




Lack of personal 








Run a successful 
owned and operated 
small business
(#) Meaning in practice, independence from negative 
thinking, being challenged and winning, having fun, 
getting financial rewards linked to personal efforts.
He interpreted this motivation not so much in terms 
of money (a by-product of other things, not an end in 
itself) but facing and overcoming challenges. He equated 
this with having great fun. In a sense his outlook is 
similar to classic scientific 'puzzle-solving' (Kuhn, 
1970).
Whereas White began his entrepreneurial career in 
his late thirties, Dean was, in his own words, 'barely
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out of short trousers'. He polarised his career options 
between frustration as an employee or success as an 
independent entrepreneur. The immediate barrier to 
enhanced personal satisfaction was his boss, who refused 
him scope to be an 'employee-entrepreneur', so he went 
solo to exploit the opportunity he perceived.
Dean's evolving outlook can be represented as a 
variety of level-2 'strategy' scripts. The goal of each 
remains a successful owned-and-operated business, the 
enabling vehicle of his masterscript, although the 
specifics are reinterpreted as time goes by. These 
scripts are proposed as follows:
2a A niche opportunity script as a fire protection
contractor to small businesses (1973-76)
2b Distributor script (specialist intumescent paints
(1976-1979)
2c Aesthetic fire protection market pioneer script
(1979-1981)
2d Post Clan-crisis growth script (1981-1985)
2e Manufacturing-crisis growth script (1985-)
2f Subsidiary-activity diversification script (1981-)
2g Related-product diversification-by-acquisition
script (1987-)
Each will be reviewed briefly. Whilst they can be
displayed in the form of Figures 4.2, 4.5 and 4.6, the
reader is now familiar with the structural concepts, so
the main hurdles and counter-strategies will be described
straightforwardly in the text.
5.2.1 The niche-opportunity contractor script (2a)
Dean's perception of an embryonic opportunity as a fire- 
protection contractor triggered his entrepreneurial 
career, but a number of hurdles quickly emerged to 
curtail progress. Specifically, a lack of technical
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expertise was an obvious difficulty, circumvented by 
getting as much advice as he could from fire officers.
The lack of human resources was mitigated by using casual 
subcontract staff and insisting that they be as flexible 
as possible. His lack of funds was mitigated by 
concentrating on cash accounts, avoiding the need for 
debt. The need for supplies of specialist equipment such 
as fire extinguishers was resolved by becoming an agent 
for an equipment manufacturer.
By Dean's account, this script was quite effective. 
In under two years he was employing more people than Bill 
White employed after seven. His working capital needs 
were modest, but even his van was sub-let to recover 
overheads. Like White, Dean relied on an adaptive, 
problem-solving approach: enthusiasm, flexibility of 
outlook, satisficing, being prepared to make mistakes and 
learn quickly. Yet although he was prepared to roll up 
his own sleeves, his personal involvement as a doer in 
White's terms was arguably never more than an expediency. 
From the start Dean saw his role as executive, co­
ordinating and directing as well as interpreting fire 
regulations.
The firm helped distressed proprietors cope with 
fire and safety regulations cost-effectively. In 
retrospect, this narrow base of expertise did not confer 
any long run advantage, and it certainly didn't satisfy 
Dean's need for challenge. Project co-ordination was a 
task he soon found tedious. On the other hand, the agency
197
for fire protection products made him wonder if 
merchanting would be a better way to make money.
He was also fortunate, perhaps, where White was not. 
If he hadn't experienced pressure to find an acceptable 
substitute for asbestos sheet, he would not have 
discovered intumescent paints. He saw the commercial 
potential where others in the U.K. apparently did not 
(despite patents being issued as early as 1938) and he 
determined to use them wherever he could.
5.2.2 Intumescent paint distributor script. 1976-9 (2h)
A 'crisis' provoked by committing the firm to a bigger 
contract than it could really handle was the turning 
point. Thereafter, Dean did not doubt the great potential 
of intumescents. He reacted decisively to his assessment 
of the possibilities and sold the contracting business. 
Unequivocally, at a stroke, he substituted a new 
distributor script for the original one.
The first hurdle to emerge in his new script was the 
need to find a supplier willing to grant him U.K. 
distribution rights. Large U.K. chemical firms like ICI 
had subsidiaries offering similar materials, but would 
not help him, so Dean overcame this hurdle by finding 
suppliers in France and Germany who gave him exclusive 
U.K. rights. However, his boldness and ambition were 
allied to only a hazy notion of the acceptability of 
intumescent technology in the U.K. regulatory 
environment. As it turned out, unfamiliarity and
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conservatism drastically inhibited sales and the 
successful 1976 project proved atypical.
Had the major chemicals firms put their reputations 
behind the technology, the situation might have been 
different, but mindful presumably of possible litigation 
over contingent liability, especially in the United 
States, they did not. As far as one can ascertain, Dean 
did not consider this prospect, although he hired his 
brother, a qualified industrial chemist, to maintain 
quality control over supplies.
Whilst the efficacy of Pyrochem's products could be 
demonstrated under controlled conditions, no-one had 
proved that they would still work years hence, so the 
acceptability hurdle remained. Dean attempted to overcome 
the problem by (i) lobbying the regulators (with little 
success), (ii) by doing technically undemanding jobs and 
(iii) like Bill White, accepting the need for patience. 
Another significant hurdle to sales growth was the lack 
of a U.K.-wide distribution and contracting service. Dean 
resolved this by using other Clan businesses.
All in all, the second script had an unspectacular 
start. Perhaps Dean's refusal to quit in the face of 
resistance from the fire authorities was a matter of 
pride? perhaps he was obligated to the Clan distributors. 
In any event, he kept going. When he did get an order, it 
was usually urgent, so another obvious hurdle was the 
problem of ensuring good customer service. He could 
afford only limited stocks, so there were frequent calls 
to the continent to expedite shipments. Meanwhile,
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customers were mollified by sending small amounts of 
materials express delivery. Even today, company myths 
invoke heroic stories of Pyrochem engineers loading their 
cars with product at 4 am. and driving hundreds of miles 
to get the product on site at the start of the early 
shift.
5.2.3 The aesthetic fire protection pioneer script (2c) 
Successful initial applications for intumescents were on 
non-structural woodwork where it could be sold as an 
'insurance policy' in the absence of a legal reguirement 
for such protection. Wood panelling in hotels and listed 
buildings could be protected with a clear intumescent 
varnish without affecting its appearance, a significant 
benefit. Thus Dean bought time for his steel-protecting 
products by selling wood treatments emphasising largely 
aesthetic considerations.
During the late 1970s he reconceived this core 
benefit as applying to steel-protecting paints, a classic 
example of concept displacement (Schon, 1963). That is, 
intumescents could offer aesthetic, cost-effective 
protection on any exposed beam or panel structure. To 
negate scepticism over technical performance he 
positioned his steel treatments as functional-aesthetic, 
redirecting the message at architects. The product could 
now be promoted as a liberating design factor. As Thomas 
explained:
'Nobody spends money they don't have to on a building
...they are not prepared to put in fire protection as
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insurance. They do it because the building 
regulations insist'.
But when architects wanted exposed steelwork
'they were prepared to fight building control 
officers'
to get intumescents approved. This created a new hurdle, 
namely the need to promote the message to a hitherto 
uninvolved audience. Dean began a concerted propaganda 
campaign to appraise architects and other structural 
specifiers of the benefits of intumescents, using 
attractive and informative sales literature, face to face 
selling and intensive mail shots. This chain of problems 
and reactions was depicted in Chapter 3, Figure 3.6.
A little later the aesthetic benefit was reinforced 
by offering top-seal coatings in a full range of British 
Standard colours. This coup created a subsidiary hurdle: 
the difficulty of controlling colour tint in batch 
production. Pyrochem had no experience, no specialist kit 
and relied on a couple of trusted staff. As Jones 
explained:
'we were just left to get on with it...we used to mix 
it in tubs with a big wooden paddle... To come up 
with a colour match... we've been at our wits end.
But it was amazing, O.K. I'm not saying we were upto 
Dulux standard but we weren't far away. The 
complaints we got were few and far between.'
Meanwhile, via the industry association Dean 
continued to lobby the regulators, aiming to win full 
acceptance of intumescents, enhancing Pyrochem's air of 
legitimacy by distancing it from 'fly-by-night cowboys'. 
Pyrochem tried to convey the impression that it was a big 
and influential company and Dean was happy for people to 
assume that the products bearing its name were made
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locally. In these various ways his script for Pyrochem 
evolved during the late 1970s from distributing some 
rather specialised chemicals to pioneering the 'aesthetic 
fire protection market', moving the competitive ground to 
where Pyrochem was strongest. This shift has a mutant 
quality analogous to Bill White's script change from 
niche opportunity to stable plateau.
In hindsight, Pyrochem was on a rising tide as steel
frame structures became increasingly popular in the early
1980s. Not only had intumescents become cost competitive
with traditional fire-protection methods, but an enhanced
version of Pyrochem's main product achieved 57 minutes
char resistance when tested by the independent Fire
Industry Research Association. Not quite the magic hour,
this result still proved a highly symbolic selling
message. Paul Quinn, who joined in 1981 as a sales
representative explained:
'if any company was associated with intumescents it 
was Pyrochem... it seemed like manna from heaven. This 
magical paint which could give fire protection, 
rather than (use) clumsy boards and casings.. But 
legislators and contractors (found) it very difficult 
to believe in... there was (still) a great deal of 
resistance (over) the longevity of the material..
Refocusing on structural steel presented another 
hurdle: it required technical field representation. The 
problem was to hire capable staff who would appreciate 
where and how intumescents could be applied, an advisory 
role combining the technician and market researcher with 
the salesman. Dean also wanted them to identify new 
projects and negotiate supply contracts, be in close
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contact through the construction phase, and ensure that 
good quality work was done.
Accordingly, by 1981 he was starting to look beyond 
the Clan for the calibre of staff he needed, which proved 
a source of growing friction with the Elders. Moreover, 
as the business grew, Dean encountered the need for more 
space, resolved by the property development initiative 
mentioned. The seeds of the next crisis had been sown.
5.2.4 Post-1981 Clan-crisis growth script f2d^
If the Clan was becoming increasingly concerned at Dean's 
ambition, relocating the business in new industrial 
premises in 1981 and hiring non-Clan personnel were flash 
points, symbolising to the Elders independent mindedness 
over duty to the Clan. Some sort of ultimatum was given, 
the upshot of which was brutal confrontation. All Dean's 
staff including his accountant quit, save for the non- 
Clan member whom Dean had just recruited. Distributors 
severed trade links with Pyrochem and Dean and his wife 
were 'excommunicated'. According to Jimmy Jones the 1981 
crisis:
'was a big drama for Hamish...when he questioned... 
that (he) could only work with people in the Clan 
and..decided it wasn't the way he was prepared to go. 
The Monday morning that he was given the ultimatum to 
repent and come back into the fold he said, I'm 
sorry, my viewpoints are so-and-so and I don't see 
that they should alter. There was a complete 
walkout...eight or so. It was excommunication time. 
There were certain members of the family they (Hamish 
and his wife) weren't even allowed to speak to.
I got the impression that the concept was to destroy 
the company and in so doing, Hamish...that the place 
would collapse around his ears. The person's
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resilience came to the fore. He rose to the occasion.
A lot of lesser men would have folded.'
It seems possible that Dean had come to see the Clan
as a constraint on the aesthetic pioneer script, and his
response was actually to provoke confrontation. But it is
also clear how much support Dean had received from the
Clan. Jones, again:
'He needed that sort of protection around him. He did 
need a few people around him who were as sharp as 
some of the (sharks) who were coming along, (but) he 
learns quickly...
According to Dick Thomas, prior to the split:
'Hamish ran the business. The technical aspects were 
his brother's responsibility. His loss was sorely 
felt at the time. The day before the Clan left they 
taught Bert (the new recruit) the job and then they 
quit...
... Hamish asked me for interview. The offices he'd 
just moved in were empty, there was nobody at all. He 
offered me the job there and then, kept upping the 
offer, threw in a company car and petrol, a good 
salary...it became an offer I couldn't refuse.'
After the walk-out:
'He didn't want to see customers, I was sent to see
them  he's become a lot more socially confident
and I'm sure he is up to anything now. Previously he 
was very shy and not at all interested in coming up 
front, getting any free advertising in editorials 
etc. He's a pretty private person.'
Yet patently the crisis diminished neither Dean's
self-belief nor his determination to proceed with his
pioneering script. After the split, according to Thomas:
'The phone never stopped ringing and I was the only 
one there to answer it. I also had to do site visits, 
three days answering the phone and two days driving 
all over the country to sort out technical problems. 
Each day a few little jobs...and perhaps a year later 
they'd come back with a big job. We were running 
around all day long...
After six months or so it was clear that he had a 
decision to make. He asked... should we stay the size 
we are or expand? It was clear we should expand
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...safety was expansion, so he appointed a sales 
manager and then set up the sales force.7
The crisis of excommunication required Dean to
reformulate the aesthetic pioneer script to take account
of his new circumstances. The new variant had to combat
hurdles such as the lack of staff, product distribution,
site representation and contracting. In fact Dean
accelerated the exploitation of intumescents. Within two
years he had eight field representatives, one of whom was
later promoted to sales manager. Quinn, a qualified
architect, began as a salesman, later became technical
director. To begin with, it was uphill work:
'In my first twelve months ..there was an awful lot 
of door knocking...playing at being an expensive 
person... starting to build... in the marketplace the 
name Pyrochem. Preaching the story of what it could 
do, the one hour product, cost comparisons with other 
materials, the decorative aspects...a lot of work.
The main object...was to get Pyrochem7s name on the 
specification, into the drawing, the bill of 
quantities.
There were bits of opposition about... competition 
from Europe..but none seemed to have their act 
together as well as we did. The literature we had 
then, it7s not very good compared to what we have 
now, but it was streets ahead of anybody else.7
We did a lot of., evening seminars, we7d put a bit of 
food on, a few pints, we did an audio visual 
presentation and a number of live burn experiments... 
people love to play with fire. We designed little 
tests which were quite spectacular.. the more you 
appeal to another sense... touch and smell and the 
like, the more ...the degree of impact it has, 
compared with going into an office and spouting for 
half an hour, nothing to see, to touch, to play with.
We would get letters of thanks and requests to go 
back and do it again. So that worked very well for 
us. It got our name very firmly established....We got 
a lot of relatively small orders and as confidence 
built in the material it started to be seen in larger 
projects. The timber product formed quite a high 
percentage of our low price orders (but) over that 
period there was a steady rise in the use of steel 
frame construction (as) the economics of steel became
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gradually better... The credibility gap was filled 
but having filled it for ourselves...we were clearing 
a path for others.'
If the concept of effective sales communication had 
been largely envisioned, and physical distribution of 
product presented few real problems, the real dilemma was 
product application. Dean overcame this hurdle by 
'demystifying' the process. He introduced a specifiers' 
manual explaining what the products would do and in what 
circumstances, how it was to be applied etc. Mindful of 
the trade's inclination to cut corners, Pyrochem 
specified coverage rates, provided thickness gauges to 
check work, and instituted a process of job certification 
for contractors.
Thomas confirmed that subsequent growth was:-
'absolutely explosive. At that time we could afford 
to make mistakes and we did...but it didn't matter.
We'd cock up one order..and the next day we'd have 
the biggest order we'd ever had - and we didn't even 
know where it came from. We had a 100% increase in 
turnover in a year. That went on for two or three 
years, then down to 70% a year for a couple of years 
then down to about 50% a year where it is now. It was 
terribly exciting then, pioneer days.'
Even so, he said, they lost a lot of jobs to a competitor
who took total contracting responsibility, which Pyrochem
would not do. To counter emerging competition, Dean took
a long term view by investing heavily in product
development and seeking credibility via independent
testing. As Jimmy Jones saw it,
'Dean ploughed a hell of a lot of money back in... 
which gave confidence to the people working with him, 
this guy isn't a flop, he ain't here just to line his 
pockets... Independent testing...is an expensive 
game, three or four thousand pounds per test... you 
may need four or five ...you can see why a lot of 
(competitors) wouldn't go down that road.
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Pyrochem could put its hand on its heart and give you 
documented evidence to substantiate what it was 
saying. (On) the marketing side..lovely brochures all 
beautifully artworked....'
Throughout this period Dean was fully involved in 
day-to-day affairs. As the scale of Pyrochem's activities 
escalated, the risk of losing good staff became a 
preoccupation. He circumvented this perceived hurdle by 
showing that he trusted people, delegating as much as he 
felt they could handle and by offering a generous range 
of benefits, including cars and the use of company-owned 
holiday homes in Britain and abroad. He aimed for a 
caring, yet results-oriented culture in which personal 
initiative was encouraged and actions would be justified 
on the basis of getting results and keeping the customer 
happy.
Conversely, Dean expected a high degree of
commitment from staff and his generosity to the loyal
ones coupled with his personal charisma seems to have
made most people, metaphorically speaking, willing to
walk through brick walls for him. He evidently retained
the knack of keeping his finger on the pulse, believing
intuitively in 'managing by wandering around', a trait
the writer observed on a number of occasions. Jones:-
'Hamish was a great believer in utilizing your 
talents ...never used to (interfere)...while a thing 
was (O.K.)...but he had this uncanny knack of sensing 
when there was a hiccup or anything untoward...he 
would appear on the scene. Never an intrusion, you 
never felt he's coming to tell me off (but)...with 
constructive advice in a friendly way... you never 
felt slighted in any way. (The staff) have...all got 
this affection for him solely because of that. He'll 
come up and say, has the wife got over her cold? They 
love it...
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He doesn't have to shout at people...just looks crest 
fallen...you've done that have you...? It's as if 
you've given them a slap, you can see them wilting 
under it...oh God I've upset him...another guy could 
be thumping the table and you'd say, up yours mate!
Even the ones who've come and gone - some out-and-out 
sharks - (if) I've met them afterwards they've said 
the same, O.K. I'd rob my grandmother but I wouldn't 
rob Hamish.'
To summarise, the post-crisis variant of the pioneer 
script contained action assumptions enabling Pyrochem to 
grow rapidly in sales, profits and headcount. By avoiding 
contracting, it was apparently more profitable according 
to Dean, who reinvested heavily in promotional coverage 
to present the firm as the obvious, the only sensible 
choice in its field. Furthermore, Pyrochem began 
exporting, winning some major civil engineering contracts 
such as the treatment of new power stations.
5.2.5 Post 1985 manufacturina-crisis growth script f2e^ 
Yet by 1985 another crisis was incipient. This arose from 
the poor consistency of the product received from France. 
Customers began to realise that Pyrochem could not 
deliver reliable product, and expected a satisfactory 
response. Because improvements were not forthcoming from 
the French supplier, Dean hired a senior chemist with 
experience of producing thick film intumescents. As 
Pyrochem's relationship with the main supplier 
deteriorated the development of its own formulations was 
accelerated.
It is unknowable whether Dean at that time intended 
to go into manufacturing. But he certainly wanted better 
control of supplies and by inference to have the option
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of manufacturing as soon as possible, should it be 
needed. He made the crucial decision to begin 
manufacturing in autumn 1985. For, despite numerous 
warnings, the supplier had not improved and as Dean saw 
it, Pyrochem's position had to be vigorously defended.
In hindsight Dean thought that this crisis was
overcome with surprising ease:
'It was extremely easy..in terms of specialist kit 
and numbers of people it didn't make much difference.
It was a very, very easy change, we had already got 
the lab to carry out the quality control function. It 
was a remarkably easy transition. I still wonder 
today what happened...'
It appears that his chemist had had a few lucky breaks.
Subsequently the production initiative prompted a new
hurdle as the French sought litigation over patent
infringements and breach of contract. Years later,
Pyrochem paid a large sum in damages to its former
supplier.
The decision to proceed can be seen as a calculated 
gamble that the benefits of enabling Pyrochem to continue 
growing rapidly by supplying its own materials would more 
than offset damages it might ultimately have to pay. It 
also pre-empted competition from other suppliers in the 
U.K. market and allowed Dean to prospect lucrative 
overseas contracts, sending experienced staff to advise 
on requirements and applications techniques. His boldness 
and refusal to contemplate failure also bolstered morale 
during a difficult period.
This crisis marked the emergence of, in effect, a 
third variant of the pioneer growth script. The emphasis
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was now less on market development, more on product 
performance and range extension. A by-product of the 
dispute was that Dean hired one of his former supplier's 
chemists with expertise in sealing mastics. Dean saw that 
she could open up a complementary market, so he funded a 
small laboratory near Paris which subsequently created a 
range of novel Pyrochem products.
But with total responsibility for product 
formulation Pyrochem had no technological 'backstop'. 
Competition in the U.K. marketplace was increasing and 
innovation in products and technology was needed. The 
U.K. laboratory extended protection times of the core 
product to two hours. Products were developed for 
different kinds of steel sections and for cast iron, for 
brushing on and for spraying. Soon, the intumescent 
product range included seals, electric cable protection, 
new wood paints and a wider range of seal-coat 
treatments. A better system of contractor approval was 
introduced for complex applications. Export sales were 
extended as the product range increased and Dean became 
more confident of Pyrochem's ability to take on 
international competition and win.
By the late 1980s Pyrochem supplied product to some 
50 countries. Its technical sales literature continued to 
be of superlative quality, so good that competitors had 
been known literally to copy parts of it. Pyrochem had 
become a major force in specialty fire protection, 
employing around 125 staff with a multi-million pound 
turnover. By continuing to pioneer and grow it had not
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only retained its number one position in the U.K. 
aesthetic fire protection market, it had become 
internationally recognised.
5.2.6 Subsidiary-activity diversification script (2f)
Two further scripts appear to have informed Dean's 
thinking after 1981. One concerned diversification into 
activities loosely supporting the development of the core 
business. It is possible to trace the emergence of this 
script from a concern in the aesthetic pioneer script 
that growth would be hampered by a lack of resources, in 
particular space. The de facto policy that emerged is 
illustrated by the creation in 1981 of a small industrial 
estate; the excess capacity thus created allowed Dean to 
short let units and reclaim them for Pyrochem when the 
need arose. This initiative recycled surplus cash, 
(resolving another dilemma!), but more importantly 
improved Dean's control over a critical resource by 
creating 'slack' for future expansion.
It was also opportunistic diversification into 
property development and management. The script slowly 
became more explicit, namely to initiate support 
activities where they were feasible, financially sound 
and would improve control of critical resources. Thus, 
dissatisfied with promotional literature from outside 
agencies, Dean set up a graphics design agency. This was 
so successful that it now works for a number of blue chip 
companies. Jimmy Jones explained:
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'the [design] company he used had a brilliant 
chappie..who now works for Hamish....he took the 
source of the creativity, gave him the tools to do 
the job...I could see the wisdom of it with 
hindsight. He'd obviously seen the potential of 
having someone gifted... .'
Frustrated by travel on scheduled airlines, Dean
learned to fly and acquired a light aircraft for his
personal use. To defray its running costs, it was hired
out per day to other companies. Later, finding his plane
constantly in use, Dean acquired another and the cycle
repeated itself, creating a small, but thriving air
charter business. Thomas:
'What Hamish has done is diversify, because there has 
been a sort of cash mountain...that's probably the 
reason behind the aircraft. He had a small fleet of 
aircraft, two Partenavias and a Golden Eagle, a 
turbocharged twin piston-engined pressurised machine 
which travels above the weather. He bought the 
Partenavias second hand and hired them out. One was 
used overnight by the Coal Board for computer data 
transport, the other for celebrity transport, jockeys 
and comedians running up and down the country.
Because they weren't pressurised they had some bad 
experiences taking visitors around, vomiting for four 
or five hours at a stretch, so he got the Golden 
Eagle.
Later, Dean acquired various retail businesses
including a travel agency. Influenced by a desire to
expand Pyrochem's distribution, he considered merchanting
building products. Thomas:
Nearly everything he's taken on has been a success. I 
think the first one was the design company, then a 
travel agency, another shop, a tele sales company, a 
printing firm, and there are two or three others.
He's got the sort of mind that can run perhaps twelve 
different businesses at the same time.'
These activities were managed separately from Pyrochem,
but in one way or another manifest sufficient perceived
synergy for Dean to justify the investment. They also
reflected his need for new challenges and to continue
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learning - even if, as occasionally happened - he lost 
money.
It is possible to interpret these moves as creating
potential options should the core business falter.
Equally, property development can be seen as a logical
means to create a capital asset. Thomas:
'He moved into quite lavish offices which he built... 
actually supervised the sub-contract labour, bought 
the land for cash...the whole row of factories he 
owned. He was always dealing...buying and selling 
cars and houses as well. He'd be in and out of a 
house every twelve months and obviously making a 
profit on it....'
Quinn:
'When we set up a laboratory we obtained a third 
industrial unit in the row. We now had three out of 
the four. Hamish built them all originally... He did 
quite a lot of property development in the early 
years.'
These developments can also be related to the theme of
flexibility. Dean's use of subcontract labour was the
first manifestation of this. Likewise in the development
of the industrial estate, flexibility of use was a key
issue. As Dean explained, he insisted on having the scope
to put a second storey on the building:
'I didn't plan for that, I planned in case it was 
ever useful. Flexibility doesn't necessarily incur a 
liability or sacrifice. It simply requires forward 
planning and anticipation of what might happen. I 
don't like there to be only one escape road or 
success route.'
After 1986, Dean was engrossed with these 
diversionary activities, plus managing the start-up of 
in-house production. Though he had a sales management 
team, other staff were supervisors, not managerial 
calibre. So he was still needed in the day to day running
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of the business. He attributed the poor financial results 
of 1986 to his being a 'management bottle-neck' and he 
took professional advice on how to resolve this perceived 
hurdle to future growth. His considered solution was to 
hire a number of experienced professional managers. He 
then stood back from the day-to-day management and turned 
his attention to longer term growth issues.
5.2.7 Related-product diversification-by-acquisition 
script (2q)
It is argued that the 'management bottle-neck' crisis led
indirectly to a new diversification script centred on
Dean's revised role as chairman of an embryonic group of
companies created by related-product diversification and
sustained via acquisitions.
Turning Pyrochem into a professionally managed firm
was a step everyone in the firm recognised. Thomas:
'Hamish decided the (previous) sales director's skill 
had been utilized to its fullest extent and for the 
company to grow he would have to go. That was a very, 
very major step... he was the company really in the 
customers' eyes. He had a lot of friends, was on a 
lot of technical committees. Hamish set him up in a 
personnel recruitment business, bought the company 
for him, said, off you go.
He took a very brave step getting rid of him.
Recognised the inadequacies of the management he'd 
put in place... and acted on it. Terribly brave, 
determined, single minded position to take. He 
virtually stripped the guts out of the company, took 
on Mike Simmonds as M.D. and another chap as 
Marketing Director.'
Jones:
'At the beginning there were a lot of reservations, 
everyone was a bit apprehensive... what's going to 
happen next, we're all for the chopping block,
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they've brought in a hit man...people were genuinely 
very worried.
I was trying to say, well if you're...giving it 
(your) best shot...you can't do any more...you 
shouldn't be worried whether it's Hamish or an 
authoritarian or a laid-back type of guy...'
In fact, Simmonds turned out to be:
'quite strict, he doesn't suffer fools gladly and 
he's probably - even though he's alienated a few 
people - been what the company needed to keep people 
on their toes. Now it's getting bigger... discipline 
has to be maintained...
(Simmonds has) 'brought a whole new approach...very 
procedural minded...Whereas you could always say to 
Hamish, I need an extra pair of hands...he would say, 
O.K. Jim, go and get somebody...that wouldn't wash 
with Mike, you would have to have it on paper....'
From Simmond's perspective:
'I'm bound to say that the company was not very well 
organised.... it had grown from where it was to where 
it is now through Hamish's supreme enthusiasm and 
ability to motivate people and perhaps even more 
important, his superb marketing skill... The company 
spent money like there was no tomorrow... if somebody 
thought it was a good idea we spent the money.'
Hamish has tended to do things... very much on the 
spur of the moment. And has tended to do things that 
have motivated one employee but sometimes had a 
negative impact on others.'
Having hired Mike Simmonds, Dean asked him to
evaluate how Pyrochem could develop its core market and
what others it could exploit with the same or similar
products. Having agreed the broad direction, he allowed
Simmonds to get on with running Pyrochem, though opinions
differed as to what extent Dean succeeded in detaching
himself from its day-to-day affairs.
Simmonds was in no doubt why he had been hired:
'People know they are (now) being measured partly 
with respect to how well they perform against 
budgets... objectives form a major part., and people 
understand it's a major part... We've all talked 
about why it's important and that we are all going in
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the same direction..and that we have targets and 
objectives. I'm very target oriented.'
He harboured no illusions about the culture change this
implied in Pyrochem:
'One or two senior people have ...become anxious, 
counter-productive because it makes them less likely 
to achieve. Others are just doubting their own 
abilities because they've never been held accountable 
for anything...the sales force was incredibly laid 
back ..."you don't expect us to make more than two 
calls a day, do you?"'
Simmonds seemed to accept his responsibilities
philosophically, confident that his and Dean's respective
styles harmonised:
'It is difficult to follow Hamish Dean...in all kinds 
of ways...you know, if the boiler goes wrong he'll go 
out and repair it. It's incredible, you might walk in 
one day and find him lying flat on his back putting 
his desk back together... Dean...likes creating and 
developing things, he hates nitty-gritty., balls- 
aching things that we have to do. We ... bring him in 
almost like a consultant at an early stage 
of...projects to get his marketing concept '
But he acknowledged the need to manage sensitively:
'I'm not an autocratic manager, 95% of the time I 
will reach a consensus decision. I thrash things out 
with the key managers.. Hamish gets pulled in if it 
involves a major change or a major investment. If 
somebody has a good idea you can do for not a lot of 
money, that's fine, I'm quite happy to take that sort 
of risk.
If somebody is talking...of a quarter of a million 
pounds of capital plant, that's a different ballgame. 
I'm not going to...let somebody do something 
intuitive if they require heavy capital investment 
without having done the homework., whereas if Hamish 
thought the idea was right, he would probably slap a 
quarter of a million down without thinking twice 
about it.'
Given Simmond's evident effectiveness, Dean 
perceived a new hurdle - how to keep himself gainfully 
occupied. Using his new found freedom he began 
enthusiastically to explore related diversification. In a
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reasonably disciplined way he looked at a range of 
acquisition options. In hindsight his selection criteria 
appear to have been to look for a firm (i) similar in 
size or smaller than Pyrochem, (ii) manufacturing fire- 
protection products or speciality chemicals that would 
fit logically with Pyrochem's range, (iii) with poor 
financial performance, offering the chance to acquire it 
cheaply, (iv) with substantial, under-utilised assets, 
ideally freehold premises, hence the prospect of cash 
recovery via disposals, and (v) offering an exciting 
personal challenge.
By 1988 he had bought a small firm making 
intumescent paints for the military market, then another 
of similar size to Pyrochem making specialty chemicals. 
Dean spent the next 18 months or so making the latter 
more efficient and market oriented. He then hired a new 
man as its Managing Director, promoting Simmonds to Group 
M.D. reporting to himself as Chairman.
Diversification strategies can take many years to
show results, so it would be premature to claim that the
diversification script will succeed for Dean over the
long term. Nonetheless, still in his early forties,
Dean's declared intention was that 'I wouldn't mind being
a micro Lord Hanson'. Simmonds commented:
'Hamish and I have talked a lot in terms of whether 
one should set up a separate company to do different 
activities. There are quite good defensive reasons 
for doing it...litigation... That apart, I believe in 
keeping things small...
If we grow in the way I hope, we'll split (the firm) 
up and run it as autonomous centres. The more people 
who are conscious of the bottom line, the more
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successful an organization will be. If you get to the 
point where the chief executive doesn't know 
everybody that's the point where you've really got to 
start thinking about splitting it up.'
Looking ahead, Thomas commented of Dean:
'He obviously has the drive to continue, gets 
pleasure in...creating things, making them grow and 
going on and doing something else. (If) I'd made a 
million I'd retire, that would be it. But that's not 
Hamish's way. He has this desire to go on building 
because he gets fun out of it, pleasure, excitement.'
Like Thomas, Jones was in no doubt that Dean would
continue to innovate and diversify:
'Hamish is that type of entrepreneurial chap. If he 
does as well with the other (ventures) he's gone into 
(as with Pyrochem)...O.K. you might get a duff egg 
amongst one of them but he's quick to (say) O.K., 
enough. I've got great confidence in him in that 
situation. His track record is exceptional. He likes 
the challenge of taking it from its infancy and then 
building it up...
It's great for Hamish, but you must have that 
nucleus, that build-up behind... to keep the spark 
alive, get the thing into a big flame and to keep 
fuelling...so that when he looks back he's got a big 
row of blazing beacons...and he can say, well I 
started all that. That's where he's going to get his 
kick. Your kick will be standing there at one of the 
beacons fanning it.'
5.2.8 Commentary on the script analysis of Dean's outlook 
As in White's case, a range of quasi-normative scripts 
seem to have informed Dean's entrepreneurial thinking. 
Some of his assumptions mirror White's, for example the 
legitimacy of intuitive, adaptive responses? devoting 
much personal time and energy to the firm? taking direct 
responsibility for new initiatives? delegating only to 
trusted subordinates within agreed areas of expertise. 
However, Dean not merely espoused the need to detach 
himself from the minutiae of day to day operations to be
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a more 'professional' manager, he took active steps to do 
so.
In other respects, Dean's outlook differed from 
White's. Although in the early days he used personal 
contacts in the Clan, he became more systematic in his 
exploration of options and sought high calibre outside 
advice. Unlike White, for whom close customer contact was 
critically important, Dean may have perceived contact 
with customers as comparatively unimportant. If so, we 
could speculate that this was due to the project nature 
of the construction industry or merely, as Thomas 
claimed, that he was customer-shy. Nonetheless, customer 
satisfaction has been part of the Pyrochem formula, as 
for Wittenshaw.
In the 1980s Dean explicitly rejected the patient, 
'shoestring' approach, preferring bold, high-risk moves 
that accelerated growth. Compared to White, he took and 
implemented aggressive, proactive investment decisions. 
Although like White he relied heavily on trusted staff, 
Dean was capable of ruthlessly weeding out under­
performers, a process that continues today. Dean, too, 
was open to advice from staff, but the evidence is that 
he valued ideas, not necessarily consensus, believing 
that the big decisions were his to take. Whereas White 
began with manufacturing and became disillusioned with 
it, Dean took the reverse route, so that manufacturing is 
now perceived as a major element of business success.
Dean manifested a very positive attitude to growth. 
This process can be portrayed as a search for challenges,
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opportunities to learn, which he claimed very clearly was 
a fundamental motivator. But although decisions to enter 
new areas were sometimes impetuous, he made a virtue of 
engineering flexibility into his activities to ensure 
satisfactory outcomes. In contrast, for White control was 
the key issue.
The assumptions underpinning Dean's various scripts 
were generally well recognised by his colleagues, even if 
they did not always concur. When Dean had endorsed a 
course of action, they accepted that further discussion 
would centre on how, not whether it would happen. Even 
when there was personal dislike, it seems there was 
respect for his authority and his skills.
As in White's case, one can posit multiple levels in 
Dean's script hierarchy, albeit with greater richness.
Yet overall, as can be seen from the summary of his lower 
level scripts in Figure 5.2, there is considerable 
continuity over time at levels 3 and 4. It is also argued 
that Dean appeared to sustain evolutionary thought 
processes more readily than White. He developed new 
patterns of thought as one strategy script evolved into 
another. However, Dean was more willing than White to 
confront perceived hurdles to growth, quite often 
stimulating perceptions of crisis to which he had to 
respond unequivocally. In effect, he would attempt to 
reconceive a threat as an opportunity which, if 
successful, would then form the basis of a new and 
sometimes 'revolutionary' script. A solution to a 




Level 3 Scripts 
Flexible use of s/con. staff 
Use Clan members 
Hire/support capable staff (#) 
Use expert outside advice 
Good bank rels. & cash mgmt. 
Maintain client variety 
Seek/exploit distributorships 
Exploit asbestos substitutes 
Insurance appeal (to hoteliers) 
Technical appeal (to regulators) 
Aesthetic appeal (architects)* 
Patient plodding 
Keep tabs by wandering around 
Excellent sales literature 
Top-seal BS colour range 
Property investment/mgmt.
Use of confrontation 
Ad hoc hire of key staff 
Promote quality/standards/ 
authenticity 
Demystify product application 
Operate in-house laboratory 
Espouse personal detachment 
Create professional mgmt. team 
In-house design capability 
Control of personal travel 
Commodity trading 
Growth via diversification of 
activities
Additional level 4 scripts 
Fast customer response 
Adaptive problem solving 
Go for high-margin business 
Subcontract idle assets 
Be personally involved 
Good staff packages/perks 
Be ruthless
Focus on wood products 
Economy with the truth 
Flamboyant demonstrations 
Get independent test data 
Certification system 
Develop export markets 
In house production 
Extend product range 
Sell design expertise outside 
Diversify via acquisition
2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 2f 2g
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(#) staff needed to be enthusiastic, adaptable and loyal 
(*) Initially level 4 - see discussion
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subscript; if effective he would elevate it to a more 
fundamental status. For example, the appeal to architects 
shown in Figure 3.6 as a low level solution to the 
problem of overcoming market scepticism was recast as a 
fundamental plank of the aesthetic script. This 
transformation process is explored further in Chapter 6.
Dean's original strategy-level script was to exploit 
a niche opportunity in fire protection contracting. When 
a better opportunity was envisioned, this script was 
rapidly substituted. The second (paint distribution) 
script mutated into the aesthetic fire protection script. 
Successive enacted crises - over the Clan's influence, 
over sourcing and manufacturing, and later over his own 
involvement in the firm - all allowed Dean to adjust and 
embellish, though not reject, the fundamentals of the 
aesthetic script. Meanwhile, one detects the emergence of 
two complementary diversification scripts which have 
continued to inform Dean to the present time.
To summarise, applying the script approach to Dean's 
evolving outlook and knowledge appears useful in that it 
suggests a number of informative xlevel 2' strategy 
scripts. In this way we can examine how his strategic 
thinking changes as he interacts with and learns from the 
environment in which Pyrochem operates. Yet, the analysis 
suggests also that some apparently low level assumptions 
encoded in these scripts are persistent and therefore 
intrinsic in his thinking about strategic issues 
affecting the future of Pyrochem.
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5.3 Paradoxical Dualisms in Dean's Outlook 
A number of seemingly paradoxical oppositions or dualisms 
emerged from Dean's account of Pyrochem's development and 
his own outlook on business. They can be subsumed under 
three broad oppositions:
* Loose control :: tight control
* Innovating :: consolidating
* Self-oriented :: orientation to others
Arguably however, in contrast to White, Dean did not 
merely accommodate paradoxes, but extracted positive 
benefits from their existence in his thinking.
5.3.1 Loose control :: tight control
(i’l Personal style: focused, committed, single-minded :: 
broad, uncommitted, open-minded. Dean acknowledged his 
ability to bear down on issues with uncommon intensity 
and focus. His consuming passion of the moment would 
sweep other priorities aside, making life uncomfortable 
for subordinates. His obsessions seem child-like: wanting 
to 'push an idea to its limits', impatient to reach a 
conclusion. His single-minded commitment kept faith with 
intumescent technology until people accepted it, and 
again, later, when his French supplier became a 
liability: XI live, eat, sleep and breathe Pyrochem...' 
Without this intensity Pyrochem would surely have demised 
or become a bit-part player in this specialised market. 
Staff who quit or were fired could not - one suspects - 
understand, much less share his single-mindedness.
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Yet Dean could also be dispassionate about
situations. Soon after hiring a new management team,
clearly affirming his commitment to the core business one
might think, he said:
'If (competitors) posed too big a threat we would 
probably go into a different market'.
So he could envision the possibility of exit even as the
new team was settling in and the business was growing
rapidly.
Always he desired multiple options and was willing
to cut losses on misguided investments without apparent
regret. The design agency exemplifies this:
'We went into printing...to take (brochure 
production) to its logical conclusion. We spent... 
£50-60,000.... struggled for while... found we could 
get (it) done far cheaper by farming it out... so we 
discontinued our printing function.
I bought a plane...and got it completely wrong...but 
you know you write it off (about £30,000) and say, 
that's down to experience. Life's got to go on.'
(iil Stvle: satisficing :: optimising. Acting impulsively
is not a recipe for optimisation and efficiency. People
interviewed said that Pyrochem could be chaotic and
inefficient. Even though Dean's enthusiasm got results,
profits must have suffered to some degree, suggesting a
satisficing outlook. But Dean also espoused and acted on
the need to become more efficient, professionalising the
firm by hiring efficient administrators. As he said:
'I like any company I'm involved with to be thought 
of as doing things better than anyone else, very 
professional. That to me is actually much more 
important than making money. I'm much more concerned 
with (it) being around in 15 years time because we 
have consistently done things better..'
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He expressed similar sentiments over his own
contribution:
'I get to the end of a day and I'm totally 
dissatisfied with what I've achieved, I'm not worth 
the salary, I wonder how the company copes. If I'm 
flying I have to land the plane absolutely perfectly 
every time. If I'm driving I have to drive fast and 
very accurately and I chastise myself if I'm not. If 
we lose an order it hurts. If I offend somebody I'm 
annoyed and I analyse why I do it...'
(iii^ Use of resources; flexibility :: productivity. This 
is a particular case of the previous point. Dean 
preferred flexible resources, whether human or financial; 
keeping options open so as to respond to events as they 
unfolded. Flexibility, he argued, can be designed into a 
project: without perfect future knowledge, it makes no 
sense to foreclose prematurely on potential 
opportunities, and one should avoid actions which might 
lead into blind alleys. His policy to keep spare factory 
space to permit rapid expansion is a good illustration. 
His aircraft were bought for their multi-role capability, 
people were hired for their ability to handle differing 
roles as circumstances changed.
But flexibility usually means lower efficiency. 
Intuitively, Dean reconciled the opposed priorities of 
effectiveness and efficiency. This could mean tough 
decisions: he did not expand into executive jet 
chartering because the most efficient aircraft were too 
costly and specialised, whilst the flexible alternatives 
were not productive enough.
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(iv^ Finance: cavalier/generous :: cautious/
parsimonious. This pairing is exemplified by Dean's
willingness to invest considerable sums in risky
ventures, yet show equanimity when losses were sustained,
provided something had been learned:
'If someone thought it worth spending £10,000 on a 
marketing campaign... it was going to be right for 
this reason, that reason...and it's a complete waste 
of time, that's great, I know that person learned 
from it and won't make that mistake again'.
But he manoeuvred in canny fashion to reduce cash
exposures. The manufacturing investment crucial to the
firm's survival was underpinned with a D.T.I. grant;
carefully timing the purchase of his current premises
minimised the net outlay even though the space was three
times as great; the design agency is still denied a
commission from Pyrochem's advertising space. Dean also
insisted on chapter-and-verse of minor expenditure:
'I sometimes find myself worrying about too small 
things, I'll say look, I know we can get an extra 10% 
discount on this stationery if we go to so-and-so...'
(v^ Diversification: synergistic businesses :: stand­
alone businesses. Dean rationalised his diversification 
initiatives in terms of synergy with existing activities 
and compatibility with future needs. Acquisitions had to 
complement Pyrochem and he had no plans to acquire or 
develop any company not fitting into a tight, coherent 
pattern of fire-prevention products and specialty 
chemicals. Yet he also insisted on new activities being 
run as separate, autonomous profit centres, presumably to 
enhance accountability and facilitate disposal if deemed
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necessary. The design agency was typical in this respect. 
His aeroplanes were justified on their ability to 
generate profits by subcontracting, even though the first 
was bought in part as a synergistic cost-saving measure.
5.3.2 Innovating :: consolidating
(vi) Pioneering: pursuing new ideas :: exploiting past 
innovations. This opposition presents two faces of 
learning: creating and applying new knowledge. From his 
earliest career days Dean valued new ideas, was driven by 
curiosity. A challenge perceived was a challenge to be 
tackled 'because it was there', because challenges are 
'great fun'.
Unquestionably a pioneering spirit, yet history is 
littered with pioneers unrewarded because of their 
inattention to detail and inability to cope with 
bureaucracy. Though Dean decried his administrative 
ability, he evidently soon accepted the need to extract 
the full returns from innovating by means of a 
structured, detailed approach even as he proceeded to 
innovate elsewhere.
When most suppliers were reluctant to promote 
intumescent paints because of the commercial risks, Dean 
effectively pre-empted serious competition by market 
innovation. Later, after Pyrochem had 'laid down the 
tracks', so that the market looked more attractive to new 
entrants, he increased the competitive stakes, 
demystifying the product, allowing general painting
227
contractors to apply it. He then implemented a stream of 
product developments. In retrospect it can be seen that 
Dean used innovating both to defend and exploit ground 
already held and to enhance Pyrochem's future competitive 
status. Clearly, he had few conceptual difficulties in 
combining the excitement of innovating with the need to 
exploit current innovations.
fvii^ Basis for and timing of action: intuitive/bold/ 
urgent :: systematic/cautious/considered. Dean's record 
confirms the power of incisive, intuitive actions. He 
seemed quickly to appreciate the key dimensions of a 
proposition, then promote urgent action. To be sure, he 
made mistakes - yet this style enabled him to learn from 
each episode. Thus, of a big loss in commodities trading 
he commented:
XI can't learn from books..I learn 100 times quicker 
jumping in the deep end...£60,000 (estimated loss) 
would buy somebody a very nice house ...I've got a 
very nice house. The company was making ten times 
that, so I wiped out 10% of its net profits... I'm 
glad I lost £60,000, it will probably stop me losing 
£600,000 in the future with the same kind of 
mistake.'
Yet having committed himself, Dean demonstrated 
patience and determination in securing the goal, 
especially between 1976 and 1981/2 when the uphill 
struggle to promote intumescent paints must have been 
very discouraging.
Though he tackled substantial challenges in relation 
to his current experience and resources, he also found 
ways to incrementalise change in a stepwise progression;
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a bold commitment would be followed by prudent actions to 
limit downside risk. For example, building multi-unit 
premises and limiting financial exposure by renting some 
of them out until needed. In short, he appears to have 
judged when to act urgently and when to be patient, when 
to be bold and when to be cautious.
5.3.3 Self-orientation :: orientation to others
fviii^ Style: Solo operator :: team player. Dean 
evidently had a natural instinct for what the market­
place needed, allied to a lack of inhibition to 
experiment. Thus it was his input that made the big 
impact. As Jimmy Jones expressed it:
'....the sharpness, the acuteness of the business 
acumen.'
Whilst much of Pyrochem's success resulted from his faith
in his own ideas, Dean claimed to be hungry for
challenging ideas from whatever the source:
'Once you've done something for more than a week 
....you stop asking why am I doing it this way 
...It's so easy to learn from everybody...you're a 
bluebottle, you can pick up good and bad points from 
all sorts of people and see what works and what 
doesn't. Find out problems, hazards, threats long 
before another person in the company will notice 
them.'
Despite his apparent self-reliance, he claimed to be a
team player, needing and valuing colleagues:
'I'm not an entrepreneur...I do need to work in a 
team. The classic entrepreneur I don't think really 
does. He does it because he really believes in it and 
that's it. I like to carry other people along with 
me. I do like to persuade them that it's a good 
idea.'
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The paradox was evident when he wanted to delegate yet 
remain close to the action. Nominally he delegated 
supervision tasks to subordinates, but he kept his finger 
on the pulse, 'managing by wandering around'.
Again, whilst he declared his team credentials, Dean 
also 'wheeled and dealed'. His 'trader' outlook remains 
intact and at the right price, who knows, he might be 
prepared to sell Pyrochem and start again.
fix^ Culture: idiosyncratic/personalised :: consistent/
formalised. Dean managed in the personalised and
idiosyncratic way one would expect of a small-firm
entrepreneur. Indeed, 'too much accountability to men in
grey suits' was his reason for not wanting to become
chairman of a public company:
'you can end up killing the inspiration and the fun, 
one of which is no good for the business, one no good 
for personal satisfaction'.
Thus he valued idiosyncratic behaviour provided that it
brought results, and he rewarded loyal and committed
staff accordingly. Conversely, his disregard for staff he
perceived as pedestrian, uncommitted or who abused their
privileges could be arbitrary, even ruthless, as he
continued to be an inspirational and paternal autocrat.
Yet despite this outlook, he had appointed a cadre 
of professional managers, recognising - like Bill White - 
the value of a more analytical and systematic approach, 
greater consistency in culture and style, less dependence 
on his own personality and skills. So there is a paradox 
between the paternal and professional in his outlook.
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(x^ Best practice; exploiting Pyrochem's commercial
advantage :: enhancing industry standards. Dean's pursuit
of an authentic, quality image for Pyrochem was
undoubtedly prompted by notions of commercial advantage.
Yet he also realised that it was appropriate to encourage
improved 'best practice' in the industry, even though it
might work against Pyrochem's short term commercial
interest. As he explained:
'Contractors try to under-apply the product. We issue 
certificates of supply, send copies to the architect, 
the building control officer..so contractors are less 
likely to get away with (it).
I'm on the Council of the Association of Structural 
Fire Protection Contractors and Manufacturers and our 
Technical Director is on the Technical Committee...We 
were the first company to satisfy the BS5750 quality 
assurance scheme called Certifire. There were two 
companies on the day of the launch...we were one of 
them....we are going to encourage (the industry) down 
that route.'
Txi^ Self-interest: the needs of Pyrochem :: personal 
priorities and interests. Dean has consistently supported 
the growth of Pyrochem; he has associated himself 
unequivocally with this business. Equally, his other 
initiatives have gone well beyond the firm and led to 
investments in a range of other areas. For example, he 
developed the design agency beyond what was necessary to 
meet its original aim. More recently, having fired his 
sales director, he funded a new venture with him to set 
up an executive recruitment agency. Dean claimed that 
some twenty other firms had benefitted from his help, 
many of which have doubtless offered him directorships.
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So one can advance the thesis that close as Dean was 
to Pyrochem, he was able to distance himself, eg. 
financially, by owning the freeholds of various 
properties and leasing them to Pyrochem or other tenants 
as he thought fit. So although he has been committed to 
the firm, he has not forgotten that his own interests 
might one day diverge from the firm's.
5.3.4 Commentary on paradoxical dualisms 
The preceding analysis suggests powerful oppositions are 
at work in Dean's outlook. Various characteristics seem 
to imply conflicting approaches of managing in a tight, 
controlled fashion and a loose, flexible and reactive 
way. There is the apparent contradiction of sometimes 
being bold, sometimes conservative, sometimes 
innovative, sometimes appropriative. There is the 
dichotomy between self-interest and awareness of broader 
collective interests involving Pyrochem.
In part these may be explained by his evolving from 
a small-firm entrepreneur to chairman of a medium-sized 
firm. Another possible explanation is that he has 
intuited a shifting, time-dependent range of convenience 
to these key constructs. Yet some ideas persist, notably 
the desire to continue seeking challenges. Dean is 
clearly a complex person whose paradoxical thinking has 
generally had constructive consequences. He does not 
become burdened, much less paralysed by conflicting 
imperatives, as White often appeared. Dean's thinking is
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realistically portrayed as 'and/both', shifting 
seamlessly from one pole of a dualism to the other.
Few people, one suspects, have such an innately 
flexible outlook. This quality was expressed by one 
respondent who described him as mercurial and 
unpredictable. He is a challenging man to work for, 
sometimes frustratingly so, because of his apparent 
inconsistency. From an analytical perspective this 
Janusian quality makes it hard to predict how he will 
construe and respond to particular issues.
For this reason, arguably, we learn less about 
Dean's strategic outlook from considering dualisms than 
we do from his scripts. On the other hand, from dualisms 
we gain insights into the thinking that characterises a 
complex and sophisticated executive mentality, of which 
the most salient feature is perhaps the capacity to 
engage dynamic mental patterns.
5.4. Metaphoric analysis of Dean's outlook 
Here, as for White, insights into Dean's perceptions of 
his roles are expressed in terms of metaphors inferred 
from his language of explanation. These are discussed 
under four broad headings (i) personal experience and 
development, (ii) capitalising on opportunity, (iii) 
managing relationships, and (iv) quality and integrity in 
business affairs.
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5.4.1 Personal experience and development
(i^ The student/scholar. Dean referred repeatedly to 
learning from experience, including his mistakes. He 
talked of the need for rapid learning, 'buying' important 
lessons, 'cutting my teeth', 'my time at school' etc. 
Learning was a goal worth 'doing grotty things' for, an 
antidote to boredom. He claimed new experiences were 
crucial, even after 20 years. To avoid getting stuck in a 
rut, he saw himself buzzing around, picking up ideas here 
and there, especially from outside the firm.
He associated learning with ideas and insights: 'I 
am an ideas person, or I should be'. It was important not 
to think narrowly, and to have one's ideas challenged. He 
was comfortable with concepts and many successes resulted 
from his imaginative, innovative ideas, reconceiving the 
nature of things.
fii) The hedonist. Dean made it clear that experience had 
to be characterised by fun and novelty. From the earliest 
days the business had provided him with 'fabulous fun', 
'spice and excitement', hence 'doing things I enjoy' and 
getting 'a buzz from doing what interests and amuses me'. 
The strong impression is of gratification-seeking, albeit 
self-actualization, rather than material reward per se, 
though the latter has obviously been substantial.
New initiatives must offer the prospect of 
amusement, provide the freedom to pursue whims. Thus 
there must be a sense of adventure, of being able to
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satisfy curiosity. Above all, he needed to be enthused 
and to enthuse others. Recent acquisitions were important 
new sources of novelty. The firms he acquired would have 
enthusiasm injected into their operations.
fiii^ The mountain climber. Dean needed challenges. Aside 
from the uphill struggle between 1976 and 1981 he did not 
refer explicitly to climbing, but this is an obvious 
metaphor: a classic, macho challenge, Putting himself to 
the test was a means of getting fired-up and to learn, of 
proving to himself and the world that he could compete 
against the odds and do worthwhile pioneering things 
commercially:
'I like doing things better than anyone else. I can't 
do that in an academic sense, because I'm not bright 
enough. I can't do it in a physical sense because I'm 
not strong enough. So I try and do it in a commercial 
sense, do things better than competitors, that is the 
arena in which I operate.'
(ivl The pioneer/pathfinder- Like White, Dean was taken 
with exploring and trail blazing, arguably with more 
justification. For a large part of his career he had been 
'going it alone', 'ploughing my own furrow', 'laying down 
the tracks for others to follow'. Motivated by a desire 
to be ahead of the game, Pyrochem had consistently 
implemented new ideas. But like most trail blazers, Dean 
was wary of 'getting bogged down' or 'stuck in the 
swamp'. Despite tough going, he intended to continue 
experimenting, to 'lever into new areas'.
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5.4.2. Capitalising on opportunity.
fv1! The speculator/gambler. Dean's opportunism was a 
matter of being bold and incisive, having faith in his 
beliefs and judgement. He trusted to 'jump in at the deep 
end' and be totally committed to exploiting a perceived 
opportunity to the full. Opportunism was about reading 
market signals correctly, reacting to events, backing his 
judgement, precipitating not avoiding decisions. It was 
about recognising and acting on priorities to enhance 
positions (to use his turn of phrase, "like a flea-in-a- 
nudist camp - where do you start?”). Opportunism was also 
knowing when to force the pace and when to be patient. It 
was about creating luck and knowing instinctively when to 
ride that luck.
fvi^ The fencer. For Dean, being flexible and versatile 
was key to survival, being quick on one's feet like a 
fencer side stepping thrusts or a boxer riding punches.
It also meant keeping slack, underutilized resources in 
reserve to cope with unforeseen problems and respond 
decisively to openings. Flexibility meant bobbing and 
weaving, not getting trapped, being prepared to quit 
indefensible positions, to tolerate small mistakes as the 
price of avoiding big ones. It meant being philosophical 
about balancing losses against gains and making the best 
of situations as they are, not as one wished them to be.
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fvii^ The envisioner. To succeed consistently in
opportunistic ventures suggests good anticipation, as
well as luck. Dean disclaimed 'early-warning antennae' to
spot emerging opportunities, but he did claim to envision
options and possibilities, to create mental scenarios of
where the firm could go, and to earmark the next steps on
route. He had been a pivotal factor in Pyrochem's future
development, especially as there was little evidence of
formal planning until Simmonds was hired:
'...the five year plan is in the subconscious and 
evolving. All the time it's changing shape slowly, 
responding to what I hear about the competition, 
products, costs etc. It's a composition, the result 
of all sorts of diverse but relevant information.
When you have someone heading an organization ...for 
some time and emotionally, not just practically 
involved, the five year plan is an unwritten thing in 
the head.'
fviii^ The resolute partisan leader. Dean could be 
doggedly determined, as well as opportunistic, by no 
means always short-termist. At times he prepared for a 
patient a long-term struggle, plugging away until others 
joined the cause, a partisan, almost ideological role. 
Especially in the early days he needed persistence in 
adversity, a resilient, reactive problem-solving 
capacity, 'flying by the seat of the pants', 'living 
hand-to-mouth' etc..
His Clan upbringing probably aided this aspect of 
his development. When much later he encountered 
resistance to change in his first acquisition, he 
confronted the old ideas and imposed rapid and ruthless 
change. Substantive and symbolic actions were needed to
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isolate and kill dissention: the blood of the dissenters 
pooled in the snow....
fix^ The predator. An overtly exploitative or 
appropriative aspect of Dean's opportunism was his 
'trader mentality', an ability to wheel and deal in the 
marketplace, 'playing monopoly to win'. In recent years 
he has exploited Pyrochem's quasi-monopolist position to 
the full. Yet in the 1990s he still wanted to dominate.
In the market he would 'go for the kill', if necessary 
attacking competitors or acquisition targets with a 
predatory game plan. He remained determined to push for 
growth: the business could not stand still, it must 
extend its product range and market coverage.
Though proper rewards for staff were important, they 
had to be earned. Dean's desire to exploit is posited as 
including staff, by weeding out low performers and 
exploiting the skills of the good ones.
5.4.3 Managing relationships.
(x^ The team captain/coach. In the early days Dean's role 
was the doer. During the 1980s his role shifted to the 
coach, to oversee and co-ordinate, specifying general 
directions and letting others execute his wishes. In the 
Clan era he accepted that dedication and commitment 
substituted for formal training. After 1981 building a 
skilled, well-trained team was seen as an important 
factor for success. Dean expected and rewarded loyalty to
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the team. He wanted enthusiastic people and to get 
results via team work. He 'managed by wandering around', 
encouraging and cajoling.
After the reorganization he was still co-ordinating, 
but increasingly at arms-length. He had to keep a lot of 
balls in the air, 'holding the reins', not 'letting 
things slip through the net', ensuring staff 'pull in the 
same direction'. He was concerned to 'keep managers on 
their toes', 'keep his finger on the pulse'. After the 
arrival of Simmonds, the new 'coach', Dean wanted to work 
in tandem to develop key players, psych up the team, get 
players pulling together, and establish good team spirit 
by equality of treatment.
fxi^ The counsellor. In large measure Pyrochem's success 
was about the relationships established with customers, 
winning credibility by good communications, empathy, and 
service. Dean remained sensitive to customer needs, 
listening and learning, getting to know what impressed 
them and advising them by communicating relevant, 
positive messages. Rapport was vital to build confidence, 
as he learned from the episode with French supplier.
Trade contacts and other networks of information 
offered valuable two-way sources of ideas and market 
intelligence, clarifying the 'rules of the game'.
External relations exposed him to ideas about best 
practice, showing what was necessary, providing the 
incentive to uplift Pyrochem's standards. However, Dean 
also made a point of getting help from outside
239
professionals, local firms and from other sources. As his 
contacts expanded, he envisioned a 'business club' to 
share ideas with peers in a more organised way.
5.4.4 Quality and integrity in business affairs
fxii^ The the spiritual leader fauruK As a religious 
sect the Clan is presumed to set its members high 
standards of discipline and integrity in personal 
behaviour. Their tenets still appeared to influence Dean. 
For example, he was aware of his responsibility for 
maintaining integrity of the firm's behaviour. He also 
recognised that there had been a cult of personality 
which was no longer appropriate in view of the firm's 
size and need for professionalism.
Though he recognised and claimed to respect the 
style of his senior managers, the good aspects of the old 
culture had to be retained. A change-receptive, 
enthusiastic and participative culture should be 
encouraged. Harmony and trust between manager and managed 
should be central, integrity in one's dealings with 
people, treating them consistently and with respect, and 
a minimum of status symbols. Staff should be encouraged 
to improve their performance and behave ethically to 
clients and to one another, creating a harmonious, 
synergistic and effective working environment.
fxiii^ The perfectionist. Dean espoused perfectionism in 
his own behaviour; he also wanted the firm to succeed by
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pursuit of quality and to be seen to do so in the 
marketplace. This required quality staff and managers, 
respecting talent, improving consistency of performance 
and decision making, innovating to keep ahead, setting 
and meeting internal standards and matching or beating 
the standards of others. Thus for example it had been 
appropriate to comply with the tough BS5750 industry 
standard before others.
To recapitulate, Dean's metaphors (like White's) suggest 
a man pitting himself against an unpredictable world-out- 
there. White conveyed the impression that he was not in 
control, that fearsome beasts in the jungle were waiting 
to devour him? Dean by contrast was optimistic that he 
understood enough of his environment to experiment with 
it to his own advantage. Dean viewed his situation as 
being fun and was enthusiastic, whereas for White it was 
all very serious and energy-sapping. Dean implicitly 
construed himself as a winner, even though he did not 
invariably win, White mostly construed himself as a 
gallant loser, even though he did not always lose.
The metaphors describing Dean's inferred roles 
reflect something of the paradoxes noted in the previous 
section. There is a hard :: soft dualism evident in the 
juxtaposition of predator and guru for instance which is 
hard to explain, and which serves once again to 
demonstrate the complexity of his outlook.
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5.5 Process Interpretation of Dean's Role Identity 
In process terms Dean makes a significant contrast with 
White. The thesis is that whereas White was largely 
artisanal and biased toward Type I in character, Dean was 
largely entrepreneurial and Type II.
As in the classic entrepreneur case, Dean was 
typically opportunistic and experimental, a 'first-mover' 
in the exploitation of intumescent paint technology. He 
courted risks of a magnitude that White would never 
contemplate. He gambled overtly, on the stock exchange, 
though he adopted tactics to contain losses; where he 
thought it necessary he would quit positions without 
regret rather than expect unrealistic turnarounds.
Though Dean claimed not to be an empire-builder, nor 
concerned with growth for its own sake, his actions tell 
a different story. Growth held no terror for him, the 
prospect excited and motivated him. Having achieved a 
handsome rate of growth between 1981 and 1986, he desired 
more, a classic entrepreneur trait. Admittedly the nature 
of his business meant that he did not have to seek 
external cash, putting his control at stake. Conversely, 
he was prepared to import expertise by recruiting a 
professional team with whose help the firm trebled in 
size over the three years to 1990, via a combination of 
organic growth and acquisition. Further growth looked set 
to continue, and barring a major unforeseen set-back, one 
would envision Pyrochem's transformation from a small 
firm to a medium or even large company with the passage 
of time. As in the classic entrepreneur case, Dean also
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acknowledged that his own role had to shift to co­
ordinating and directing if growth were to continue, 
difficult as this might be in practice.
Despite the disclaimers, like many successful 
entrepreneurs Dean enjoyed material success, a large 
house and a fast car, for instance. He also enjoyed the 
luxury of being in a position to do more or less as he 
pleased, and wanted to indulge in a great many ventures, 
often with a high degree of originality. As in the 
characterisation of Carland et. al. (1984), he was 
impatient to progress, implying a low threshold of 
boredom.
However, it must be noted that Dean had grounds to 
feel at least as socially marginalised as White. Clan 
membership constituted a form of social isolation from 
society at large; more prosaically it prevented him from 
pursuing a legitimate career in higher education. Later, 
its dependency culture may also have stymied his ability 
to cope with the rigours of entrepreneurship, whilst his 
subsequent 'excommunication' was an extreme, traumatic 
instance of marginalisation. So in some respects the 
distance between artisanal and entrepreneurial qualities 
are narrowed.
As befits the Type II identity, Dean was biased 
towards novelty and innovation, willing to contemplate 
and initiate root-and-branch change. Equally, there has 
been a strong commitment to the core business of fire 
protection, providing continuity of background against 
which more unusual 'experiments' were conducted. Like
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White, Dean has clearly been action-rational. As his 
colleagues acknowledged, he has championed new ideas, 
attacked defensive routines, persisted with experimental 
behaviour which more deliberate, decision-rational 
colleagues like Simmonds have had difficulty adjusting 
to.
However, Dean/s action-rationality has combined with 
an intuitive, reflective understanding of possibilities. 
In this respect the absence of formal plans has not meant 
a lack of anticipation, guite the reverse. This was a 
significant difference between White and Dean, since the 
latter evidently believed that because detailed outcomes 
cannot realistically be envisioned, the flexibility of 
multiple options is necessary to respond to threats and 
opportunities as they emerge. Thus he has been happy for 
multiple initiatives to run in parallel, given only 
broad-brush envisioning of options and potential 
outcomes.
Dean appears also to have done much more than White 
to develop a wide range of contacts beyond Pyrochem. In 
some instances this has been to the extent that quite 
unexpected alliances and ventures have arisen, whose 
logic was not immediately obvious, even to close 
colleagues. His external orientation as manifest in these 
wide ranging contacts has also been underpinned by guite 
effective political skills, promoting shared interests 
among the community of clients, industry stakeholders and 
others. He has mobilised external contacts beyond the 
immediate trade network to identify and exploit potential
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opportunities. However, although unquestionably 
opportunistic, the evidence points to a relatively 
unitary view of co-ordination processes, albeit for the 
most part determined autocratically rather than 
democratically. Like better known entrepreneurs, Dean's 
political skills appear to reside largely in the 
authority of a charismatic personality. Accordingly, he 
has been more sensitive than White to the symbolic as 
well as substantive aspects of managing, for instance his 
provision of benefits to staff that add value well in 
excess of their cost.
All in all, during the long evolution of Pyrochem 
Dean appears to have conformed broadly, though not 
perfectly to Stanworth & Curran's entrepreneurial 
identity and to the Type II identity defined in Chapter 
II. But more recently Pyrochem's culture has evolved 
toward what one might term mature professionalism. Dean's 
own outlook has arguably not changed significantly, a 
possibility noted by Stanworth & Curran. There is for 
example some tension between his action-rationality and 
the dictates of being chairman of a sizeable enterprise. 
So it may be that Dean will ultimately construe his 
contribution and role-identity as increasingly marginal, 
remote from Pyrochem's operations and - in that context 
if not elsewhere - limited to endorsing the decisions of 
others. One can envision circumstances where he might 
become sufficiently frustrated, even marginalised, that 
he quit as chairman, perhaps would even sell out to 
regain lost enthusiasm in an entirely new venture.
5.6 Chapter Summary
Chapter 5 replicated for Hamish Dean the analyses done 
for Bill White. The result is an equally rich picture of 
a complex role-identity presenting a variety of seeming 
paradoxes to the observer.
Script analysis was useful in making sense of Dean/ 
evolving patterns of thought, in particular how his 
strategic thinking developed in response to external 
perceived stimuli.
The analysis of dualisms indicated a notable 
difference when compared with White's thinking, namely 
Dean's apparent capacity to reconcile opposed and 
potentially conflicting propositions constructively and 
to feel comfortable with consequent ambiguity, avoiding 
the frustrating tensions White experienced.
Indeed, the dilemmas seem to exist principally for 
the observer wishing to make sense of Dean's outlook. To 
colleagues he could appear unpredictable and 
inconsistent: promoting loose and tight control in 
tandem, innovating and consolidating with equal facility 
As argued earlier, he turned AND or combinatorial, 
flexible thinking consistently to commercial advantage.
This is not to deny that some conflicts have been 
genuinely problematic for Dean. There remains potential 
conflict for example between caring and predatory 
instincts. To behave ethically and with integrity is 
clearly at odds with conventional impressions of
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predatory present day entrepreneurs, though paternalism 
is in the tradition of the great Victorian entrepreneurs.
In his quest for self-actualization Dean espoused 
the status of explorer, wanting to experience and 
appreciate as much of his chosen world as possible. Many 
of the role metaphors inferred from his account differ 
qualitatively from White's. To take one example, though 
each saw himself as a pioneer/pathfinder, Dean construed 
his world as bountiful in the range of challenges and 
opportunities it conferred on him. Like an expert 
mountaineer, with a judicious blend of boldness and 
caution his gaze would take in not just Everest, but the 
entire range of Himalayan peaks waiting to be climbed. 
White, in contrast, sees challenges as burdens, most 
certainly not generally to be enjoyed.
A variety of role metaphors testify to Dean's 
curiosity and resilience in engaging the 'world out 
there', above all believing in his ability to influence 
outcomes and to inspire and motivate colleagues to 
achieve bold results consonant with his ambitions. White, 
in contrast, construed challenges rather negatively. They 
are typically threatening because he perceives his modest 
capacity to influence events; hence his cautious, 
incremental responses.
Finally, Dean appeared to contrast sharply with 
White in being much closer to the model of an 
entrepreneurial, Type II actor, whereas White was much 
closer to an artisanal, Type I model. However, it is 
stressed that the match was not perfect in either case.
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CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE FINDINGS
6.1 The Study of Executive Knowing 
Knowing is presumed to be a key determinant of the 
ability of purposive, goal-directed individuals to 
achieve desired personal and organizational outcomes.
This study links evolving, experiential knowing or wisdom 
(Sternberg, 1990) with strategic management in small 
firms. Investigating experiential executive knowing, it 
has been suggested, can lead to a better appreciation of 
the nature of strategic competence.
There are at least three important research aims (i) 
ways to represent and interpret knowing (ii) exploring 
how (and why) that knowing evolves, and (iii) gaining 
insights into the facilitation of learning in a 
strategic organizational context. The preceding chapters 
offered various representations of the strategic knowing 
of two individuals and how it has evolved in each case. 
This chapter reflects on these findings and discusses the 
evolution of knowing, particularly in respect of scripts. 
It concludes with some reflections on the enabling of 
effective strategic learning.
It was argued in Chapter 2 that one can usefully 
distinguish cognitive structural representations of 
knowing such as dualistic constructs and pattern-encoding 
frames or scripts on one hand, and an alternative 
approach via metaphoric and process conceived role 
identities.
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Drawing on Kelly (1955), paradoxical cognitive 
dualisms were inferred in the knowing of two executives. 
The theory of dissonance reduction (Festinger, 1957) 
leads us to suppose that conseguent tensions encoded in 
their dualisms could have motivational consequences. How 
and to what degree opposing priorities are resolved and 
with what implications, is therefore a matter of 
legitimate interest.
The second avenue of cognitive structural 
investigation drew on the script concept of Abelson 
(1973) and others. Scripts, it was argued, encode a 
wealth of accumulating, implicit knowing of a somewhat 
utilitarian and prescriptive form. Scripts offer a 
systematic, multi-layered approach to representing this 
knowing, and how it evolves over time.
The representation of knowing also explored the 
concept of role identities. It was proposed that 
executive knowing is illuminated by exploring the 
organizational roles which they construe and enact. One 
strand of investigation inferred metaphors of role 
identity. Metaphors provide a conceptual bridge between 
abstract cognitive structures and tangible behaviour.
They encode potentially insightful constructions of roles 
and their implied consequences. Like scripts, metaphors 
are experiential analogies, but there are important 
differences. Metaphors are essentially stylistic and 
context-free. They address the imaginative, creative, 
even fanciful aspects of role; by comparison scripts tend 
to be prosaic, utilitarian and contextually-grounded.
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A complementary approach to exploring role identity 
examined various perspectives on executive process, 
within the small firm and more generally. Small firm 
archetypes of artisan and entrepreneur were noted. So- 
called Type I and Type II archetypes were also 
hypothesized, located in an 'identity space' defined by 
the perceptual/motivational dimensions of (i) continuity 
versus change-seeking, (ii) decision versus action- 
rationality, (iii) internal versus external focus, and 
(iv) consensual versus conflictual co-ordination 
processes. These archetypes proved moderately useful in 
the cases explored, accepting that empirical identities 
are generally hybrids, not pure types, and will develop 
over time.
The discussion now continues with further 
observations on the three research issues noted above.
6.2 Representations of Chief Executive Knowing 
The script analysis presented in this study drew on 
Abelson (1973), highlighting goal-directed, behavioural 
assumptions of the actors. The benefit of the script 
approach is that it renders explicit the generally tacit 
or uncodified causal assumptions held in personal, 
experientially-derived patterns of thought. We assume 
that actors seek movement toward desired goal states, and 
the frustrations or hurdles they encounter on route 
stimulate responses that become lower level scripts in 
their own right. The conclusion from subjects White and
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Dean is that such hierarchical structuring is both 
feasible and productive.
The content and structure of individual scripts 
remain matters for investigation. The similarity of the 
two subjects' situations led to apparently similar 
metascripts, reflecting a quest for gratification and 
self-actualization, to be channelled by owning and 
operating a successful small firm. This 'solution' became 
the desired state of second level (strategy) scripts, in 
many ways the most interesting ones. Here we find the 
strategic organizational knowing of the executives 
encoded in a quite generic form, for example the 'niche 
opportunity' script, recognisable by countless small firm 
proprietors. In contrast, lower level constructs are 
particular to the knower and the context. Whilst a 
specific strategy script is operative, it is doubtful 
whether the validity of the meta-script is questioned.
The nesting of sub-scripts could in theory continue 
without limit. But since there is finite variety in an 
individual's portfolio of ideas and responses, there 
seems to be considerable persistence of many lower level 
components. Thus for example, in all three of White's 
'strategy' scripts he accepted the need for a high level 
of personal involvement. To use an analogy, the plumber 
continues to use an adjustable spanner whether he repairs 
a water leak or installs a complex heating system. In 
consequence, little was gained by extending the analysis 
beyond four levels.
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To represent Dean's knowing adequately it was, 
however, necessary to uncover more scripts than White. 
Dean also appeared more likely to retain some of them 
concurrently. There was also greater variety in his lower 
level scripts. The specifics of these scripts will be 
considered again in relation to role identity.
Turning to the exploration of cognitive dualisms or 
paradoxes in thinking, the main findings are summarised 
for White and Dean respectively in Figures 6.1 and 6.2.
Figure 6.1
Paradoxical dualisms inferred in White's outlook
Expectations: financial returns :: non-material 
gratification
Results: self reliance :: depending on others 
Basis for action: analysing (evaluating) :: doing 
(intuiting)
Resources: labour-intensive :: reluctance to recruit 
Consensus: tolerate conservatism :: urge to change 
mentality
Structuring the firm: integration :: separatism 
Culture: 'big firm' professionalism :: small firm 
expediency, adaptiveness
Investment: 'shoestringing' :: invest to get growth 
Risk: grow the business :: keep control of the firm 
Progress: current clients :: prospecting new clients 
Progress: product-led :: customer-led 
Adding value: making :: merchanting.
The point to emphasise is not the content of these lists 
per se, but that sets of this general dualistic form 
constitute an important part of the intuitive knowing of 
small firm executives and can be investigated 
systematically with their co-operation. They encode taken 
for granted assumptions about the world of the knower's 
organization, and his priorities in that context. Each 
element contains an apparent contradiction or paradox.
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Figure 6.2
Paradoxical dualisms inferred in Dean's outlook
* Personal style: narrow, committed, single-minded :: 
broad, uncommitted
* Personal style: satisficing :: optimising
* Use of resources: flexibility :: productivity.
* Finance: cavalier/generous :: cautious/parsimonious.
* Diversification: synergistic businesses :: stand­
alone businesses
* Pioneering: pursuing new ideas :: exploiting past 
ideas
* Basis for and timing of action: intuitive/bold/ 
urgent :: systematic/ considered/cautious
* Personal style: solo operator :: team player
* Culture: idiosyncratic/personalised :: consistent/ 
formalised
* Best practice: exploit Pyrochem's advantage :: seek 
enhanced industry standards
* Self-interest: needs of Pyrochem :: personal 
priorities.
The existence of a dualism constitutes a potential 
tension in the subject's outlook. To the extent that a 
subject leans toward one pole of a dualism for a time, he 
makes an implicit choice. Polarised thinking may be 
expected to legitimise some forms of action and preclude 
others. Thus dualisms provide insights into the 
behaviours of the respective subjects. Taken as a set, 
they offer substantial insights into the knowing of 
executives in relation to the management of their firms.
It was suggested that White typically adopts more- 
or-less polar positions (eg. preferring 'shoestringing' 
to capital investment). In this sense he appears 
consistent. Dean's postures are altogether more 
ambiguous, colleagues might say whimsical. He adopts 
positions consonant with his 'reading' of particular 
circumstances and his generally opportunistic approach.
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As a consequence he sometimes appears inconsistent to 
others, not to be confused with being indecisive.
Turning to the notion of role identities, Stanworth 
& Curran's (1976, 1986) small-firm proprietor identities 
were helpful in describing Messrs. White and Dean, 
respectively the craftsman/artisan for whom the small 
firm provides comparative independence, and the classic 
entrepreneur who is naturally opportunistic and motivated 
by the prospects of growth, success and social acclaim. 
The notion of role identity can be encapsulated as 'what 
I believe I am, why I'm here, and what I'm trying to do' 
and an executive's conception of her role-identity is 
posited as central to her organizational self-awareness, 
knowing, and expertise.
The two process-derived role identities labelled 
Type I and Type II also offered moderately good matches. 
White was Type I in his preference for continuity, 
consensus and an inward-looking bias? however, although 
he espoused decision-rationality, his behaviour was 
typically action-rational. Dean, in contrast, was Type II 
in his preference for change, an external orientation, 
and a willingness to confront as well as to seek 
consensus. Though his behaviour was sometimes impulsively 
action-rational, he also manifest a capacity for shrewd, 
reflective thinking which one would associate with 
decision rationality. Whilst this pair are not pure 
archetypes, their respective role identities are in many 
respects mirror images. This approach to role identity
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holds promise, albeit one recognises the dangers of 
categorising complex actors too simplistically.
The exploration of metaphors of role identity looks 
especially promising. Dean prompted a greater variety of 
role metaphors than White, though some were equivalent, 
for example the pioneer, prospector, explorer and team 
leader/coach. White's metaphors, taken together, convey 
the impression that he interprets his role identity in 
terms of being continually tested on an obstacle or 
assault course which presents real and unwelcome barriers 
to progress. The world beyond the firm presents an 
unknown, hostile context for his exploratory, pioneering 
voyage. In contrast, Dean sees the challenges of the 
unknown as opportunities to experience, learn, achieve, 
and to gain satisfaction from achievement. The contrast 
is highlighted in White's shoestringing imagery 
(cautious, pessimistic, muddling along) compared with 
Dean's speculator/gambler (bold, proactive, optimistic, 
opportunistic). White's outlook conjures mundane images 
of plodding experimentalism, whereas Dean is much more 
the forecaster or prophetic envisioner and inspirational 
communicator.
White's and Dean's respective role identities were 
apparently well understood by their colleagues. In 
passing, the evidence also points to differences in 
identity between each CEO and his immediate colleagues. 
Empirical support for this view exists, albeit from large 
British firms. Norburn explored the match between chief 
executive type and other executives in the 'top
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management team' (Norburn, 1989? Norburn & Birley, 1988), 
concluding that CEOs were more likely to have had profit- 
centre responsibility early in their careers and to have 
run, or at least seriously considered running, their own 
firms. So it seems reasonable to propose that in a 
comparatively stable organization a CEO's role identity 
will be complemented by those of other colleagues.
The role metaphors attributed to the two subjects 
are quite persistent. This is seen in Figures 6.3 and 6.4 
when roles are mapped against strategic scripts. It seems 
plausible to suppose that role identities and scripts 
ought to be correlated in some respects. However, the 
Figures do not corroborate this in any obvious way, 
suggesting the need for further research directed 
explicitly to this question. More generally, it is hoped 
that these findings lend credence to the exploration of 
how role identities and scripts facilitate the strategic 
sense-making of executives.
Figure 6.3
Mapping White's metaphoric roles on scripts
Script > 
Role
Exploit Niche Growth to Diversified 
Opportunity stable business 
plateau

































Mapping Dean's metaphoric roles on scripts
Role Script > 2a 2b 2c/d/e 2f 2g
Student/scholar X X X X X
Hedonist X X X X X
Mountaineer X X
Pioneer/pathf inder X X X
Speculator/gambler X X X
Fencer X X X X X
Forecaster/prophet X X X X X
Partisan leader X X X X X
Predator X X X X X
Captain/coach X X X X X
Networker X X X X X
Guru X X X X X
Perfectionist X X X
2a Fire protection contractor niche; 2b Intumescent paint 
distributor; 2c/d/e Variants of the aesthetic fire 
protection market pioneer; 2f subsidiary activity 
diversification; 2g related product/market 
diversification
Exploration of executive cognition in these ways is 
relevant theoretically and empirically, not least in 
providing a language and an agenda for clinical studies 
where practitioners reflect on their knowing and 
capabilities. Whilst learning (gaining expertise) at 
lower organization levels may be largely about acquiring 
factual (technical, professional) knowledge, at senior 
levels it also requires awareness and conceptualising of 
ambiguities in prior experience from which the knower 
hopes to distil useful lessons for the future. In this 
regard an actor's scripts and role-identities condition 
his assumptions and interpretations about what is to be 
done, how it is to be done, indeed what factual knowledge 
will actually be required in the future.
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To summarise, each way of representing strategic 
organizational knowing sheds some light on the outlook 
and expertise of the two executives studied. The script 
is possibly the most systematic and replicable approach.
The analysis of paradoxical dualisms may be particularly 
relevant in clinical investigations. Archetypes of role 
identity have a synthetic elegance, but inevitably 
oversimplify; their underlying dimensions may generate 
better insights. Metaphoric representations of role 
identity provide elegant, multi-faceted, synoptic 
insights unlikely to be derived by other means.
6.3 The Evolution of Strategic Knowing 
Each of the approaches used here also has something to 
offer in providing insights into the evolution of 
strategic knowing, in the sense that one can identify 
changes over time: from one script to another, from one 
metaphor to another, from one pole of a dualism to 
another, from one dualism to another. If we can map these 
changes systematically, we shed light on the way that 
knowing evolves in particular cases. Whether or to what 
degree the processes of evolution of executive knowing 
are generalisable is beyond the scope of this study, but 
are evidently legitimate and researchable questions.
6.3.1 Script-based insights
Representing evolving strategic knowing via scripts is 
relatively straightforward, given that perceptual 
stimulus-response (problem-solution) structures and
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desired goal states emerge progressively. Thus the 
changing outlooks of the two subjects, White and Dean 
were expressed as time-series of dominant scripts in use. 
Some scripts persisted and were elaborated over time. 
Others, it is argued, were supplanted by a new script 
with differing characteristics. This raises the question 
of why script changes arise. Several mechanisms for 
evolution and transition are suggested.
Script appropriation. Both White and Dean may have had 
proximate role models, though the direct influence of 
these does not emerge very clearly from their respective 
accounts. Role models at large abound, however, and as 
the evidence shows it is not necessary to have a fully 
elaborated script at the outset. When each decided to 
start a business he had a moderately well formed concept 
of what it meant to be the proprietor of a small firm. In 
the event, each appropriated the skeleton of a 'niche 
opportunity' script, probably from a variety of sources, 
and this was necessary and sufficient to begin trading.
Apart from the setting up of the two businesses, the 
clearest instance of script appropriation is arguably 
Dean's later decision to engage in related product 
diversification. One could rationalise this move as a 
crisis of confidence in the growth prospects of Pyrochem, 
but in truth there was no objective necessity for 
Pyrochem to pursue such a radical approach. In the event, 
it seems an instance of Dean implementing the first step 
of his implicit goal to become a 'micro Lord Hanson'.
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Script elaboration Having appropriated a script, the 
knower can be said to extend or elaborate it over time to 
encompass solutions to new problems as they emerge. These 
'solution hypotheses' are validated or rejected in the 
light of experience. For instance, White's original 
script soon relied heavily on solution subscripts such as 
(i) intuition to mitigate risk, (ii) personal contacts to 
offset lack of detailed market knowledge, (iii) using his 
own efforts to combat lack of resources and (iv) 
responsiveness to customer needs to enhance his 
credibility as a supplier. When a solution appeared 
effective it was integrated into the script-in-use and 
soon became taken for granted. When the problem which had 
given rise to it was neutralised, it ceased to dominate 
his thinking, being supplanted by other priorities. Yet 
although an elaborated script incorporates multiple 
solution hypotheses, it remains recognisably the same 
script. Elaboration does not challenge the basic script, 
on the contrary it corroborates and reinforces it.
Script rejection. Abrupt, outright rejection of a script- 
in-use is uncommon, arguably because it devalues and 
sacrifices prior experience. Yet it does occur; in this 
study the most obvious instance was when Dean sold his 
contracting business to become a specialist paint 
distributor. This created a hiatus in his business 
affairs, signalling a concrete change of mission and 
direction.
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The seeds of the transformation lay in his quest to 
eliminate the health hazard of asbestos when used as a 
fire preventive medium. Dean could have mitigated the 
problem by issuing workers with face masks and laundering 
their overalls frequently. But he was evidently concerned 
to find a less hazardous alternative. This prompted a 
proactive search which discovered intumescent paints.
Dean converted a perceived liability to an opportunity, 
by rising to the challenge he had identified. Having met 
the challenge he envisioned a new script which looked so 
attractive that the script-in-use was jettisoned.
Script mutation. More commonly, a script appears to 
metamorphose into another. This shift can be likened to 
biological mutation. White's 'niche opportunity' script 
mutated into a script emphasising the quest for security 
by growing toward a mythical stable plateau. The plateau 
hypothesis signified to White that growth was expedient, 
not an end in itself. To reach the plateau necessitated a 
proactive search for business opportunities beyond the 
original niche, yet it continued to legitimise many 
assumptions of the original script.
As in the biological cell analogy, mutant forms co­
exist for a time. Ambiguity arising from the use of 
overlapping scripts may actually be functional in 
preventing resource-sapping debate over their competing 
claims. Equally, it seems that a particular 'solution 
hypothesis' may remain influential, sometimes in a 
passive or mythical sense, even after the script in which
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it evolved has been superseded. For instance, White's 
acceptance of the minimalist 'shoestring' approach 
remained influential well after the 'niche' script had 
been displaced.
Further examples of mutation are the successive 
transformations of Dean's 'aesthetic fire protection 
pioneer' script. The script emerged in the mid/late 1970s 
as a mutant form of the paint distributor script as Dean 
came to realise that he would not get the endorsement he 
sought from fire officers and other regulators, thus 
threatening the success of his venture. His solution was 
to appeal directly to architects and other specifiers, 
emphasising cosmetic, not purely functional benefits. The 
new script was still about paint distribution, so it had 
much in common with its predecessor. But the new focus on 
communication with specifiers required modification of 
the 'aesthetic' script to address specific problems, 
including the need to commission eyecatching and 
informative sales literature.
Ironically the success of the mutant 'aesthetic' 
script led to Dean's parting from the Clan. This 
traumatic event evidently did not make him doubt the 
validity of his goals. Subsequently the script-in-use 
mutated in response to new crises such as the 
unreliability of the French supplier, leading to the 
'manufacturing' script. Yet the common thread remained 
specialist paint distribution, because that concept 
continued to 'work' financially and in the marketplace.
262
As the preceding instances suggest, the galvanising
mechanism for script mutation is the emergence of a
problem which is seen to be insoluble within the existing
frame, hence construed as a crisis. This observation is
cu
of course not new (eg. Pettigrew, 1985? Pitt 1989? 1990). 
Mutation itself is characterised by a shift of perception 
such as re-construing threat as opportunity. Emphasising 
the cosmetic benefits of the product was initially Dean's 
low level, tactical response to the problem of non- 
acceptance by the authorities. The revised benefit 
statement allied to the new medium of communication 
proved so effective that he then conceived of pioneering 
an aesthetic fire protection market, elevating the 
concept of cosmetic benefit to strategic status. As 
already argued, this is classic 'concept displacement', 
drawing an analogy between wood and metal treatment 
markets. Such inversions of perceptions evidently require 
some innovativeness and creativity in the knower's 
evolving patterns of thinking.
The various script changes of the two executives are 
summarised in Figure 6.5 below. The study of scripts 
reinforces an evolutionary, rather than radical 
interpretation of strategic organizational knowing. A 
script locates the actor in time and context and provides 
a sense of deja vu. It suggests that new events are 
assessed in the light of prior experience, tending to 
highlight incrementally different solutions to the 
knower, contributing to the development of experience in
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a fairly predictable, incrementalist manner. A highly- 
elaborated script is an extremely useful interpretive
Figure 6.5 
















template, though the construction of new insights is 
constrained by the quality and extent of prior 
experience. For, functional as a script may be, it 
promotes action-influencing myths that with the benefit 
of hindsight may prove misleading. These myths become 
widely understood, promoting conformity and lack of 
reflection. For instance, White subscribed to the myth 
that the shoestring approach would sustain growth and 
lead ultimately to a stable state.
Fundamental, transformational shifts require 
creative, unpredictable, out-of-context thinking, as Dean 
demonstrated from time to time, a point addressed in 
section 6.4.2. Exposure to a rich variety of ideas and
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sources could be a relevant antidote to incrementalist 
thinking. White, whose scripts encoded personal 
commitment and consensus, was considerably - perhaps 
dysfunctionally - influenced by a limited set of 
colleagues. Dean, in contrast, appears not to have been 
influenced by any particular individual for long; he is 
very much his own man and those who work with him have 
had to strive to influence him by the quality of their 
deeds, ideas and skills of advocacy. As regards the 
external competitive environment too, Dean's scripts have 
benefitted from his acceptance of differing market 
challenges and outside contacts.
6.3.2 Insights from role identities
From a strategic perspective role-identity could be of 
major importance in the evolution of executive knowing.
As Stanworth & Curran (1976) and Barber et. al. (1989) 
noted, the imperatives of founding and growing a small 
firm are very different from maintaining and enhancing it 
in later years. Stanworth & Curran hypothesized that 
small firm proprietors develop from artisan to 
entrepreneur and potentially to professional manager.
This is neat, if somewhat implausible. For as they 
recognised, some individuals will effect a partial or 
reversible transition, whilst for others role identity 
will typically be rather stable. Because the shift to 
professional manager identity is especially problematic, 
we should not be surprised if the founder consolidates 
and builds on his entrepreneurial identity, recruiting
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professionals who will complement his outlook, as Dean 
and (less explicitly) White have done. Thus the evolving 
mix and complementarity of identities in the dominant 
coalition is important. Failure to recognise this may 
force the founder to quit prematurely or be deposed.
The defensive, risk-averse culture in Wittenshaw 
seems likely to survive White himself, not least because 
an entrepreneurially minded potential successor is 
unlikely to see the firm as an attractive opportunity. 
Equally, whilst Dean is in charge at Pyrochem there seems 
only a remote possibility of the opportunistic culture 
ceasing. However, the longer he remains chairman and the 
bigger the firm grows, the more likely it is that his 
successor will be a professional manager rather than an 
entrepreneur. According to Simmonds, Dean could resolve 
this concern by divisionalising Pyrochem, selecting a 
chief executive for each division with a role-identity 
judged appropriate to the priorities facing it.
Inspection of the posited Type I and Type II 
identities makes it clear that postures adopted with 
respect to their key defining variables can be well- 
entrenched, so that transitions between identities will 
tend to be espoused rather than truly action-informing. 
For example, White espoused a shift towards decision- 
rationality, but his conduct suggests that he remained 
largely action-rational. Likewise, the evidence is that 
Dean retained an action-rational, externally-oriented 
entrepreneurial identity, so his appointment of 
professional managers can be interpreted as a substitute
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for, rather than a conversion to, decision-rational 
professionalism.
The weakness of using archetypes to explore these 
developments in knowing is that they are oversimplistic. 
It makes more sense to appraise the evolution of complex 
identities via their underlying dimensions such as those 
identified in chapter 2, which have aided discrimination 
between two empirical cases here. We should also be able 
to distinguish the evolution of espoused theories from 
theories in use, and might anticipate contextual aspects 
of identities, such as continuity in the internal affairs 
of the firm allied to change-orientation in the external 
(competitive) domain. This appears true of Dean over 
quite long periods. Hence a richer and more subtle 
picture of an evolving identity can be mapped.
The metaphoric approach also allows the evolution of 
identity to be mapped. Such analysis has the potential to 
highlight revealing, and also quite subtle changes in 
outlook especially if used in a clinical, interactive 
context. Under these circumstances a wider range of 
perhaps quite ephemeral images may be detected. Repertory 
grid and other idea-associative methodologies can be 
applied to formalise and facilitate analyses and to 
explicate the underlying sense of a metaphoric role 
construct.
Identities informed by metaphoric thinking provide 
implicit cues for (and legitimation of) specific actions 
by the knower. These actions will tend in turn to 
reinforce the images and constructs with which they are
267
consistent. Hence we should not expect influential images 
to change readily, indeed, the evidence presented in 
Figures 6.3 and 6.4 is that they are rather persistent. 
However, it is possible that when change occurs it is 
abrupt, in the fashion of a gestalt shift. A metaphor 
based approach will be all the more potent if it can be 
shown to highlight linkages between the evolving role 
identity and patterns of action over time.
6.3.3 Insights from paradoxical dualisms 
Broadly similar comments apply to the mapping of 
paradoxical dualisms as role identities. Again, the 
potential exists to highlight changes in the repertoire 
of an executive's constructs over time. That said, it is 
hypothesized that many executives manifest continuity in 
their constructs. White for example never truly outgrew 
the growth :: control paradox. Given his bias towards 
control-seeking, this effectively stymied Wittenshaw's 
growth prospects.
To the extent that construct changes occur, they 
take several forms (i) inclusions and deletions of 
particular constructs from the identity set (ii) 
increasing (declining) salience of particular constructs 
(iii) subtle reinterpretation of the form of a particular 
opposition and (iv) a 'flip-flop' in the posture of the 
knower with respect to a particular dualism. A few 
instances will suffice as reminders.
As far as can be ascertained, White introduced only 
a handful of new constructs during the period studied.
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Arguably, some increased in salience, for example, his 
growing awareness of the need to base action on analysis 
rather than intuition, and of the need to invest to grow. 
Sometimes the form of the dualism shifted, as discussed 
in chapter 4, such as the shift from invest: yes :: no, 
to invest: now :: later.
Most of White's mental shifts, however, were 'flip- 
flops', consistent with OR thinking. For example, he 
shifted from being tolerant of conservative colleagues to 
being keen to change the collective mentality. Later he 
appeared to shift his preference markedly from 
manufacturing to merchanting. Notwithstanding the 
problems of conducting a true longitudinal study, it is 
concluded that a majority of White's dualisms as 
presented in Figure 6.1 retained considerable salience 
over time, indicating comparatively little learning.
Many of Dean's dualistic constructs also appeared 
quite durable, though he did evolve new constructs (eg. 
over diversification), and he allowed others to atrophy 
(eg. pioneering). As regards 'flip-flops', Dean showed 
evidence of greater mental flexibility than White in 
modifying his posture, leading colleagues sometimes to 
regard him as inconsistent. For instance, over money he 
might be cavalier or generous in one situation, yet in 
another berate a colleague for wasting a trivial sum.
In summary, there seems little doubt that knowers' 
constructs do evolve. Whilst particular constructs may 
appear to change quite abruptly, the persistence of many 
others in the knower's cognitive set means that the set
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itself tends to evolve gradually. Observation of how an 
individual's construct set evolves is a valid exercise, 
though one would not expect the results necessarily to be 
neat and consistent, hence analysis must be done with 
care and sensitivity to context.
6.4 Experiential Knowing and Developing Strategic Wisdom 
Three themes are addressed here, firstly, the link 
between personal knowing and organizational strategy? 
secondly, the significance of transformational thinking; 
and finally, some implications for enhancing executive 
strategic knowing or wisdom.
6.4.1 Personal knowing and organizational strategy 
Winter (1987) argued that the knowledge and competences 
lodged in organizations are key strategic assets. Much of 
this knowledge resides in the personal knowing of senior 
executives. Indeed, a plausible definition of a competent 
strategic executive is that she has developed and can 
apply a broad repertoire of scripts. A valuable aspect of 
extending this repertoire is to experience a variety of 
contexts and new relationships and to have one's ideas 
challenged periodically. But how does this developing 
personal knowing relate to organizational strategy and 
can one be developed consciously in support of the other?
The emphasis on organization strategy could be taken 
to imply that it is partly or even wholly actor- 
independent. This is an understandable view, given recent 
theorising about strategy in bureaucratic organizations,
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whether business, government or military. The formal 
strategy paradigm culminating in work such as that by 
Hofer & Schendel (1978) elevates strategy content to the 
pinnacle of strategic management achievement, appearing 
to transcend the value of the strategists responsible for 
its development and implementation. This surely cannot 
be. In a small firm, certainly, the scripts and role 
identity of the chief executive are central to the 
evolving strategy process and its realised outcomes. The 
development of Wittenshaw and Pyrochem cannot be 
understood in isolation from the outlooks of their 
respective CEOs.
Yet despite the influence of the strategic knowing 
or wisdom of a CEO on organizational strategy, it remains 
largely tacit, personal property. Constructions such as 
scripts and role identities are personal and remain more 
or less idiosyncratic. Of course, key elements of this 
knowing enter the 'public domain' in and around the 
organization. Nonetheless, shared knowledge remains 
relatively fragmented and ill-diffused. Colleagues 
internalise what they can in order to interpret the 
particular actions required of them. Here the 
dramaturgical analogy is instructive.
Through the medium of the script a play presents a 
rich and contextually specific narrative in which the 
responses of the main characters (roles) to problematic 
challenges are central elements. The result on the night 
is an elusive product of the interpretive performances of 
the actors as they seek to make the script their own. As
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the audience we expect this? it is what we pay to see. 
That an executive makes an essentially personal 
interpretation of a script is therefore no surprise. Yet 
the dramaturgical metaphor also misleads insofar as it 
generally signifies a written, externalised script, 
whereas a personal script is patently neither written, 
nor highly specified, nor necessarily well planned and 
crafted. It is merely an unfolding improvisation whose 
enactment selects and raises the salience of some past 
experiences, encouraging hypotheses of plausible and 
acceptable future actions in a broadly familiar context. 
Its application elsewhere may in fact be problematic, in 
that it suggests stylised rules and principles which 
implicitly render some conduct unacceptable. For example, 
White set his face against investing in machinery and 
employing sales staff because such moves were 
inadmissible according to his script-in-use. Equally,
Dean would have difficulty applying White's scripts in 
Pyrochem or his own scripts in Wittenshaw.
By comparison with a dramatic script, Abelson's 
concept of script focused on events and acts, rather than 
roles. Here, using the concept of role identity, this 
shortcoming has been at least partially addressed. A 
construction of role identity is a persistent feature of 
personal knowing, locating an actor in the scene and 
combining his motives with implicit specifications for 
his active contribution: I am, therefore I behave.
Appreciating these analogies allows us to predict 
how individuals will improvise when facing future
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challenges. We may suppose that White will generally act 
to contain uncertainty and improve his perceived control. 
Despite his best efforts, the nature of his perceived 
role identity is such that he will continue to regard 
himself as at the mercy of his environment. So we should 
not be surprised if he remains risk averse, depending on 
actions he perceives as low risk because they have 
'worked' in the past. In contrast, Dean will continue to 
seek challenges and find ways to overcome them. No doubt 
he will make mistakes, but the flexibility inherent in 
his outlook suggests that he will find a way to resolve 
such dilemmas. As he does so, his tacit repertoire will 
continue to develop, adding to the argument for 
considering him an expert strategic manager.
In general, though personal knowing is not lost to 
the organization for as long as the knower is associated 
with it, such knowing becomes public only to a limited 
extent. In contrast, organization strategy is explicit, 
shared property: in a sense strategy can be regarded as 
the lowest common denominator of key actors' personal 
knowing. In a small firm the key actors are normally 
close, so colleagues should in theory have a good sense 
of the chief executive's personal scripts and role 
identity. Yet Dean's colleagues did not always appreciate 
the assumptions underpinning his knowing until they were 
clarified in the light of unfolding events. Furthermore, 
even in small firms personal knowing encodes interests 
which do not automatically coincide with the interests of 
the firm as an entity.
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6.4.2 Experience and transformational thinking 
Experiential knowing has been represented variously as 
evolving perceptions and enactments (Weick, 1982) of 
scripts, dualistic tensions and role identity.
The analysis of scripts highlighted the distinction 
between elaborative and mutative development. Elaboration 
appears to be the dominant mode of developing experience, 
analogous to Mintzberg's (1978) evolutionary 
organizational change. The continuing elaboration of a 
basic script indicates that the executive is taking 
account of changing circumstances in the 'out-there' 
world as she interacts with or enacts it.
Hamish Dean's frequent use of the learning metaphor
suggests a belief in proactive experimentation, seeking
bold (but not reckless) challenges. Reacting to
environmental stimuli is a legitimate way of gaining
experience, but it is preferable to find ways that do not
make the interaction costly when failures occur. Dean
interpreted this as the need for his thinking to be
highly contingent, in his terms, identifying options
within options, or escape routes:
'So many theoretical strategies on paper look superb, 
but in fact they are often dependent on twenty 
different conditions being met. Maybe there is a high 
likelihood of all twenty being met ...but it needs 
only one to go wrong and it can take the bottom out 
of your whole proposal.'
Thus he takes for granted the need for flexible, adaptive
behaviour, adjusting his cumulative knowing in the light
of experience. Consistent with his flexible
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experimentalism, he maintains slack, redeployable 
resources, as for instance, keeping factory space unused 
even though it adds cost that colleagues would prefer to 
avoid.
But we should not overlook Dean's capacity to 
anticipate problems and rehearse solutions, in effect, to 
construct de facto crisis stimuli to which he believes he 
must respond. Pyrochem's lack of sales representation was 
construed as a mini-crisis which justified spending 
substantial amounts on high quality brochures? his 
inability to control the quality of subcontractors' work 
led him ultimately to introduce a specifiers' manual and 
a system of certification. Having construed a problematic 
issue as a threat prompts a creative response which often 
converts the threat to an opportunity. He then acts 
incisively and proactively to realise a plausible new 
scenario or alternatively to vacate a losing position.
In his book 'Strategies for Change' J.B. Quinn
(1980) pointed to the significance of 'precipitating
events' He noted:
'No organization - no matter how brilliant, rational, 
or imaginative - could possibly foresee the timing, 
severity, or even the nature of all such 
precipitating events. In this sense, they were truly 
unknowable' (1980, 20).
Dean might have written this, which is arguably why he
does not spend inordinate time formally planning his
business. Instead, he copes with uncertainty by creating
his own 'precipitating events', constructing crises which
flexible responses generally enable him to conquer. In so
doing, it is argued, he envisions solutions to problems
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other people either do not recognise or are prepared to 
tolerate. We can portray this in Figure 6.6. in which 
Dean expends a good deal of mental energy roaming the 
upper left quadrant. Having located problems and threats,
he finds ways to translate them to the lower right 
quadrant. A more typical behaviour, and one which 
characterises Bill White for much of his time, is 
operating in the lower left quadrant where he is obliged 
to seek solutions to problems imposed upon him.
The significance of Dean's proactive approach is 
that, paradoxically, he actually increases his control of 
situations. The process is dynamic? like a cyclist or 
skier he relies on his ability to shift 'strategic 
balance' at short notice. Such 'anticipatory problem 
solving' is what Ackoff (1970) rightly called planning. 













outlook, provided that the planner takes steps to solve 
the perceived problem promptly and imaginatively.
A good deal has been written about the challenge of 
coping with organizational ambiguity and achieving 
positive change. Executives like Dean appear to envision 
and revise their strategic constructs over time, 
affirming the experiential basis of their knowing.
Torbert (1987) posited four development stages in this 
process, diplomat (apprentice), technician, achiever, and 
strategist. The second pair are of interest here. The 
achiever, according to Torbert, is proactive, responsible 
and goal oriented, and adjusts behaviour positively to 
feedback. The strategist level, said to be reached by 
less than one in five is more flexible and less goal 
oriented than the achiever. The strategist accepts 
contextual relativism, manifests complex and often 
paradoxical thought processes and has the capacity for 
transformational thinking. Logic and judgement are allied 
to intuition, creativity and reflectiveness (Agor, 1986; 
McCaskey, 1982, 1988; Schon, 1983). In general 
strategists will appreciate the merits of dialectical 
enquiry and devil's advocacy to explore and understand 
issues (Mason, 1969; Mason and Mitroff, 1981). Though 
they have a positive outlook, they are tolerant of 
frustration and acknowledge the possibility of failure.
Dean is certainly an achiever, arguably a 
strategist. White appears to be a mix of technician and 
achiever. Dean acknowledges the process of continuing to 
master his craft, a concern he articulated clearly and
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frequently. Instinctively he has learned by doing,
behaving with an insatiable curiosity, internalising and
later reflecting on his experiences. Perhaps this is a
common quality among effective entrepreneurs. In any
event, Dean's multifaceted and flexible thinking, his
ability to cope constructively with ambiguity and paradox
arguably do not explain his growing expertise, but are
emerging consequences of it. To quote Torbert:
'...paradoxes .... cannot be resolved solely through 
creative turns of the mind: they and their resolution 
must be lived'.
Dean directed his skills to business since he felt 
he had an aptitude and because the avenue was open to 
him. Equally, his challenge-seeking and envisioning 
capability might have made him a formidable scientist.
The role of innovative analogical thinking in 
experimental science has been much discussed (Bohm &
Peat, 1987; Leatherdale, 1974; Schon, 1963b). Arguably, 
it is Dean's ability to go beyond puzzle solving 
behaviour (Kuhn, 1970) that distinguishes him.
Innovative, non-linear mental processes have been 
called lateral thinking, concept displacement, 
paradoxical, contradictory or Janusian thinking (De Bono, 
1970; Cameron & Quinn, 1988; Koestler, 1964; Quinn, 1988; 
Westenholz, 1993). After the event, such mental shifts 
may seem rather obvious. Yet the ability to reconceive a 
pattern is relatively uncommon for two reasons. In 
conception the idea or assumption which was subsidiary 
becomes (or has the potential to be) primary and 
therefore strategic. In implementation it requires a
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bold, determined, but flexible approach, coupled with 
continuing tolerance of risk and ambiguity if the idea is 
to progress to a satisfactory conclusion.
Dean's capacity for mental gymnastics appeared to 
underpin various script changes. Sometimes his mental 
inversions have been quite tactical, in other cases 
envisioning has effected a transformation in his 
thinking, evolving a distinct new script, a process 
likened earlier to biological mutation. Such innovative 
thinking is consistent with various role metaphors that 
were imputed to him. There is Dean the challenge seeker, 
the pioneer of uncharted territory, the speculator and 
the forecaster/prophet. There is also Dean the student, 
with an enquiring, childlike enthusiasm for establishing 
how the world works.
Cameron & Quinn (1988) cited several studies
purporting to show that paradoxical thinking was central
to effective performance (1988, 10-11). Westenholz (1993)
linked paradoxical thinking to the 'reframing' of
situations in organizational sense-making. For Ford &
Backoff (1988) paradoxes create inherent tensions in
organization life which:
'may produce gradual or sudden and abrupt 
translative...or transformative shifts.'
But in their view it is not possible to:
'assure progressive transformations merely through 
"health enhancing" translative changes'.
If the latter are considered akin to script elaboration,
this study corroborates this conclusion.
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Gaining insight via paradoxical thinking is 
significant in the strategic domain, for making 
apparently sensible choices may still lead to 
organizational failure in the absence of insight and luck 
(1988, 113). Conversely, as Meyer & Zucker (1989) noted, 
even incompetently managed organizations sometimes 
survive for long periods, so the link between innovative 
thinking and firm performance has to be treated 
cautiously.
Ford & Backoff pointed out that formalised logical 
thinking establishes polarities and mutually exclusive 
categories which stimulate OR rather than AND thinking, 
hence the exhortations by others to 'chart dilemmas'
(Hampden-Turner, 1990) and to 'go beyond rational 
management' (Quinn, 1988). Logic, of course, remains 
valuable in defining the poles which the AND thinker 
seeks to encompass, synchronically or diachronically. The 
former is truly creative, whilst the latter is consistent 
with the use of flexible, contingent mental heuristics 
cast as evolving scripts and role identities.
The management of small firms has to contain and 
resolve seemingly contradictory and opposing goals and 
priorities, particularly those arising from lack of 
resources or access to opportunities. This process 
creates inevitable dilemmas, some of which are ignored or 
rationalised away. Others persist and are accommodated 
pragmatically. Bill White rationalised his investment 
dilemma (whether or not to invest to grow the business) 
by recasting the dilemma as invest: now later, opening
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up the option of deferring investment indefinitely. 
Dilemma resolution which involves adopting a polar 
position implies rejecting the opposing position. Bill 
White typically construes opposites as exclusive choices, 
one of which therefore has to be rejected if progress is 
to be made. Thus he construed retaining control meaning 
that he had to reject rapid growth, since the latter 
would increase outside interference in his firm.
Some of White's dilemmas are logical oppositions: 
growth does carry increased risks; limited resources do 
make it hard to keep existing customers happy and 
prospect new ones. The resolution of such dilemmas is 
genuinely problematic. Some however, are questionable in 
terms of externally applied logic? is it inevitable that 
non-material and financial rewards are mutually 
exclusive? Some of White's other dilemmas highlighted 
oppositions between espoused and action-informed 
positions, for example, the unresolved dilemma between 
intuitive behaviour and the analytic, systematic 
behaviour he imputed to 'professional' managers.
A lesson for White is that his construed dilemmas 
need scrutiny and challenge from outside thinking. He 
needs encouragement to reformulate oppositions in more 
constructive terms. In particular he needs to shift at 
least partially from OR to AND thinking.
In contrast Dean is clearly a paradoxical AND 
thinker. Though his dilemmas appear to the outsider to be 
as weighty and durable as White's, he retains an ability 
to envision seemingly opposed ideas and concepts without
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discomfort, applying whichever seems more appropriate in 
context. For Dean this Janusian thinking is clearly a 
source of strength. Moreover, his willingness to envision 
new options allied to his enthusiasm for their 
implementation means that his repertoire of experiences 
has accelerated way beyond that of White.
A criticism noted already is that colleagues see him 
as inconsistent and whimsical: behaving intuitively and 
boldly in one arena, whilst being evaluative and cautious 
in another? sometimes looking at a situation as a team 
player, sometimes as a solo performer. True, there have 
been apparent movements in his posture as he accepted the 
need to be somewhat more 'professional', valuing 
efficiency and productivity as well as flexibility and 
expediency. In fact he resolved this dilemma by a range- 
of-convenience trick: by delegating he made efficiency 
someone else's problem.
Finally here, one notes that Dean is exceedingly 
articulate. Whilst this quality alone will not guarantee 
managerial effectiveness, it is a necessary component.
For although the mental skills to envision, construe and 
categorise are key aspects of intellectual capability, 
they are of little significance if linguistic capability 
is inadequate to the task of galvanising a wider audience 
with enthusiasm for novel ideas, or as Pettigrew (1979) 
said:
'..to make words walk...is one of the unexplored
characteristics of successful entrepreneurs'.
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6.4.3 Implications for enhancing strategic wisdom 
What can be said about enhancing personal strategic 
knowing or wisdom in a reasonably systematic way? Dean 
may be a role model of a learning manager, but that does 
not make him easy to emulate. Indeed, executives with the 
potential to achieve strategist status in Torbert's terms 
are likely to be too busy learning by doing to feel able 
to devote time to learning in a more formal context, such 
as at a business school. Indeed, many schools have little 
to offer someone like Dean, since they provide few real 
opportunities for either thinking creatively or learning 
experientially - after the fashion of Revans (1979).
Nonetheless, reflecting on past or present 
experiences can be an experience in its own right, 
ideally to be shared (Easterby-Smith & Davies, 1983; Kolb 
et. al., 1986). Dean no doubt shared formative work 
experiences with mentors in the Clan, and in the 
traumatic period after his 1981 excommunication he 
acknowledged that his wife was a major source of advice 
and support, as was Paul Quinn, the former architect. 
Subsequently a few respected outside 'mentors' are also 
known to have influenced his thinking.
There would appear to be a role as yet largely 
unexplored for external agencies such as business schools 
to act as mentors to developing executives.
Realistically, what such agencies ought to offer is the 
opportunity for creative, out-of-context thinking and 
various forms of prompted self-reflection. The latter 
might take the form of discussion with or without formal
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supporting techniques such as repertory grid (Reger,
1990? Ryle, 1975), cognitive mapping (Eden et. al., 1979) 
or expert systems (Hertz, 1988).
In this research the investigator was in a position 
to prompt executives to reflect on what they know. With 
few exceptions all those participating appeared to find 
the experience unusual and challenging. Of more than two 
dozen people interviewed at length, only one, whose 
business subsequently folded, declined a second meeting. 
Because interviews were non-directive and exploratory, 
respondents seemed to find the experience unthreatening, 
even therapeutic. Whilst these brief encounters are 
unlikely to have made them more effective managers, they 
did surface aspects of their otherwise tacit sensemaking, 
which may subsequently have been thought provoking for 
them.
Can such interactions systematically enhance
expertise development? Jones (1987) described the
approach she sought to implement as:
'...a research relationship in which the persons 
concerned articulate their image of their worlds not 
primarily to please (or deflect) me but because doing 
so is part of a process of reflection and analysis 
about their issue which is of relevance and use to 
themselves.'
Schein (1987) distinguished clinical and ethnographic 
interventions. The clinican is involved because she is 
asked - and presumably paid - to be. Access may be harder 
for the ethnographer to negotiate, but having done so she 
is under less pressure to perform, that is, to be 
prescriptively useful. Indeed, the ethnographer will have
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scope for impartial, exploratory discussion that may win 
the trust of respondents who would be suspicious in 
different circumstances. In short, the interaction may be 
more productive between voluntary participants than in 
the asymmetry of a client-consultant relationship.
Thoughtful and enthusiastic people like Jones may 
gain access to the likes of Dean and White because the 
latter are curious. If they have few expectations of such 
encounters they may actually gain more. It is possible 
also that a subject gains most from the initial 
interaction: in the experience of this writer subsequent 
discussions ran the risk of being perceived to generate 
less novelty than the first had done. Thus interventions 
may benefit from being comparatively self-contained, with 
all participants accepting a limited scope to and 
expectations of the process. Absent either of these 
options, colleagues in a firm may benefit by engaging in 
non-routine interactions like the mentoring process 
commonly attributed to Japanese firms. A useful 
alternative for entrepreneurs is to develop contacts 
among peers in the business community, as Dean has done.
Although a slightly fanciful phrase, the concept of 
strategic wisdom appealed to the writer from an early 
stage of the research. The collection by Sternberg (1990) 
reinforced the view that wisdom is an appropriate label 
for the phenomena studied, particularly given the section 
in his text on 'psychodevelopmental conceptions of 
wisdom' including themes of 'Wisdom and reflective 
judgement: knowing in the face of uncertainty' (Kitchener
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& Brenner) and 'Wisdom: the art of problem finding' 
(Arlin). For these authors the development of (strategic) 
knowing or expertise is patently about the development of 
wisdom. Unfortunately, as Sternberg noted in his 
introduction, 'Wisdom is about as elusive as 
psychological constructs get'.
Although isolated exceptions are found, Kitchener &
Brenner's research concluded that:
'reasoning characterised by an awareness of the 
uncertainty of knowing and an ability to make 
reasoned judgements despite this uncertainty is 
clearly not associated with youth or young adulthood' 
(1990, 223)
Thus ageing and experiencing are necessary, if not 
sufficient conditions for the development of wisdom to 
cope with:
'the difficult, wicked-decision problems of adult 
life' (1990, 226).
They noted also that individuals with sophisticated
knowing abilities develop and defend good judgements
which:
'reflect a recognition of the limits of personal 
knowledge, an acknowledgement of the general 
uncertainty that characterises human knowing, and a 
humility about one's own judgements in the face of 
such limitations' (1990, 226).
Above all, wisdom is required when facing
unstructured strategic problems, such as those
encountered by senior executives. Whilst it may be
largely of semantic interest to conjecture on the
congruence of wisdom and expertise, Day & Lord (1992)
observed that:
'the knowledge of novices is organized around 
explicit information provided in stimulus materials,
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whereas experts' knowledge is organized around 
implicit principles and abstractions, which are used 
to guide responses (sic)'
In a similar vein, Schon (1983, chapter 8) posited the:
'testing of (an executive's) intuitive understanding 
of experienced phenomena... in the form of a 
reflective conversation with the situation',
a process in which she:
'draws on (accumulated) organizational knowledge, 
adapting it to some present instance' (1983, 241-2)
and which appears similar in concept to Torbert's (1987)
'action inquiry'. Dean might riposte that in small,
growing firms the repository of organizational knowledge
is inadequate, or - as exemplified in his 'Clan-crisis' -
readily dissipated. In any event, it points to the need
to develop and exploit a network of contacts as well as
drawing on collective knowing in the firm.
Arlin (1990), echoing Schon (1983), emphasised the
problem-finding aspect of wisdom, a quality attributed in
this study to Hamish Dean. She asserted that this is a
major component of wisdom. Nonetheless,
'Knowing what one does not know can be represented by 
the questions one asks, the doubts one has, and the 
ambiguities one tolerates',
implying that wisdom is manifest also as an insatiable
curiosity to probe beneath the 'surface structures of a
domain'. In drawing a close parallel between wisdom and
problem finding, Arlin defined several key features:
* A sense of when a problem is important, as opposed
merely to being interesting
* A sense of complementarity, meaning an ability to
detect patterns of similarity and conceptual 
conflict between analogous situations
* A feeling for symmetry, detecting subtle signs of
imbalance that go unnoticed by the casual observer
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* Receptivity to new information, and the ability to 
think creatively and imaginatively, thereby changing 
one's understanding of a situation
* Pushing acknowledged norms and standards of 
behaviour or performance beyond presently accepted 
limits
* Envisioning as part of the approach to address ill- 
defined problems.
Though these qualities may not be amenable to being 
learned in a conventional sense, they imply a stylistic 
direction in which to attempt to enhance personal 
expertise. Schon's advice, though plausible, is hardly 
operationalised, other than pointing to the 
responsibility of senior executives to help educate 
subordinates. More specifically, he emphasised their duty 
to set the context in which subordinates are required to 
articulate their knowing and offer it for scrutiny by 
wiser counsel. Others, too, have underlined the 
importance of social and dialectical processes in the 
development of wisdom. Kolb (1983) and Feldman (1986) for 
example, argued for a supportive, but stimulating 
organizational environment that requires, monitors, 
critiques and rewards attempts to learn 'on the job', 
especially when abstract qualities of envisioning and 
planning are involved.
Kolb posited four stages in problem management of 
which executives should be aware and be proactive 
towards. He associated each with a specific executive 
role, namely the leader (problem selection), detective 
(problem definition), inventor (solution definition) and 
co-ordinator (solution implementation). Quinn (1988) 
offered a somewhat more extensive, but otherwise similar 
typology of so-called 'master-managerial' roles.
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All these sources would presumably subscribe to 
Schon's (1983, 283) observation that:
'a theory of education for reflection-in-action ...
would take us well beyond the scope of this (text)'.
Still, recent empirical work by McCall, Lombardo and 
Morrison (1988) offered guidelines on such a theory. They 
noted the significance of timely experience (for example, 
holding responsible positions early in one's career), the 
value of having to cope with pressure and adversity, and 
of continuing to seek challenging and opportunity-laden 
situations throughout one's career. This appears to sum 
up Hamish Dean's attitude very neatly.
There is an obvious link here with a broadly stated 
concept of emerging leadership skills. With some notable 
exceptions (eg. Barnard, 1938; Bennis & Nanus, 1985; 
Pettigrew, 1992; Vroom & Yetton, 1973), the writer has 
found the concepts of leadership presented in the 
literature rather unhelpful, often lacking analytic 
leverage or disappointingly prescriptive and value laden 
in tone. Bennis (1983), however, provided a short 
descriptive tour de force of economy and insight into the 
range of skills a leader needs. Whittington (1993) also 
presented a balanced account of what he called strategic 
leadership, drawing on Czarniawska-Joerges & Wolff (1991) 
to make the point that leaders are conventionally 
perceived differently from managers and entrepreneurs, 
being portrayed as inspirational, charismatic, performers 
with strong convictions and ideologies.
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The evidence of this study is that the knowing of an 
effective executive - whether we construe it in terms of 
leadership skills or otherwise - is multi-faceted and not 
amenable to simplistic explanation. Rather, the argument 
is advanced that without making prior value laden 
assumptions or assertions about quality of performance, 
executive knowing can usefully be explored by the knower 
and the researcher (in the broad sense of personal 
counsellor or organizational developer). Using a variety 
of relatively non-technical approaches, these exploratory 
processes can assist the self-awareness of the knower by 
exposing significant aspects of what is tacitly known. 
When the researcher collaborates with the knower to this 
end, he enables the executive as well as others to 
discuss, review and learn as part of a continuing, 
reflective process. Whilst arguably still at an early 
stage of theoretical understanding, this kind of activity 
is held to be a valid and potentially valuable 
contribution to the development of managerial wisdom and 
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Preamble. I am a lecturer in management and business 
studies. I am currently investigating how effective 
managers tackle the successful development of their firms 
over time.
My special interest is in proprietors who are involved in 
small, but growing firms. I'd like to know how the firm 
has evolved and changed since its formation? something of 
how and why its managers have acted as they have ? and how 
they see themselves managing in the future.
My primary purpose is to understand as much as I can 
about what makes for effective and successful management 
in these circumstances, so that ultimately I can 
generalise my findings into advice for other managers 
embarking on similar kinds of venture.
To do this I would like in confidence to ask you a number 
of questions about your firm, your perceptions about your 
style of management, and the actions you deem to be 
important in developing the firm. I would like to tape 
record the discussion so that I make sure I do not miss 
important points.
I will use the tape for analysis afterwards, but the 
detail on it will remain strictly confidential and will 
neither be made public, nor discussed with other members 
of the firm. The first stage of my analysis will be to 
transcribe the tape into a typed document, a copy of 
which I will send you if you wish.
I am undertaking this enquiry because I believe much can 
be learned about effective management styles and skills 
by talking with effective managers, and this ultimately 
will be for the benefit of others. There is no financial 
reward involved for me in so doing.
1. When and how did the firm come into being?
2. What was your own role (if any) in this? How and why 
did you get involved when you did?
3. Can you clarify the part played by colleagues and/or 
other key players in the formation and development 
of the firm?
4. Please pin-point and describe the most important 
(milestone) events in the development of the firm 
upto the present time.
5. What is your present role and position in the firm?
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6. Can you tell me a little about your work experience 
and education prior to the events you have 
described.
7. To what extent has this experience related to the 
contribution you have made and are making to the 
development of the firm? Some illustrations here 
would help.
8. Can you now explain in some detail what the firm 
currently does?
9. What do you see as the firm's main strengths and 
skills? What are your reasons for saying this?
10. Please tell me about the business environment in 
which the firm operates.
(Probe gently for views about competition, rate of 
change, hostility, complexity etc.)
11. What changes do you expect in your business 
environment in the foreseeable future?
12. At the present time do you see opportunities in the
business environment? If so, what are they, and how
is the firm responding to them?
13. Do you see threats in the business environment? If
so, what are they, and (how) is the firm responding 
to these?
14. To what degree does your firm offer unique or 
differentiated products or services in relation to 
other suppliers, and/or appeal to special customer 
groups?
15. In broad terms, why do you feel the firm has been 
successful so far?
16. In what ways are you defining success here? Do you 
monitor specific performance factors regularly, and 
if so, what are they?
17. To what extent do you think the success of the firm 
is the deliberate and conscious result of decisions 
and actions taken by the firm's managers?
(Seek illustrations).
18. Turning to the internal organization of the firm, 
please comment on how you operate, for example, the 
division of responsibilities, number of staff, 
processes of reaching decisions etc.
19. What do you think it is that motivates you to 
continue to develop the firm? Are your colleagues 
motivated by the same things?
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20. Continuing in a reflective mode, can you explain 
your style and philosophy of managing the firm. More 
specifically, what kind of "levers” can you/do you 
pull in order to make things happen, not only today 
or tomorrow, but in the longer term too?
(Without overt prompting, attempt to explore 
attitudes to planning, setting objectives, 
adaptiveness, risk taking, desire for change, use of 
power/authority, attempts to promote shared beliefs 
and views about the way to compete and behave etc.)
21. Can you give me some (more) examples of what you 
mean here?
22. What about your colleagues? Are their outlooks 
similar to yours in these respects? Does this mean 
you are able to work effectively together in 
practice?
23. In organizing your time, what do you regard as your
major ongoing priorities? Do you find it possible
and/or proper to delegate any of these?
(Without overt prompting, attempt to explore whether 
these are externally or internally oriented, eg. 
building external networks of contacts versus 
improving internal procedures etc.)
24. Looking ahead, do you expect any major changes to 
the position of the firm in relation to its markets 
and the business environment? Specifics would be 
helpful.
25. Do you expect any changes in your style of managing
in the future? Specifics would be helpful.
(End of formal questioning)
A final question in relation to my enquiry, please tell
me which (if any) of the following you would agree to my
doing:
* A follow-up interview with you after I have 
considered your comments today
* Similar interviews with some of your colleagues
* Spending time in the firm as an unobtrusive observer 
watching how things are done
* Examining documents and records on a confidential 
basis for the purpose of clarifying details of the 
firm's progress.
* Organising a joint discussion on topics of mutual 
interest to you and other colleagues using material 
that I can provide.
